Southern Ry. Co. v. Atlanta Sand & Supply Co.
| Decision Date | 11 August 1910 |
| Citation | 68 S.E. 807,135 Ga. 35 |
| Parties | SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. ATLANTA SAND & SUPPLY CO. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Storage rule No. 9, of the Railroad Commission of Georgia, adopted under authority of the act of 1905 (Acts 1905, p. 120), reads as follows: Held, that such rule applies where cars are intended to be used for intrastate shipments, and also where it is intended that cars are to be used for the shipment of freight from a point in this state to a destination in another state.
Prior to the repeal of the third section of the act of 1905 by Laws 1907, p. 78, § 11, a shipper filed with the Railroad Commission a complaint, setting forth a violation of rule 9 above quoted, and giving the details of such violation by a named railroad company. Thereupon the secretary of the Commission addressed a letter to the manager of the railroad company, who handled claims and demurrage complaints inclosing a copy of the complaint, and adding, "You will please show cause at the earliest practical time, if any you had [can?], why this claim should not be paid." The manager replied, acknowledging the receipt of the letter, and setting up that he had investigated the complaint, and that his investigation had developed that all orders for cars were promptly filled, that no discrimination was practiced in the distribution of cars, that shippers were furnished all cars that the railroad company had for loading, that he understood that suit had been brought on the claim, and that he did not suppose that it was worth while for him to undertake to answer the complaint in detail. Held, that this gave the Railroad Commission sufficient jurisdiction to authorize that body, on the next day after the receipt of the reply from the railroad manager, without further hearing, to pass an order declaring that the Commission was of the opinion "that sufficient cause had not been shown to relieve said railroad company of the penalty claimed," and thus to leave the complainant free to bring suit against the railroad company under the act of the Legislature and the rule of the Commission.
Under the third section of the act of August 23, 1905 (prior to its repeal, August 23, 1907 [Acts 1907, p. 78, § 11]), a decision of the Railroad Commission that a railroad company had not shown sufficient cause to relieve itself from liability did not conclude the company as to the question of such liability, upon a suit by the complaining shipper for the amount claimed by him against the company for a failure to furnish cars on written demand within four days, as provided by the rule of the Commission.
Storage rule No. 9, of the Railroad Commission of this state, quoted in the first headnote, properly construed in the light of the act of the Legislature authorizing its adoption, is a reasonable rule.
In the construction of a statute the courts will not generally attribute to the Legislature the intention to punish the failure to do an impossible thing, if another construction can legitimately be given to the act.
In a suit brought by a shipper against a railroad company for the amount specified in the rule of the Railroad Commission to be paid to him for failure by the company to furnish cars upon demand, if the carrier shows the existence of conditions for which it is not responsible, preventing the discharge of the duty, it will not be held liable.
(a) Questions of admissibility of certain evidence and of the sufficiency of certain particular defenses determined.
(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
The reasonableness of a rule of the Railroad Commission is a question of law for the court.
It is the duty of a railroad company to provide cars sufficient to transport goods offered in the usual and ordinary course of business, but it is not bound to anticipate and prepare for an exceptional and extraordinary press of business.
In an action against a railroad company for a penalty for failure to furnish cars for freight tendered, mere proof that the railroad did not have sufficient cars to comply with the demands made upon its services when cars were ordered from it, would be no defense, but if it had complied with its duty to furnish facilities for the transportation of goods, in the ordinary conduct of its business, it would be relevant to prove that at the time of the demand, the general movement of freight through the country traversed by the company's lines, was unusually large and more than was normally to have been expected, and that therefore it could not comply with the demand for cars.
Mere proof that there is a strike on a railroad is no defense to an action for failure to furnish cars on demand, since strikes may include only an insignificant number of employés or those engaged in some department in no substantial way interfering with the furnishing of cars or upon the happening of a strike, the company may without sufficient effort, fail to conduct its business, but if a strike is of such magnitude and character as to render the company unable, by the use of proper effort, to furnish cars on demand, it will be a good defense to a suit under Railroad Commission Storage Rule No. 9, prescribing a penalty for failure of a railroad company to furnish cars after written application therefor.
Where there is a press of business, perishable goods, or goods the inherent character of which is such as to render them peculiarly liable to serious injury from delay, have been considered of such exceptional character as to authorize a reasonable preference, as to expedition in hauling them, over freight not of such a character, in absence of express statutory regulations on the subject, but such rule cannot be invoked as a cloak for making illegal discriminations for one shipper or class of shippers as against another without real ground for its application.
Action by the Atlanta Sand & Supply Company against the Southern Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brought error to the Court of Civil Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court. Questions answered.
The Court of Appeals certified to the Supreme Court the following questions:
(1) Does storage rule 9 of the Railroad Commission of Georgia, adopted under authority of the act of 1905 (Acts 1905, p. 120), commonly known as the "Steed act," apply to cars intended to be used for the shipment of freight from a point in this state to a destination in another state; i. e., is the rule applicable to interstate transactions? Said rule is as follows:
(2) Where, prior to August 23, 1907 (the date on which section 3 of the Steed act was repealed [Laws 1907, p. 78, § 11]), the shipper filed with the Railroad Commission a complaint setting forth a violation of the said rule 9 referred to in the preceding question, and giving the details of the violation by a named railroad company, was it necessary for the Railroad Commission to cause formal notice to be served upon the railroad company, requiring it to show cause on a named day, before any lawful order could be passed by the Railroad Commission upon the complaint? Was a letter addressed by the secretary of the Railroad Commission to the manager of the railroad company, who handled freight claims and demurrage complaints, inclosing him a copy of the papers filed by the complainant, and adding, "You will please show cause at the earliest practical time, if any you had why this claim should not be paid," a sufficient notice under said act? If not, did a letter written by this manager to the secretary of the Railroad Commission, acknowledging receipt of the letter just referred to and setting up that he had investigated the complaint, and that his investigation had developed that all orders for cars were promptly filled; that no discrimination was practiced in the distribution of cars; that shippers were furnished all the cars which the railroad company had for loading; that he understood that the suit had been brought on the claim; and that he did not suppose that it was worth while for him to undertake to answer the complaint in detail--operate as a waiver of further notice? Did the foregoing correspondence give the Railroad Commission jurisdiction of the defendant, so as to authorize the Commission on the next day after the receipt of the letter last mentioned, without further hearing, to render a judgment "that...
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