Southern Ry. Co. v. Order of Ry. Conductors of America
| Decision Date | 15 August 1949 |
| Docket Number | 16254. |
| Parties | SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. ORDER OF RY. CONDUCTORS OF AMERICA. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
The Southern Railway Company, a corporation of the State of Virginia, brought an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act against the Order of Railway Conductors of America, an unincorporated association, for construction of written contract between plaintiff and defendant.
The Common Pleas Court of Charleston County, William H. Grimball, J., rendered a judgment adverse to defendant, and defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion, overruled exceptions and affirmed the judgment, holding that exclusion from evidence of a certified copy of file of National Railroad Adjustment Board showing that claims of conductors had been submitted to and were pending before board was not prejudicial to defendant. It further held that a holding of Supreme Court on first appeal that state courts had jurisdiction of action was law of case and could not be reviewed.
This action was instituted against the defendant by Southern Railway Company in July, 1945, under the declaratory judgment Act of this state, Code, Section 660, for the purpose of obtaining a construction of a written contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, Order of Railway Conductors of America. The question presented by the complaint is whether certain industrial switching movements to the plant of the Ancor Corporation at Pregnall, South Carolina, an intermediate point on plaintiff's railroad line between Charleston and Branchville, are part of the service trips of conductors in charge of local freight trains between Charleston and Branchville; or whether such conductors are entitled to an additional day's pay for performing switching operations to the plant of the Ancor Corporation separate and apart from and in addition to the pay for their service between Charleston and Branchville.
When this case first came on for hearing in this court, a demurrer to the complaint was sustained on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction, and the court in the exercise of its discretion refused to take jurisdiction. The plaintiff appealed this ruling to the Supreme Court of South Carolina which reversed the judgment, holding that 'the complaint alleged a cause of action for declaratory relief' and saying: 'In this case, after a hearing upon the merits, the court will exercise its discretion as to whether or not it will make a binding declaration.' 41 S.E.2d 774, 779.
Following that decision that case came on for trial on the merits in this court. Upon the proof adduced at that trial I find that the following facts have been established.
The defendant is an unincorporated association engaged in union activities in Charleston County and is the duly authorized representative of and bargaining agent for the conductors employed by the plaintiff in the operation of the local freight trains on the line of railroad between Charleston and Branchville in all matters involved in and arising under a written contract dated May 16, 1940, between the plaintiff and the defendant entitled 'Schedule of Wages and Rules and Regulations for Conductors'. There exists an actual and continuing controversy as to the proper construction of this contract, with reference to service performed at Pregnall, South Carolina, by conductors on local freight trains on said line of railroad.
The distance from Charleston to Branchville is 63 miles; the average time consumed on the 'straight-away' run of these local freight trans is approximately 6 1/2 hours; the average time on duty of the conductors each day is approximately 8 1/2 hours, the conductors going on duty at Charleston or Branchville as the case may be and being released from duty at the end of the run at the opposite terminal.
As a part of the regular service trips, the conductors in charge of the freight trains on the run perform such switching as is necessary over the industrial tracks of the various industries served by plaintiff along this line of railroad, and have been doing so continuously for many years, without demanding or being paid extra compensation. Conductors in charge of local freight trains have been instructed to perform such industry switching at Pregnall, South Carolina, as may be necessary at the plant of the Ancor Corporation over the privately owned industry tracks ever since their construction in 1943. These tracks connect with the plaintiff's railroad within the yard limits at Pregnall and extend some 6 miles to the plant of the Corporation. This industry switching consists of the local freight trains taking cars the destination of which is the plant of the Ancor Corporation, to the plant, placing the cars on the designated track or tracks, and then picking up and hauling from the plant to the plaintiff's main line any cars destined to other points.
The testimony further establishes that those movements are similar to those performed on innumerable other industry tracks which join plaintiff's railroad line and have always been accepted and agreed to in practice by the conductors of plaintiff's local freight trains as a part of their service trips and have been performed pursuant to the terms of the said contract.
The basic rate of pay for these conductors in effect at the time of the commencement of the suit (the distance run being less than one hundred miles) was $9.10 per day for eight hours service or less, and if service exceeded eight hours they were entitled to additional pay for overtime on a minute basis at the rate of $1.71 an hour. The basic day rate has now been increased to $10.58, and the overtime rate to $1.98 1/2 an hour.
The defendant as the duly authorized representative and bargaining agent of the conductors of plaintiff demanded that plaintiff pay additional compensation to the conductors under the contract here involved at the rate of a minimum day's pay, or $9.10 per day, separate and apart from and in addition to their regular pay of $9.10 plus overtime for the local freight service each time industry switching service is performed at Pregnall.
The defendant handled these claims beginning shortly after the filing of the first claim on September 9, 1944, claiming that the performance of the industry switching at the plant of the Ancor Corporation entitled the conductors to an additional day's pay, separate and apart from, and in addition to their pay for the local freight service trip between Charleston and Branchville, which claims the plaintiff contends are a violation of the articles of the contract referred to above. The claims were appealed by defendant to the highest officer of the plaintiff authorized to handle such claims and were formally rejected.
The defendant has continued to assert such claims which the conductors have been filing continuously down to the present date so that as a result of the continuing accrual of these claims the plaintiff is faced with a growing potential liability in the event the defendant's claims are justified. For the period September 7, 1944, to July 14, 1945 alone there were filed some 40 claims for an additional day's pay by conductors. The testimony also shows that if this service were performed on each working day by conductors during a year's period the liability would amount to $2,848 at the rate of pay then effective, or $3,311 at the current rate of pay. It further appears that if the conductors should ultimately prevail, the plaintiff would also be liable for large sums to other members of those local freight train crews whose contracts have provisions similar to those of the conductors' agreement here involved. It is thus clear that unless this controversy is settled the plaintiff will be subjected to substantial injury and damage.
Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the contract here under consideration establish the basis of the compensation to be paid to conductors in this local freight service and are as follows:
'Basic Day
'(a) In all road service, except passenger, 100 miles or less, 8 hours or less (straightaway or turn-around), shall constitute a day's work; miles in excess of 100 will be paid for at the mileage rates provided, except as provided for in Article 28.
'(b) In through freight or mixed train service, a straightaway run is a run from one terminal to another terminal; and not less than one hundred miles will be allowed for each such run, except as provided for in Article 28.
'Beginning and Ending of Day
'In all classes of service, other than passenger, conductors' time will commence at the time they are required to report for duty and shall continue until the time they are relieved from duty at end of run.
'Overtime
Article 5(a) merely provides that a conductor going on duty and performing service must be paid for a minimum day's pay of '100 miles or loss, 8 hours or less'.
Article 6 provides that his day begins from the time he goes on duty at the initial terminal and continues until he goes off duty at the final terminal. In other words, he is to be paid for all time on duty on a continuous time basis. There is no provision or interrupting the time under any circumstances.
Article 7 awards the conductors pay at time and one-half rates for all time on duty in excess of 8...
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