Southwest Delaware County Municipal Authority v. Aston Tp.

Decision Date17 March 1964
Docket NumberPENN-DELCO
Citation198 A.2d 867,413 Pa. 526
Parties, 15 A.L.R.3d 836 SOUTHWEST DELAWARE COUNTY MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY, Appellant, v. TOWNSHIP OF ASTON, Penn-Delco Union School District, Penn-Delco Union School District Authority and Aston Township School District Authority (two cases). Appeal ofUNION SCHOOL DISTRICT and Penn-Delco Union School District Authority and Aston Township School District Authority.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Joseph W. deFuria, deFuria, Larkin & deFuria, Chester, for Southwest Delaware County Municipal Authority.

Malcolm B. Petrikin, Chester, for Penn-Delco Union School Dist., Penn-Delco Union School District Authority, and Aston Twp. School District Authority.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

JONES, Justice.

Southwest Delaware County Municipal Authority, 1 [Sewer Authority], on March 1, 1961, completed the construction of a sewer system in Aston Township, [Township], Delaware County. Prior to that date, the Township, by ordinance, 2 had required that the owners of improved property in the Township adjoining or adjacent to any accessible public sewer system must connect therewith. To pay the construction and maintenance costs of the sewer system, the Sewer Authority, by resolution, provided that assessments be made, on a front foot rule basis, against properties benefited by the sewer construction and also provided for the imposition of connection charges and sewer rentals.

Adjoining and adjacent to the new sewer system, the Township owns property to be used for a municipal building and other municipal purposes; the Aston Township School District Authority, [School Authority] owns property which it leases to Penn-Delco Union School District, [School District], upon which the School District operates an elementary school; Penn-Delco Union School District Authority, [School Authority], owns property which it leases to the School District upon which the School District operates a junior-senior high school.

The Sewer Authority called upon the Township, the School Authorities and the School District (a) to pay their share of the sewer assessments and (b) to connect with the sewer system paying the necessary connection charges and sewer rentals. The Township now takes the position that it will pay the assessments and connect with the sewer system paying the necessary connection charges and sewer rentals. The junior-senior high school is connected with the sewer system but the elementary school,--which, admittedly, has 'adequate' onthe-site sewage disposal--, is not so connected. The School Authorities and the School District maintain that they are exempt from the payment of any sewer assessments and that they do not have to connect with the sewer system or pay connection charges and sewer rentals.

The Sewer Authority instituted declaratory judgment proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County against the Township, the School Authorities and the School District. The court below held that, while the School Authorities and the School District are exempt from payment of the sewer assessments, they must connect their schools to the sewer system and pay the necessary connection charges and sewer rentals. From the former portion of this judgment the Sewer Authority has appealed (No. 22 January Term 1964) and from the latter part of this judgment the School Authorities and the School District have appealed (No. 29 January Term 1964).

These appeals present two principal issues: (1) is property used for public school purposes immune from the assessment of benefits arising from the construction of a sewer system?; (2) is such school property required to connect with the accessible public sewer system and pay the necessary connection charges and sewer rentals?

IMMUNITY FROM SEWER SYSTEM ASSESSMENTS

This Court, in Pittsburg v. Sterrett Subdistrict School, 204 Pa. 635, 54 A. 463, 61 L.R.A. 183, (1903), held that real estate purchased and used for public school purposes was not liable for assessments for local improvements because: (1) such real estate was public property and, therefore not taxable or assessable for public improvements under the then existing statutes; (2) there were no statutory provisions by which such an assessment could be enforced; (3) taxation of any kind imposed on school property would interfere with and defeat the Commonwealth in maintaining the constitutionally required public school system.

