Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma County Excise Bd.

Decision Date17 June 1980
Docket Number54913,Nos. 54893,s. 54893
Citation618 P.2d 915
PartiesIn the Matter of the Protests of SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY and Mustang Fuel Corporation alleging illegal sinking fund levies of fiscal year 1979-80 budgets of the City of Oklahoma City and the City of Lawton, Appellees (Protestants Below), v. OKLAHOMA COUNTY EXCISE BOARD, and Comanche County Excise Board, Appellees(Respondents Below). The CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, a municipal corporation, and the City of Lawton, a municipal corporation, Appellants (Intervenors Below). Board of Trustees of the Employee Retirement System of the City of Oklahoma City, a Public Board, Petitioner, v. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, a Missouri Corporation, Mustang Fuel Corporation, an Oklahoma Corporation, Oklahoma County Excise Board, a statutory board, the City of Oklahoma City, a municipal corporation, and the State Insurance Fund, a statutory fund, Respondents.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Appeal from an Order of the Oklahoma Court of Tax Review Consolidated with a Related Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction.

This cause is a consolidation of a direct appeal filed from a decision of the Oklahoma Court of Tax Review, and a declaratory judgment action brought by the Board of Trustees of the Employee Retirement System of the City of Oklahoma City. On motion of the parties, both causes were consolidated for consideration in this Court.

The question presented in both causes is whether certain sinking fund levies levied by the Cities of Oklahoma City and Lawton violated the provisions of Article 10, Section 26, of the Oklahoma Constitution, which require municipalities and counties to be on a "cash basis."

Finding that the levies did violate the provisions of Article 10, Section 26, of the Oklahoma Constitution, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Tax Review, holding that it should be applied prospectively.

RULING OF THE OKLAHOMA COURT OF TAX REVIEW AFFIRMED AND APPLIED PROSPECTIVELY.

William J. Free, Mary R. Whitten, Oklahoma City, for appellee-respondent, Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.

James E. Kifer, Oklahoma City, for appellee-respondent, Mustang Fuel Corp.

Andrew M. Coats, Dist. Atty., and James P. Laurence, Asst. Dist. Atty., Oklahoma City, for appellee-respondent, Oklahoma County Excise Bd.

Robert G. Perrine, Asst. Dist. Atty., Lawton, for appellee-respondent, Comanche County Excise Bd.

Walter M. Powell, Municipal Counselor, Diana L. Davis, Asst. Municipal Counselor, Oklahoma City, for appellant-intervenor, City of Oklahoma City.

Russell D. Bennett, City Atty., Lawton, for appellant-intervenor, City of Lawton.

Robert J. Turner, Oklahoma City, for petitioner, Bd. of Trustees of Emp. Retirement System of City of Oklahoma City.

Sam Hill, Fred Nicholas, Jr., Richard G. Mason, Oklahoma City, for respondent, State Ins. Fund.

Lynn C. Rogers, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Norman, amicus curiae, Oklahoma Ass'n of Municipal Attys.

DOOLIN, Justice:

We are called upon to determine the legality of certain sinking fund levies levied by the cities of Oklahoma City and Lawton for the fiscal year 1979-80 budgets. A determination of that question requires an interpretation of portions of 85 O.S.Supp.1977, § 149, 62 O.S.1971, § 362, and Article 10, Section 26, of the Oklahoma Constitution. The controversy over the legality of the sinking fund levies comes about in the following manner: Southwestern Bell Telephone Company and Mustang Fuel Corporation officially protested the levies made by the City of Oklahoma City, and the protest was set for a hearing before the Oklahoma Court of Tax Review. The City of Lawton was allowed to intervene in that action. In February of this year, the Court of Tax Review issued its ruling, holding (1) that the sinking fund levies of the City of Oklahoma City, insofar as they would retire certain specific judgments obtained in the District Court of Oklahoma County, were illegal, and (2) that the sinking fund levies of the City of Lawton, insofar as they would retire certain specific judgments rendered in the District Court of Comanche County, were illegal.

Both Oklahoma City and Lawton have appealed from the order of the Tax Commission in Supreme Court Case No. 54,893. Additionally, the Board of Trustees of the Employee Retirement System of the City of Oklahoma City, the purchaser of judgments which Oklahoma City was seeking to retire, has commenced an original action asking this Court to rule upon the validity of portions of 85 O.S.Supp.1977, § 149, under which the judgments the Board purchased came about. This original proceeding was filed as Supreme Court Case No. 54,913.

