Southern Ry. Co v. Heymann

• Decision Date: 14 August 1903
• Citation: 118 Ga. 616,45 S.E. 491
• Parties: SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. HEYMANN.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

45 S.E. 491

118 Ga. 616

SOUTHERN RY. CO.

v.HEYMANN.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Aug. 14, 1903.

CARRIERS—SHIPMENT OF LIQUOR—SEIZURE BY AUTHORITIES—LIABILITIES.

1. Intoxicating liquors which have been shipped from Augusta, Ga., to persons in Charleston, S. C., and which have reached Charleston, and been placed in a freight warehouse of the railroad company in that city, to await the call of the consignees, have "arrived" in the state of South Carolina, within the meaning of Act Cong. Aug. 8, 1890, c. 728, 26 Stat. 313 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3177], known as the "Wilson Act, " which provides that "all fermented, distilled, or intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into any state or territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage therein, shall, upon arrival in such state or territory, be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such state or territory, enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such state or territory."

2. A railroad company is not liable for loss of property intrusted to it for shipment, occasioned by seizure of the property by an officer of the law under a prima facie valid authority.

v 2. See Carriers, vol. 9, Cent. Dig. §§ 364, 365.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from Superior Court, Richmond County; E. L. Brinson, Judge.

Action by Paul Heymann against the Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.

Jos. B. & Bryan Cumming and G. M. Beas-ley, for plaintiff in error.

Saml. H. Myers, for defendant in error.

CANDLER, J. Heymann, a wholesale liquor dealer in Augusta, made two shipments of whisky over the Southern Railway to persons in Charleston, S. C. Upon reaching Charleston, the whisky was placed in a warehouse of the railroad company, where it was shortly afterwards seized by constables, under what is known as the "Dispensary Law of South Carolina." That law provides that "the transportation, removal, or taking from the depot or other place, by consignee or other person, or the payment of freight or express or other charges * * * upon any spirituous or malt, vinous, fermented, brewed,

* * * or other liquors, or any compound or mixture thereof, * * * is prohibited"; that "all such liquors, except when bought of a state officer authorized to sell the same, * * * are declared to be contraband andagainst the morals, good health, and safety of the state"; and that all such liquors are "to he seized, wherever found, without a warrant, and turned over to the state commissioner." Heymann had guarantied delivery of the whisky to the consignees, and whs compelled to return to them the purchase price, which they had paid. He sued the railroad company, and obtained a verdict for the price of the whisky. The defendant made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and it excepted.

1. It is apparent that the decision of this case depends upon two questions: First, was the seizure of the whisky by the constables in Charleston a prima facie valid exercise of legal authority? and, second, if it was, did that fact excuse the railroad company from liability on account of the loss of the goods intrusted to it for shipment? In order to determine the first question, it becomes necessary to decide whether, at the time of the seizure, the interstate shipment of the goods had been completed; for if they were still in the course of interstate transportation, the seizure by the constable was not even prima facie legal, for the very law under which the seizure was made had, prior to such seizure, been declared by the Supreme Court of the United States to be unconstitutional in so far as it interfered with interstate commerce. Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 17 Sup. Ct. 265, 41 L. Ed. 632. It therefore follows that, if the shipment had not been completed at the time the goods were seized, the railroad company would have no right to defend on the ground that it submitted to the superior authority; granting that such a defense, if established, would relieve it from liability. In support of the contention that the interstate shipment had not ended, counsel for the defendant in error relies upon the case of Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 18 Sup. Ct. 664, 42 L. Ed. 1088. In that case the court held that an Iowa statute which prohibited any express or railway company from transporting or conveying intoxicating liquors between points or from one place to another within the state, without first having been furnished by the county auditor of the county to which the liquor was to be transported, or was consigned for transportation, a certificate that the person to whom the liquor was to be transported was authorized to sell such intoxicating liquors in such county, did not apply to a box of spirituous liquors shipped by rail from a point in Illinois to a citizen of Iowa at his residence in that state, while in transit from its point of shipment to its delivery to the consignee, without causing the Iowa law to be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; and that moving such goods in the station from the platform on which they were put on arrival to the freight warehouse is a part of the interstate commerce transportation. It is argued that, under the ruling in the Rhodes Case, an interstate shipment is not complete until the goods are delivered to the consignee; that not until such delivery can they be said to have "arrived, " within the meaning of Act Cong. Aug. 8, 1890, c. 728, 26 Stat. 313 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3177], commonly known as the "Wilson Act, " which provides that all intoxicating liquors "transported into any state or territory, or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage therein, shall, upon arrival in such state or territory, be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such state or territory, enacted In the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such state or territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise." If this contention be correct, then the judgment...