Southern Ry. Co. v. Watson
| Decision Date | 05 June 1900 |
| Citation | 36 S.E. 209,110 Ga. 681 |
| Parties | SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. WATSON. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. While the section of the Code which denies to a carrier the right to limit his legal liability by a notice or entry on receipts given or tickets sold, but declares that he may do so by express contract, applies only to carriers of goods yet, under general law, a carrier of passengers cannot limit his legal liability for the consequences of his own negligence by such notice, or even by express contract.
2. A carrier of passengers, however, has the legal right to make reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of its business in the transportation of passengers. When a regulation is made affixing a limit to the time in which a ticket shall be good, and the time of the limit affords to the passenger ample opportunity to make his journey with safety and convenience to himself, such a regulation, if otherwise reasonable, becomes a part of the contract of carriage, and if, after the expiration of the limit of time specified on his ticket, the passenger tenders the same for his transportation, and for refusing to pay fare is ejected from the train in a decorous and proper manner by the conductor, such ejection affords no cause of action against the carrier.
3. A regulation so limiting the period of transportation, when it embraces a provision for refunding the purchase price of the ticket, or any unused part thereof, if not used within the limited period, is, as a matter of law, held to be reasonable.
Error from city court of Griffin; E. W. Hammond, Judge.
Action by I. M. Watson against the Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.
Charlton E. Battle, for plaintiff in error.
Robt. T. Daniel, W. H. Beck, and G. R. Hutchens, for defendant in error.
Watson instituted an action against the Southern Railway Company to recover damages for being wrongfully ejected from one of the cars of the defendant, while a passenger, on June 1, 1897. A trial of the case resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $200. Defendant made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and he excepted. It appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff lived at Tallapoosa, Ga., which was situated on one of the lines of the defendant's railroad. He desired to go to Columbus, Ga., to which point the defendant also maintained and operated a railroad. Plaintiff consulted the agent of the defendant in Tallapoosa, and informed him that he desired to be in Columbus by 10 o'clock on the next day, and was informed by the agent that there was no train running directly from Tallapoosa to Columbus, but that he could go to Atlanta from Tallapoosa on Friday night, and, leaving Atlanta on the early morning train, would arrive in Columbus by 9 o'clock. The agent also told plaintiff that he could purchase a through ticket from Tallapoosa to Columbus, for which there would be no reduction in the rate, but would save him the trouble of purchasing another ticket in Atlanta. The agent said nothing to the plaintiff as to the kind or character of the ticket which he would furnish him. After this conversation plaintiff purchased a through ticket from Tallapoosa to Columbus, and, leaving Tallapoosa at 8:30 o'clock on Friday night, he reached Atlanta about 11 o'clock the same night. The train for Columbus regularly left Atlanta about 5 o'clock in the morning. Plaintiff went to the station next morning at a very early hour, but did not take the train, because, having temporarily left the station, when he returned the train had departed. There was also a train which left Atlanta daily in the afternoon, reaching Columbus early at night. The route to Columbus from Atlanta by the Southern Railway was over its main line to McDonough, and from there over the Georgia Midland Division to Columbus. The cars for Columbus were attached to a train, and carried to McDonough and detached. These cars were then attached to another locomotive, and carried on to Columbus in charge of another conductor. Plaintiff remained in Atlanta on Saturday. On Sunday he went up to Douglasville, and returned to Atlanta, and on the Tuesday morning following boarded the train for Columbus. The conductor on the train between Atlanta and McDonough declined to accept for passage the ticket which plaintiff had purchased in Tallapoosa on the Friday previous, because it was a limited ticket, and the limit of time had expired. This train did not stop at any point between Atlanta and McDonough, and the conductor informed the plaintiff that the conductor from McDonough to Columbus would not accept the ticket for passage. After leaving McDonough, he presented the ticket to the second conductor, who refused to accept it for passage, and when the train reached Griffin the plaintiff was requested to leave the train. He declined to do so, and was ejected. Concerning the manner of ejection, there is no complaint. Plaintiff had frequently purchased tickets over the lines of the Southern Railway since 1896, but testified that he had never inspected any of those tickets to ascertain whether they were limited or unlimited. He did not know at the time it was purchased that his ticket was limited. He knew that it had holes punched in it, because he saw the agent when he made the holes, but did not look to see for what purpose they were made. After arriving at McDonough, plaintiff knew that his ticket had expired, but he thought it was possible that the conductor might pass him on it. He was informed by the second conductor that if he would take the ticket back to Tallapoosa, where it was issued, the amount of money he paid for it would doubtless be refunded. Plaintiff testified further that at the time he was ejected he had sufficient money with which to pay his fare to Columbus, but not enough to pay his fare to Columbus, hotel bill, and return passage. He also testified that the limit on the ticket gave him time to go from Tallapoosa to Columbus. It was shown that the regular fare from McDonough to Columbus was $2.94, and that all local tickets issued by the Southern Railway Company are limited tickets, and good for continuous passage only. The limit is expressed by punching out the date on the margin of the ticket. The sale of limited tickets exclusively began on May 15, 1896. Each ticket shows that it is limited, and the time in which it may be used. Notices of this regulation were posted in the ticket windows and waiting rooms at all of the depots, in plain, legible type, placed in conspicuous places. The ticket which the plaintiff purchased on May 28th was limited as good for use through May 29th. The plaintiff paid regular fare for the ticket. It was also testified that the regulation for the adoption of limited local tickets was made by the railroad in 1896, for the reason that the limited ticket conferred benefits on the passenger and the railway company beyond those afforded by an unlimited ticket. If a passenger should lose his ticket, or have it stolen from him, and it has not been used within the time limited, the railway company refunds the amount paid to the purchaser. Without a limitation. no such refunding could be made, because it would be impossible to ascertain when the ticket might thereafter be used. The regulation was beneficial also to the railway company, because it enabled it to more properly check its accounts, which include sales of tickets by agents, as well as their collection by conductors; and it also diminished the opportunity for the fraudulent manipulation of a ticket either to the injury of a passenger or the revenues of the company. It was also testified that 10 or 12 tickets are daily redeemed by the defendant company. The plaintiff testified in rebuttal that he had never seen any of the notices in relation to the limitation of tickets, nor did he know that the ticket he purchased was limited.
There are many grounds set out in the motion for new trial, which if considered, would require a discussion of many questions which, under the view that we take of this case, are not material to the ascertainment of the rights of the respective parties. After all, the merits of the case must depend on a solution of the question whether one who has paid full fare for transportation between two points on a railway line, and receives a ticket which bears on its face a limitation of the time in which it may be used for passage, is bound by the terms of such limitation, in the absence of any further notice or contract. It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to enter into a discussion of the question whether a ticket purchased by a prospective passenger constitutes the contract of carriage between the carrier and passenger, or whether it is in law simply a token or receipt that the passage money has been paid. Many apparently well-considered authorities go to the extent of ruling that the terms and conditions printed upon the ticket constitute the contract between the parties. Others, however, entitled to equal weight, declare that the words placed upon a ticket which the passenger receives do not constitute the contract, but that it is simply evidence of the receipt by the carrier of the passage money, and a token that a contract of carriage has been made. The latter view seems to be more in accord with the views heretofore expressed by this court in several cases than the former. It may not be amiss, however, to remark that it is somewhat singular that, admitting the ticket to be only the token of a contract, yet, when that token bears on its face statements that the contract of which it is an evidence is subject to certain limitations and conditions, that the contract is not in any way affected thereby. If in an...
To continue reading
Request your trial