Southern v. Berryhill
| Decision Date | 14 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. EDCV 17-2114-JPR |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | MICHELLE ALICIA S., Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner's final decision denying her application for supplemental security income benefits ("SSI"). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The matter is before the Court on the parties' Joint Stipulation, filed October 5, 2018, which the Court has taken under submission without oral argument.For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed.
Plaintiff was born in 1962. (Administrative Record ("AR") 38, 174.) She completed 12th grade (AR 38, 202) and some college (AR 202, 325). She last worked as a "caregiver or caretaker," from 2007 to 2009. (AR 38; see also AR 239.)2
On May 16, 2014, Plaintiff applied for SSI, alleging that she had been unable to work since May 9, 2009,3 because of "bad knees," "left shoulder . . . lump," "scarred lungs, can't breath [sic] good," "depression," "anxiety," "paranoia," and "PTSD." (AR 70; see also AR 174-82.) After her application was denied initially (AR 70-85) and on reconsideration (AR 86-103), she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (AR 122). A hearing was held on July 12, 2016, at which she was represented by counsel and testified. (AR 36-69.) A vocational expert also testified. (AR 62-67.)
In a written decision issued September 21, 2016, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled since May 16, 2014. (See AR 25; see also generally AR 16-26.) Plaintiff requested review from theAppeals Council (171-73), which denied it on September 25, 2017 (AR 1-4). This action followed.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. The ALJ's findings and decision should be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence means such evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035 (citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court "must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion." Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). "If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing," the reviewing court "may not substitute its judgment" for the Commissioner's. Id. at 720-21.
People are "disabled" for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is expected to result in death or has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C.§ 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992).
The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended Apr. 9, 1996). In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim must be denied. § 416.920(a)(4)(i).
If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting her ability to do basic work activities; if not, the claimant is not disabled and her claim must be denied. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
If the claimant has a "severe" impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments set forth at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
If the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimanthas sufficient residual functional capacity ("RFC")4 to perform her past work; if so, she is not disabled and the claim must be denied. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). The claimant has the burden of proving she is unable to perform past relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant meets that burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. Id.
If that happens or if the claimant has no past relevant work, the Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that the claimant is not disabled because she can perform other substantial gainful work available in the national economy. § 416.920(a)(4)(v); Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. That determination comprises the fifth and final step in the sequential analysis. § 416.920(a)(4)(v); Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application date, May 16, 2014. (AR 18.) At step two, he determined that she had severe impairments of "arthralgias;5 chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD); and bipolar affective disorder." (Id.) He foundother ailments mentioned in the record "nonsevere," including "obesity," "benign . . . lipoma," and "history of polysubstance dependence." (AR 19.)
At step three, he determined that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal a listing. (AR 19-21.) At step four, he found that she had the RFC to perform "light work"
except: can lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; can stand and walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; can sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; can perform occasional kneeling, jumping, and walking on uneven terrain; should avoid even moderate exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation; is limited to work involving simple repetitive tasks; and no more than occasional contact with co-workers, and no contact with the general public.
(AR 21.) She had no past relevant work. (AR 24.) At step five, he concluded that given her age, education, work experience, and RFC, and "[b]ased on the testimony of the vocational expert" (AR 25), she could perform at least one representative job in the national economy: "Assembler of small products," DOT 706.684-022, 1991 WL 679050 (Jan. 1, 2016), "an unskilled position . . . performed at a light exertional level" (AR 25). Accordingly, he found Plaintiff not disabled. (AR 25-26.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ (1) "failed to properly evaluate [her] mental illness" (J. Stip. at 9), (2) "failed to give great weight to treating [p]sychiatrist Dr. Kurera" (id. at 12),7 (3) improperly assessed her RFC (see id. at 11, 19-21), (4) "did not address the [c]ombination of her impairments" (id. at 21), and (5) "did not meet [the Commissioner's] burden of [p]roof at [s]tep [five]" (id. at 23).8 As discussed below, remand isnot warranted on any of these grounds.
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to (1) "properly evaluate [her] mental illness" in accordance with the "special techniques" outlined in § 416.920a, (2) develop the record as to her psychiatric treatment in prison and after her release, and (3) consider the effect of her mental impairment on her RFC. (See J. Stip. at 9-12.) As set forth below, the ALJ did not err.
An ALJ must apply a five-step evaluation process to determine whether a claimant qualifies as disabled. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2014). When evaluating an alleged mental impairment, an ALJ must follow a "special psychiatric review technique" during steps two and three. Keyser v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing § 404.1520a). The special technique for evaluating alleged mental impairments in SSI claims is codified in§ 416.920a.9 First, an ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable mental impairment. § 416.920a(b). Next, he must "rate the degree of functional limitation resulting from the impairment(s)" in "four broad functional areas": "[a]ctivities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of decompensation." § 416.920a(b)(2), (c)(3)-(4). If the degree of impairment in these areas is "none" or "mild," the impairment is "generally . . . not severe." § 416.920a(d)(1). If it is "moderate, marked, [or] extreme," it is severe, and the ALJ "must then determine if [the impairment] meets or is equivalent" to a "listed mental disorder." § 416.920a(c)(4), (d)(2). If it does not meet or equal a listing, then the ALJ will continue with the five-step evaluation process and assess the claimant's RFC. § 416.920a(d)(3). The ALJ's written decision "must incorporate the pertinent findings and conclusions based on the technique . . . [and] include a specific finding as to the degree oflimitation in each of the functional areas." § 416.920a(e)(4).
In assessing a disability claim, an ALJ has a "duty to fully and fairly develop the record" and "assure that [a] claimant's interests are considered." Garcia v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 768 F.3d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 201...
To continue reading
Request your trial