Southern Ry. Co. v. Smoak
| Decision Date | 17 December 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 18143,18143 |
| Citation | 133 S.E.2d 806,243 S.C. 331 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant, v. Leo SMOAK, Mrs. Lillie Smoak and W. H. Cato, Respondents. |
F. Dean Rainey, Greenville, Henderson, Salley & Cushman, Aiken, for appellant.
Toole & Toole, Henry Busbee, Aiken, for respondents.
This appeal involves a determination of the validity of the claim of the plaintiff Southern Railway Company to fee simple title to a strip of land forty feet wide and more than two miles in length, situate at or near Langley, in Aiken County, South Carolina, which had been used by the plaintiff for the operation of an industrial spur track from approximately 1901 to 1954. In 1954, the plaintiff discontinued the operation of its spur track and removed its property and fixtures from the land in question. Upon the assertion by the defendants, as owners of contiguous and overlapping lands, of a claim that title to the strip of land reverted to them upon the discontinuance of its use for the operation of an industrial spur track, the plaintiff brought this action for declaratory judgment to establish its claim of fee simple title to the property. All issues were submitted to the circuit judge for determination upon an agreed statement of facts, in which it was conceded that the validity of the claim of title of the plaintiff turns upon the proper construction to be placed upon the deeds by which it acquired possession of the property in 1901. The circuit judge held that the deeds in question did not convey to the plaintiff a fee simple title to the land in question and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff has appealed from this decision.
In 1901, Langley Manufacturing Company owned a large tract of land in Aiken County, South Carolina, and conveyed the strip of land in question to Immaculate Kaolin Company and Peerless Clay Company, both corporations, to enable the grantees to have constructed an industrial spur track across the Langley property to their kaolin mines which were located some distance from the main line of the plaintiff Southern Railway. The foregoing grantees immediately conveyed the strip of land to the Southern Railway, a corporation, which constructed a spur track thereon and operated it until 1954 when it was discontinued and the rails removed. Our sole inquiry is to determine whether, under the foregoing deeds, the Southern Railway was conveyed a fee simple absolute title to the forty foot strip of land described therein. The terms, conditions and estates granted in both deeds were identical in all material respects, and, therefore, we need only set forth the pertinent provisions of the deed to plaintiff.
The granting clause in the deed in question is as follows:
'Witnesseth: That the parties of the first part for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar to them in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained, sold and released, and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell and release unto the Railway Company * * *.'
The habendum clause in the said deed is as follows:
'To have and to hold the said premises unto The Railway Company, its successors and assigns, as a right of way for use for railroad purposes so long as it or they may require the said right of way for the operation, maintenance and repair of said industrial spur track.
'Upon condition, however, that in the event that Railroad Company should abandon the said industrial spur track and in evidence thereof should discontinue the operation of the same and remove its property and fixtures therefrom and from the way appurtenant thereto, then and in such event the said parcel of land hereby conveyed shall revert to the parties of the first part, their successors and assigns.'
It is stipulated that the plaintiff was, and is, 'a corporation aggregate, incorporated in perpetuity.' The foregoing granting clause conveyed the property to the plaintiff, a corporation aggregate, without words of succession. The habendum clause, however, limits the estate granted to the plaintiff, its successors and assigns, to the use of the lands for railroad purposes so long as required for the operation of an industrial spur track, with reversionary provisions in the event of the discontinuance of the use of the land for such purpose.
The plaintiff takes the position that the granting clause conveyed to it a fee simple absolute title to the lands, and that the title...
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Bennett v. Investors Title Ins. Co.
...the intention of the grantor must be ascertained and effectuated if no settled rule of law is contravened." S. Ry. Co. v. Smoak, 243 S.C. 331, 336, 133 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1963); Wayburn v. Smith, 270 S.C. 38, 41, 239 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1977); Estate of Sherman ex rel. Maddock v. Estate of Sherm......
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Bennett v. Investors Title Ins. Co., 4153.
...the intention of the grantor must be ascertained and effectuated if no settled rule of law is contravened." S. Ry. Co. v. Smoak, 243 S.C. 331, 336, 133 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1963); Wayburn v. Smith, 270 S.C. 38, 41, 239 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1977); Estate of Sherman, 359 S.C. at 413, 597 S.E.2d at 85......
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Kelly v. McCombs, Appellate Case No. 2016-002176
...of the grantor must be ascertained and effectuated if no settled rule of law is contravened." (quoting S. Ry. Co. v. Smoak, 243 S.C. 331, 336, 133 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1963))); id. at 571, 635 S.E.2d at 665 ("Moreover, in ascertaining such intention the deed must be construed as a whole, and ef......
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Kelly v. McCombs
... ... and effectuated if no settled rule of law is ... contravened." (quoting S. Ry. Co. v. Smoak, 243 ... S.C. 331, 336, 133 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1963))); id. at ... 571, 635 S.E.2d at 665 ("Moreover, in ascertaining such ... ...