Southern Ry. Co. v. Simmons
Decision Date | 17 July 1919 |
Docket Number | 10257. |
Citation | 100 S.E. 5,24 Ga.App. 96 |
Parties | SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. SIMMONS. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
The petition set out a cause of action, and was not subject to general demurrer.
The suit was brought under the federal "Employer's Liability Act" (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), but not on account of any violation of the federal statutes for the protection of employés. Thus the doctrine of assumption of risk was available as a complete defense, since an employé assumes the ordinary risks and hazards of his occupation, and also those risks which are known to him, or which are plainly observable, even though due to the master's negligence and no presumption of negligence existed against the defendant.
The plaintiff was a section hand in the employ of the defendant and was injured while engaged in the work which he was employed to perform. The uncontradicted evidence shows that as to the acts of negligence charged, the defendant used all ordinary care for the plaintiff's safety, unless it be that the foreman was negligent in ordering him to remove the lever car at the time and place he did; and, even though the defendant was negligent in this respect, such negligence was known to the plaintiff, and was plainly observable. He therefore assumed the risk occasioned thereby, and cannot recover.
Error from Superior Court, Habersham County; J. B. Jones, Judge.
Action by Seaborn Simmons against the Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.
A petition, in a railroad employe's action under the federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S. C.A. §§ 51-59) for personal injuries while attempting to remove a lever car under the section foreman's direction, held to set out a cause of action as against general demurrer.
Seaborn Simmons brought an action against the Southern Railway Company for personal injuries, under the federal "Employer's Liability Act" of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat. 65, c. 149 [U. S. Comp. St. 1916, §§ 8657-8665]). The allegations of the petition are substantially as follows: That on February 11, 1918, while engaged by the defendant as a section hand, plaintiff was working for the defendant under the direction and control of Dalton Lovell, section foreman, who was in full charge of the section of the defendant's line of road known as the "Baldwin section;" that the plaintiff was directed by Lovell to assist the remainder of the crew in propelling a lever car belonging to the defendant, which was being used to transport the section crew and their foreman from Baldwin, Ga., to Cornelia, Ga., for the purpose of repairing the tracks of the defendant's line of railroad; that when the plaintiff was on the car helping to propel it, and had traveled about half the distance from Baldwin to Cornelia, one of the defendant's passenger trains came around a sharp curve, running at great speed, some 50 or 60 miles per hour, on the main track that the lever car was on; that when Lovell saw the train coming he ordered the section crew to remove the lever car from the track, which they undertook to do, but, on account of the nearness of the train and the great speed at which it was being run, they were unable to remove the car in time to prevent the train from striking it; that when the plaintiff saw that the train was going to strike the car, he undertook to get to a place of safety, but the train struck the car and knocked it from the track and against him, breaking his leg and causing other injuries described. It was further alleged that the defendant had a double track from Baldwin to Cornelia, and an agent at its station at Baldwin whose duty it was to know when trains were due to arrive, and that it was the duty of Lovell, the foreman, to ascertain from the station agent at Baldwin, before starting with the lever car, if any train was due to arrive, and which track it would be on. It is alleged that the defendant was negligent in the following respects: First, in running the lever car on the same track that it was using at the time for its passenger trains at this point; second, in ordering the plaintiff to remove the lever car from the track, as the train was so close to it; third, in not warning the plaintiff of the approach of the train, in running the train at such a great rate of speed, in not stopping the train, and in knocking the lever car from the track and against the plaintiff; fourth, in not using the other track for the lever car, as the defendant knew that the passenger train was on the track at that time and place, and that it was obviously dangerous to operate the lever car on that track. It is further alleged that the plaintiff was without fault, and in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, and could not have avoided the consequences of the defendant's negligence by the exercise of ordinary diligence after the negligence of the defendant became apparent; that he did not know of the approach of the train in time to prevent the injuries, and could not have found out about the acts of negligence by the exercise of ordinary care; that it was no part of his duty to look out for trains, but this was the duty of Lovell, the foreman.
Upon the trial of the case it was admitted that both the plaintiff and the defendant were engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the alleged injury. The plaintiff himself testified:
The plaintiff further testified:
Dalton Lovell, sworn in behalf of the plaintiff, testified:
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