Southwire Co. v. Cato, 39353

• Decision Date: 19 April 1983
• Docket Number: No. 39353,39353
• Citation: 250 Ga. 895,302 S.E.2d 91
• Parties: SOUTHWIRE COMPANY v. Willie R. CATO.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 91

302 S.E.2d 91

250 Ga. 895

SOUTHWIRE COMPANY v. Willie R. CATO.

No. 39353.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 19, 1983.

Rehearing Denied May 24, 1983.

[250 Ga. 898] James T. McDonald, Jr., Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, for Southwire Co.

C.C. Perkins, Clifford C. Perkins, Jr., Carrollton, for Willie R. Cato.

Don C. Keenan, Charles A. Ashman, amicus curiae.

OPINION

HILL, Chief Justice.

Certiorari was granted in this worker's compensation case to decide two questions: (a) whether the "natural inference from human experience" can be relied upon where there is medical testimony that the employee's heart attack was not caused by exertion on the job, and (b) whether the "natural inference from human experience" is applicable to a heart attack occurring at a time when the employee is not engaged in the employer's business.

The facts of the case as found by the administrative law judge are as follows: "Claimant, an over the road truck driver for Southwire, returned to Carrollton from a two day trip to Cincinnati and Columbus, Ohio on March 6, 1980. He arrived about 2:00 p.m., and after detaching his trailer, refueling the tractor, and checking out, he began to remove all of his personal effects from the old tractor to put them in a new tractor which had been awarded to him by the supervisor upon his return. He made these transfers on his own time; however, the new tractor was on the property of Southwire and the endeavor took him in excess of two hours to complete. During the day, he had appeared to be in good spirits; had expressed no concern regarding his health to any of his co-workers; and was reported to be happy concerning the new tractor he would be driving on the following day. When his wife arrived home around 6:30 p.m., he was there and told her he was not feeling well, commenting that he did not know he had so much stuff in his old truck to move over to the new one. He commented he felt he had an up-set stomach before dinner, and after eating, took an alka-seltzer, prepared his clothes and shoes for the next day's trip and lay down. Around 11:30 p.m., he got up and began watching T.V. Shortly after his wife got into bed, he fell across the bed [and] suffered a heart-attack, from which he died...." The employee had a history of hypertension.

Following her husband's death the widow, contending that work-related fatigue caused his heart attack, filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with his employer, Southwire Company. The company contested the claim on the ground that the employee's death was not job related. Each side presented medical testimony favoring its position. Following the hearing, the administrative law judge awarded benefits to the widow, based upon the foregoing facts, the medical testimony favoring the claimant and "the natural inference that claimant's death was work related." The Board affirmed, one member dissenting, and on appeal the superior court affirmed. Southwire's application for a discretionary appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals, and its petition for writ of certiorari was granted by this court.

After plenary consideration, we find that the second certiorari question is the only one properly before us. This determination should not be interpreted as an implied decision of the first certiorari question.

Under our worker's compensation law, " 'Injury' or 'personal injury' means only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment...." OCGA § 34-9-1(4) (Code Ann. § 114-102). An additional requirement as to heart attacks is that "injury" and "personal injury" shall not "include heart disease, heart attack, the failure or occlusion of any of the coronary blood vessels, or thrombosis unless it is shown by a preponderance of competent and credible evidence that any such conditions were attributable to the performance of the usual work of employment." OCGA § 34-9-1(4) (Code Ann. § 114-102).

The "natural inference" rule has at least two applications: (1) unexplained deaths, and (2) unexplained deaths involving heart attacks. ¹ 1 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law §§ 10.32, 10.32(a) (1982); Hiers & Potter, Georgia Worker's Compensation, § 5-6 (1981). According to Larson, the classic case of unexplained death "is that of the night watchman found dead at his post of duty, having been assaulted during the night, with nothing to indicate whether the motivation for the assault was personal or work-related." Larson, supra, § 10.32 at p. 3-101. In such case, "the natural presumption arises that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment." Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Kiker, 45 Ga.App. 706(5), 165 S.E. 859 (1932).

This natural presumption is well stated in Georgia Casualty & Surety Co. v. Conner, 117 Ga.App. 233(1), 160 S.E.2d 436 (1968): "Where an employee is found dead in a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his duties, the natural presumption arises that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment." ² A prerequisite to application of this presumption is that the employee be found at a place where he might reasonably be expected to be in the performance of his duties.

The "natural inference" rule applicable to heart attacks is stated differently. In such cases, "... the evidence must show the work engaged in by the employee to have been sufficiently strenuous or of such a nature that, combined with the other facts of the case, it raises a natural inference through human experience that the exertion contributed toward the precipitation of the attack...." Hoffman v. National Surety Corp., 91 Ga.App. 414, 85 S.E.2d 784 (1955). The question before us is whether this "natural inference" is applicable to a heart attack following exertion at work where the first symptoms of such attack occur at a time when the employee is not engaged in the employer's business. No case directly in point has been cited and none has been found.

"The mere fact that an employee suffered a fatal heart attack while working for his employer does not, in and of itself, require a finding that the attack was caused by exertion on the part of the employee in the course of his employment. [Cits. omitted]." Hansard v. Georgia Power Co., 105 Ga.App. 486, 124 S.E.2d 926 (1962). A fortiori, a heart attack occurring after work may be caused by conditions unrelated to the employee's work.

In Guye v. Home Indemnity Co., 241 Ga. 213, 244 S.E.2d 864 (1978), we pointed out (at p. 215, 244 S.E.2d 864): "It is well recognized in 'heart attack' cases that it is often difficult for the trier of fact to find the line between a noncompensable heart injury that is a symptom of an existing disease merely manifested during job exertion, and a compensable heart injury to which the job exertion was a contributing precipitating factor. [Citing cases]." In Guye the employee's heart attack symptoms started on the job following exertion. There was no medical evidence as to the cause of the attack. The question before us there was whether, without medical evidence as to causation, the natural inference...