Southern Surety Co. v. Illinois Powder Mfg. Co.
Decision Date | 05 July 1930 |
Docket Number | No. 9441.,9441. |
Parties | SOUTHERN SURETY CO. v. ILLINOIS POWDER MFG. CO. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Harris County; Ewing Boyd, Judge.
Suit by the Illinois Powder Manufacturing Company against A. J. Harty & Co., a partnership, the individual members thereof, and another. From the judgment rendered, defendant Southern Surety Company appeals.
Reversed, and cause dismissed.
J. T. Suggs, Jr., of Dallas, for appellant.
Campbell, Myer & Foster, of Houston, for appellee.
This suit was brought by the appellee, Illinois Powder Manufacturing Company against A. J. Harty & Co., a partnership, and the individual members of the partnership, as principals, and against the appellant surety company as surety, to recover the purchase price of goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered to Harty & Co. by the plaintiff.
Adopting the convenient designation of the parties used in appellant's brief, the firm of Harty & Co., engaged in the general contracting and construction business, will hereinafter be referred to as the contractor, the appellant surety company as the surety, and the appellee powder company as the claimant.
The following summary of the pleadings of the parties is copied from appellant's brief and adopted as sufficient for the elucidation of the questions discussed and decided in this opinion:
Under appropriate assignments and propositions appellant's brief vigorously and ably assails the ruling of the trial court in not sustaining appellant's plea to the jurisdiction, and in assuming jurisdiction of appellee's suit.
The pleadings and evidence show that appellee is an Illinois corporation, having a permit to do business in Texas and also in the state of Mississippi. The articles, for the purchase price of which this suit was brought, were sold by appellee to A. J. Harty & Co. for use in the performance of a contract undertaking of that firm entered into in March, 1926, with a drainage district in the counties of Leflore and Sunflower in the state of Mississippi for clearing, grubbing, and excavation in the construction of a drainage system for the district. This contract binds the contractor to furnish all labor and material required in its performance, and provides for compliance by the contractor in the performance of the work with all federal, state, and local laws, ordinances, and regulations, and further provides that the contractor furnish an indemnity bond to secure the faithful performance of the contract. Such bond, payable to the drainage district, was furnished by the contractor, with appellant, an Iowa corporation having a permit to do business in the states of Texas and Mississippi, as surety. This bond does not contain the express obligation that the contractor would make prompt payment for labor and material used in the performance of the contract, but, since the statute of the state of Mississippi (Hemingway's Code Miss. 1927, § 2617), which was pleaded and relied on by both appellee and appellant, requires such bond to contain that obligation, it must be read into the bond. This statute (Hemingway's Code Miss. 1927, §§ 2620-2622) further provides that only one action shall be brought on the bond, notice of which shall be published in the county or town in which the contract is performed, and in which all parties interested shall intervene; and that, in event the penalty of the bond shall be insufficient to pay all claims adjudged against it, the surety may pay the full amount of the penalty into court for pro rata distribution among the judgment creditors of the contractor, and be discharged from further liability.
Prior to the institution of this suit in August, 1927, the firm of Harty & Co. had dissolved and abandoned its contract and two members of the firm were residents of Texas and within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Notice of the bringing of this suit was published in the state of Mississippi as required by the statute of that state.
Upon this state of the record we agree with appellant that the trial court erred in not sustaining the plea to the jurisdiction of the court. Unlike the usual questions of jurisdiction, which are only dependent upon the legal power or authority of the court over the parties and the intrinsic subject-matter of the suit, the question here presented must be considered in the light of the broad principles of state comity and public policy.
The general rule that a defendant in a transitory action based upon a contract may be sued in whatever jurisdiction he may be found, has, among other well-marked limitations, the requirement that, when the contract liability upon which the suit is based is one imposed by a statute which provides a remedy for its enforcement, that remedy is exclusive unless made cumulative by the statute, and a suit brought to enforce the right created by the statute must be brought in the jurisdiction of its creation.
That the contract sued on in this case is not a common-law obligation seems to be settled by the decisions of the courts of this state. Oak Cliff Lumber Co. v. American Indemnity Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 266 S. W. 429; General Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Waples Lumber Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 176 S. W. 651; American Indemnity Co. v. Burrows Hardware Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 191 S. W. 574; Murphy v. Huey & Philp Hardware Co. ...
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