The Sewer Authority dubs Pittsburg v. Sterrett Subdisitrict School a 'strange' case claiming its holding is contrary to decisions of this Court, before and after Sterrett, and that the exemption of public school property applies only to taxes of a general nature and not to assessments. The pre-1900 cases 3 cited by the Sewer Authority to support this proposition are inapposite; they relate only to the validity of taxes to pay the costs of constructing public buildings and bridges, taxes which were laid by the legislature on the benefited communities alone. No case is cited in which this Court has even questioned the reasoning or holding of Pittsburg v. Sterrett Subdistrict School, supra. Mr. Justice Mestrezat's opinion in Pittsburg v. Sterrett Subdistrict School, carefully reasoned, is relate with authorities from this and other jurisdictions. The Sewer Authority's contention that an assessment for local improvements differs from general taxation may well be conceded, 4 but the proposition that such assessments are an exercise of the taxing power is supported by Justice Mestrezat with numerous decisions of this Court and with decisions of sister state courts (e. g., Hammett v. City of Philadelphia, 65 Pa. 146; In re Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. 352; Olive Cemetery Company v. City of Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 129; City of Erie v. First Universalist Church, 105 Pa. 278; Borough of McKeesport v. Fidler, 147 Pa. 532, 23 A. 799). 5 'These authorities conclusively show that statutes imposing assessments for local improvements are enacted in the exercise of the taxing power of the Legislature. They, therefore, notwithstanding the generality of the enumeration of the property affected, do not apply or relate to property held or used for public purposes by the state or any of its political subdivisions. The reasons for this rule given in the authorities cited above are convincing, and amply sufficient to sustain it. The imposition of a tax or assessment by the authority of the state, represented by itself or any subordinate political division thereof, upon property held by another subordinate division, and used for public purposes, would, in effect, be a party demanding money and receiving payment from himself. An assessment pays for a public, though a local, improvement. It therefore relieves the public from the necessity of contributing to the cost or expense of the improvement. If public property purchased by funds raised by taxation is subjected to assessment for a local public improvement, it is the public paying the public, which clearly discloses the absurdity of the proposition.' Pittsburg v. Sterrett Subdistrict School, supra, 204 Pa. pages 643, 644, 54 A. page 466, 61 L.R.A. 183. Nor, we may add, does the fact that the Sewer Authority financed construction of the sewer system by a bond issue alter the force of the above reasoning for the public eventually foots the bill and there is little point in adding a bookkeeping expense to its burdens.

However, reliance need not rest solely on Pittsburg v. Sterrett Subdistrict School, supra; the immunity of these public school properties from assessments for local improvements rests upon the present statutory law. Unlike property owned by a charity wherein the charity has the burden of proving its property is exempt from taxation, property owned by a municipality and devoted exclusively to public purposes is immune from any form of taxation or assessments unless a statute clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative will that such property shall not be immune: Robb v. City of Philadelphia, 25 Pa.Super. 343, 346; Wilkinsburg Boro v. School District, 298 Pa. 193, 197, 148 A. 77; Com. v. Pure Oil Co. et al., 303 Pa. 112, 117, 154 A. 307; 90 A.L.R. 1137 et seq. In Robb, the Court said (25 Pa.Super. p. 346): 'Property belonging to the state and its municipalities, and which is held for governmental purposes, is presumed to be exempt, and is not included in any designation of property to be taxed, however sweeping, unless the statute authorizing the tax expressly to provides'.

It is well settled that in the absence of a statute to the contary, public property used for public purposes is exempt from taxation and from assessments for improvements and no express exemption law is needed: Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa. 209, 228, 200 A. 834; Directors of Poor of Schuylkill County v School Directors, etc., 42 Pa. 21; County of Erie v. City of Erie, 113 Pa. 360, 6 A. 136; City of Philadelphia v. Barber, 160 Pa. 123, 128, 28 A. 644; Pittsburg v. Sterrett Subdistrict School, supra; Com. v. Pure Oil Co. et al., supra.

The Swer Authority relies upon the exemption clause of the Municipal Claim and Lien Act of 1923, (Act of May 16, 1923, P.L. 207, Section 5, at amended, 53 P.S. § 7108), [Lien Act], as statutory authority for the imposition of these sewer assessments. That clause reads as follows: 'All real estate * * *, other than property owned by the State or the United States, shall be subject to all tax and municipal claims herein provided for, except that all property owned by any * * * municipality [defined to include all Municipal Authorities] * * * and institutions of purely public charity, shall not be subject to * * * municipal claims on property, by law, exempt from taxation except for * * * sewer claims and sewer connections * * *.' (Emphasis supplied). While we cannot be hasty in imputing the immunity of the sovereign to its agent or...

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