Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Railroad Com'n
Decision Date | 25 November 1936 |
Docket Number | No. 7104.,7104. |
Citation | 99 S.W.2d 263 |
Parties | SOUTHWESTERN GREYHOUND LINES, Inc., v. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS et al. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Price & Christopher and William E. Dahl, all of Fort Worth, for plaintiff in error.
Everett L. Looney, of Austin, J. E. Quaid and R. B. Rawlins, both of El Paso, William McCraw, Atty. Gen., and Curtis E. Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants in error.
On February 19, 1935, Edward A. Jackson filed with the Railroad Commission of this state his application under the Texas Motor Carrier Act ( ), for a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate a motorbus service, exclusively for interstate purposes, from Anthony, N. M., a point just across the New Mexico line, over Texas highways, via El Paso, Abilene, and Fort Worth to Dallas, Tex. The Railroad Commission granted such certificate on September 27, 1935. The Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., an interested party and competitor, appealed from such order by filing suit in the district court of Travis county to set aside the order and for an injunction to restrain Jackson from operating under such certificate, and to restrain the Railroad Commission from permitting him to do so. The temporary injunction was by the trial court granted, as prayed for, on October 5, 1935; from which order Jackson and the Railroad Commission appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals dissolved the injunction as being issued improvidently, and remanded the cause. 92 S.W.(2d) 296. This court granted a writ of error.
This cause brings into review for the first time by this court the Federal Motor Carrier Act 1935, §§ 201-227, Acts 74th Congress, Senate Bill 1629, U.S.C.A., title 49, §§ 301 to 327, inclusive. This law was approved by the President of the United States on August 9, 1935. The act is very comprehensive in its terms, and clearly shows that it was the purpose of Congress to legislate and to declare its policy to regulate transportation by motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce on the highways. We shall mention only those parts pertinent to a decision of the question before us. Section 302 of this act (49 U.S.C.A.) sets forth the declarations of policy and delegation of jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and in order to show the full purpose of the act we copy the whole section:
Section 303 contains the definitions and exceptions contained in the act.
Subdivision 10 thereof reads: "The term `interstate commerce' means commerce between any place in a State and any place in another State or between places in the same State through another State, whether such commerce moves wholly by motor vehicle or partly by motor vehicle and partly by rail, express, or water."
Subdivision 12 reads: "The term `highway' means the roads, highways, streets, and ways in any State."
Under various subsections the terms "motor vehicle," "common carrier by motor vehicle," "contract carrier by motor vehicle," "motor carrier," "private carrier of property by motor vehicle," and "broker" are defined.
Subdivision 19 reads: "The `services' and `transportation' to which this chapter applies include all vehicles operated by, for, or in the interest of any motor carrier irrespective of ownership or of contract, express or implied, together with all facilities and property operated or controlled by any such carrier or carriers and used in the transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce or in the performance of any service in connection therewith."
Subdivision 20 reads: "The term `interstate operation' means any operation in interstate commerce."
Under subsection (b) of section 303 are described the vehicles excepted from the operation of this act.
Section 304 describes in exhaustive detail the powers and duties of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the enforcement of this law.
Section 305 describes in what manner the Commission shall administer the provisions of the Motor Carrier Act.
Section 306 relates to the certificate of convenience and necessity, and in part reads: "No common carrier by motor vehicle subject to the provisions of this chapter shall engage in any interstate or foreign operation on any public highway, or within any reservation under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, unless there is in force with respect to such carrier a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission authorizing such operations."
Section 307 describes the issuance of the certificate, and subsection (b) thereof reads as follows:
Section 308 describes the terms and conditions of the certificate, the specification of routes and termini, extension of routes, and restriction on additions to equipment.
Section 325 reads as follows:
Section 327 reads:
The main question before us for decision is: Does the Federal Motor Carrier Act confer upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the exclusive power of issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity to motor vehicles operating upon the highways wholly in interstate commerce? Until this act was passed by Congress, there was some confusion among the decisions of the courts as to the power of the state to require a motor vehicle operating on the highways wholly in interstate commerce to obtain a permit of public convenience and necessity. Since the enactment of this law, in our judgment, that question is removed, and a decision thereof becomes immaterial.
It is common knowledge that many of the highways in this state were built, and are now being built, with federal aid, by virtue of and pursuant to federal laws. Act of July 11, 1916, c. 241, 39 Stat. 355, as amended February 28, 1919, c. 69, 40 Stat. 1189, 1200, and the Federal Highway Act, November 9, 1921, c. 119, 42 Stat. 212 (as amended, ...
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