Southern Surety Co. v. Inabnit
Decision Date | 16 September 1927 |
Docket Number | (No. 342.) |
Parties | SOUTHERN SURETY CO. v. INABNIT et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Eastland County; Geo. L. Davenport, Judge.
Proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Law by John Inabnit, as employee of John Inabnit, receiver of Harris-Fisher Oil Company, opposed by the Southern Surety Company, insurer. An award of compensation was affirmed by the district court, and the insurer appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Horace C. Bishop, of Dallas, for appellant.
Butts & Wright, of Cisco, for appellee.
Prior to the date of the transactions disclosed in this opinion, the Harris-Fisher Oil Company was producing oil in Eastland county, and the appellee John Inabnit was employed by the company as a pumper on a salary of $150 per month. The appellant, Southern Surety Company, had issued a policy of compensation insurance to the oil company, whereby the company became a subscriber under the Workmen's Compensation Law of this state (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. 1925, arts. 8306-8309). On the 1st day of September, 1925, upon application of one of the creditors of the said oil company, L. H. McRea was by the district court of Eastland county duly appointed receiver thereof. Thereupon the policy of insurance was transferred to McRea as receiver of Harris-Fisher Oil Company. Appellee continued to work for the receiver in the same capacity as he had for the oil company. Later McRea resigned as receiver, and an order was entered by the court discharging him as such, and appointing one H. C. Steele in his place; appellee continuing to work during the receivership of Steele in the same capacity. After Steele was appointed receiver, the policy of insurance was written in his name as receiver of Harris-Fisher Oil Company. Thereafter Steele resigned, and an order of the court was entered discharging him, and appointing the appellee as his successor. The appellee qualified as receiver, and served in that capacity from the date of his appointment up to, and including, the day of the trial of this cause. After appellee was appointed receiver, the policy of insurance was transferred to him by an indorsement attached thereto showing its transfer to "John Inabnit, receiver, Harris-Fisher Oil Company." This transfer, by indorsement, became effective at noon on November 1, 1925. On the 22d day of December, 1925, appellee sustained an injury while discharging the duties of a pumper. He presented his claim for compensation to the appellant, which claim was denied by appellant on the ground that he was the assured in the policy, and not an employee. He then, in due time, presented his claim for compensation to the Industrial Accident Board, which board by final ruling made on the 2d day of June, 1926, awarded him compensation as an employee protected under the terms of the policy. The appellant properly appealed from the award of the board to the district court of Eastland county, the county in which the injury occurred. Trial of the case was had before the court without a jury, and, on December 2, 1926, final judgment was rendered granting the appellee a recovery of compensation for 45 weeks, at $20 per week, and a certain sum for medical bills. From this judgment an appeal has been duly perfected to this court.
The learned trial judge made his findings of fact. Among these findings are the following:
* * *"
The controlling question in the case is whether the appellee, who, as receiver, was named as the assured in the policy of compensation insurance, was protected as an employee under the terms of the policy. Counsel agree that this is a question of first impression. Our search for authorities has not disclosed any case passing upon the exact question, although we think the principles controlling the disposition of the case are well established.
A determination of the question here presented depends in a large measure upon the view adopted of the purposes prompting the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Laws. Appellant states that they were enacted to the end that an employer of labor might, by becoming a subscriber thereunder, be relieved of liability for injuries to his employees, and that liability assumed by the insurer. Keeping this purpose in mind, the conclusion is very naturally and logically reached that no liability exists in this case. We cannot adopt appellant's statement of the purposes of this legislation. The leading authorities, including the Supreme Court of our state, speaking through the commission in the cases of Millers' Mutual Casualty Co. v. Hoover, 235 S. W. 863, and Cook v. Millers' Indemnity Underwriters, 240 S. W. 535, agree that Workmen's Compensation Laws came into existence in response to a general acceptation of the broad economic theory that industrial accidents should properly be chargeable as a part of the overhead expenses of the industries. These laws are remedial in their nature, and should be liberally construed with the view of promoting their objects. The early tendency of our courts to construe them strictly because they were thought to be in derogation of common law has long since given place to a liberal rule of construction. The rule now prevailing prevents the restriction of the scope of the laws by exceptions and exact definitions not in harmony with their spirit. It being conceded that appellee was protected as an employee before he became receiver, and that he continued to perform the same duties after appointment as before, the inquiry arises, What legal impediments arose by his appointment as receiver? Several impediments are...
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