Southgate Development Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp.
| Decision Date | 15 December 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 76-299,76-299 |
| Citation | 2 O.O.3d 393,358 N.E.2d 526,48 Ohio St.2d 211 |
| Parties | , 2 O.O.3d 393 SOUTHGATE DEVELOPMENT CORP., Appellee, v. COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION CORP., Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The trial court is not confined to the allegations of the complaint when determining its subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss, and it may consider material pertinent to such inquiry without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.
2. R.C. 4905.04 is not applicable to an action for declaratory relief upon a contract against an interstate gas transmission company which is exclusively regulated by the Federal Power Commission.
Appellant, Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation (Columbia), as successor to the Ohio Fuel Gas Company, owns and operates a natural gas pipeline in interstate commerce, which passes through the land of the appellee, Southgate Development Corporation (Southgate), pursuant to a right-of-way easement. Southgate is the assignee of the grantor of the right-of-way easement pursuant to a contract dated September 16, 1963, which provides that the landowner has the right to purchase natural gas from the pipeline for use on the premises in consideration for the grant of the easement and until Columbia desires to remove or abandon such pipeline.
Southgate commenced an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Lorain County alleging its demand and Columbia's refusal to fulfill the contractual right in question and seeking declaratory relief as to the duties and obligations of the defendant, Columbia, under the aforesaid 'right-of-way easement.' Southgate is also seeking a determination that Columbia is bound by the provisions of the right-of-way easement to sell gas to Southgate while gas is conveyed through said tracts, and prays for an order that the duties and obligations of Columbia be specifically performed and for such other and further relief as complainant may be entitled to at law or equity.
Columbia responded to the complaint, not by filing an answer admitting or denying its obligations under the contract, but by filing a motion to dismiss for the reasons that '(t)his Court of Common Pleas does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter presented and for the relief sought by the complaint.'
This motion, which clearly raised the defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, under Civ.R. 12(B)(1), may have been intended to assert the additional defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
Material pertinent to subject-matter jurisdiction presented to the trial court by Columbia admitted that Columbia is the present owner and operator of the natural gas pipeline passing through Southgate's property, and is the wholesaler of the gas flowing through that pipeline; and that both the pipeline in question and the gas therein are in interstate commerce and therefore within the exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission. Columbia represented further that the right-of-way deed upon which Southgate relies was issued while Columbia's predecessor was an 'integrated gas company' subject to dual state and federal regulation; that thereafter a division of the integrated company's functions into those involving interstate pipeline operation and that which concerned the intrastate sale and delivery of gas to retail consumers occurred; and that the latter functions were 'spun off' to Columbia Gas of Ohio.
In that material, Columbia Gas Transmission then argued that, through these events, Columbia Gas of Ohio became the obligee of the contractual obligation involved. It was maintained further that the enforcement of this obligation was then because of, and now remains subject to, R.C. 4905.04, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio so that only that agency may now require, and only Columbia Gas of Ohio may, in the statutory language, be required 'to furnish their products and render all services exacted by the commission or by law.'
Columbia Gas Transmission argued, alternatively, that if it is found to be the obligee under the easement contract, then, in that event, its authority to use its interstate transmission pipeline for the purpose of making a direct sale, i. e., a retail sale for industrial or commercial purposes directly from its pipeline, must be derived from its regulatory agency, the Federal Power Commission, citing Federal Power Comm. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. (1961), 365 U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 435, 5 L.Ed.2d 377.
Southgate initiated discovery in the form of interrogatories, which were answered in part. Columbia objected to the remaining interrogatories and to notices to take depositions, and obtained, ex parte, an order precluding further discovery by way of those depositions. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.
Southgate filed its notice of appeal assigning the following errors:
'1. The Court of Common Pleas of Lorain County, Ohio erred in entering judgment dismissing this action for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court.
This cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Robert E. Leach, Michael J. Canter, Columbus, Ashenbach, Tattersall, Gallagher & Glavas and J. C. William Tattersall, Elyria, for appellee.
Miraldi & Barrett Co., L. P. A., Ray L. Miraldi, Amherst, Thomas E. Morgan, Columbus, H. L. Snyder and Larry L. Roller, Charleston, W. Va., for appellant.
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