On motion of the parties, both of these causes were consolidated in this Court, and the parties in the original proceeding were allowed to intervene in the appeal.

As an understanding of the provisions of 85 O.S.Supp.1977, § 149, is essential to a determination of the issues before us, we start with an analysis of that statute.

I.

In 1977, when the State Legislature revised the Workers Compensation Act, the Legislature required the State, all its departments, municipal corporations, counties, and cities and towns to provide insurance to protect their employees who are injured in the course of their employment. At Section 149 A of Title 85, the Legislature provided that municipal corporations, counties, and cities and towns may insure against a liability for compensation with the State Insurance Fund, or may carry its own insurance. Subsection A of Section 149 reads as follows:

"The state and all departments thereof must insure against their liability for compensation with the State Insurance Fund and every municipal corporation within the state, counties, cities and towns may each insure against their liability for compensation with the State Insurance Fund, and may not insure with any other insurance carrier unless the State Insurance Fund refuses to accept the risk when the application for insurance is made, but any county, city or town may carry its own insurance; provided, such municipality may make any appropriation of funds to take care of such claims." (Emphasis supplied).

Subsection B of Section 149 provides that governmental organizations which are either self-insured, or have secured insurance coverage with the State Insurance Fund, may by resolution of its governing body, make payments of such insurance premiums. Alternatively, that subsection provides if the premiums due the State Insurance Fund are not paid, the Fund may obtain a lien against the governmental organization for the amount due, together with interest and penalty. Subsection B reads:

"Any governmental organization, including its instrumentalities, which is permitted to self-insure under the provisions of this section and which is carrying workers' compensation insurance with the State Insurance Fund may, by resolution of its governing body, make payments for such insurance premiums after receipt of the notice of the full amount due. If such amount of premiums dues is not paid to the State Insurance Fund by such governmental organization by the due date, the State Insurance Fund may file in the office of the court clerk of the county in which the situs of the governmental organization is located a certified copy of its notice of the full amount due, regardless of any minimum, and including any interest or penalty that may be assessed which shall become a lien against the governmental organization."

Subsection C of Section 149 of Title 85 provides the lien asserted against a governmental organization may be reduced to judgment and paid in the manner provided for payment of judgments as set forth in Sections 365.1 through 365.5 of Title 62. 1

Subsection D of Section 149 of Title 85 merely provides the State Insurance Fund is authorized to sell and assign any judgments obtained under the authority of the prior subsections of Section 149.

The last subsection of Section 149 of Title 85, subsection E, provides if the procedure for obtaining reimbursement of the premiums in subsection B of Section 149 is found to be unconstitutional or unenforceable as to governmental organizations authorized to raise revenue as provided in Article 10, Section 28, of the Oklahoma Constitution, then such reimbursing organization shall be required to post bond for the payment of such premiums.

The Protestants, Southwestern Bell Telephone and Mustang Fuel, argue subsections B and C of 85 O.S. (Supp.1977), § 149, are violative of the provisions of Article 10, Section 26, of the Oklahoma Constitution, unless the provisions of Title 62 O.S.1971, § 362, apply to judgments rendered against municipalities, cities and towns under the provisions of Section 149 of Title 85. Section 362 of Title 62 provides before final judgment in any suit based on contract shall be rendered against a municipality, certain proof must be filed with the court, including a statement of the appropriations against which each claim accrued. 2

In short, Southwestern Bell and Mustang Fuel argue that judgment based upon the nonpayment of insurance premiums due the State Insurance Fund may not be rendered unless the State Insurance Fund proves that the municipality has appropriated funds to pay the premiums.

In examining the provisions of 85 O.S.Supp.1977, § 149, we conclude it was the intent of the Legislature not to require governmental entities to appropriate funds for the payment of premiums to the State Insurance Fund, though such appropriations may be made. In so holding, we note that the last provision of subsection A of Section 149 specifically provides that:

"... such municipality may make any appropriation of funds to take care of such claims."

The Legislature's use of the word "may" is a clear indication it was not its intent to require governmental agencies to appropriate funds with which to pay the premiums due the State Insurance Fund. This being the case, we...

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