Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 18 April 1916 |
| Docket Number | 5131. |
| Citation | 157 P. 92,57 Okla. 318,1916 OK 468 |
| Parties | SOVEREIGN CAMP OF WOODMEN OF THE WORLD v. JACKSON. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
When deceased has been accepted for membership by the local camp and his application for insurance has been accepted by the head camp, and benefit certificate issued, and same has been delivered to the member and his dues collected thereon, the lodge is estopped to deny that he is a member, and will not be heard to object that he has not been initiated.
The phrase "in good health" is a comparative term, and the fact that deceased was suffering with a slight cold at the time the benefit certificate was delivered to him, which afterwards developed into pneumonia and caused his death will not defeat a recovery upon the benefit certificate under the stipulation that the insured be "in good health" when the policy is delivered to him.
A beneficiary certificate issued by the order of the Woodmen of the World contained a clause that the order would pay the sum of $100 for the erection of a monument to the memory of the member to whom the certificate was issued. Held, in default in the erection of said monument, the beneficiary named in the policy or certificate was not entitled to a personal judgment for the said $100.
Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 4. Error from District Court, Bryan County; Jesse M. Hatchett, Judge.
Action by Mrs. Daisy Jackson against the Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Modified and affirmed.
Maxey Jackson & Dial, of Muskogee, for plaintiff in error.
Utterback Hayes & MacDonald, of Durant, for defendant in error.
On the 5th day of December, 1911, William E. Jackson made a written application to become a member of the local camp of the Woodmen of the World at Kenefick, Okl., and was on that day examined, and the application for insurance and medical examination forwarded to the home office of plaintiff in error. On the 14th day of December, 1911, the medical examination was approved, and the certificate sued on was issued by the proper officers, and sent to the proper officers of the local camp at Kenefick for delivery to the applicant, and was delivered to Jackson on the 29th day of December, 1911, and his receipt taken therefor, and the initial payment of dues thereon paid by Jackson. At the time of the delivery of the policy to Jackson he was suffering with a cold, accompanied by a slight fever, and late in the afternoon of that day a physician was called, though it does not appear whether the physician was called or the policy delivered first, except that the physician stated that he was there very late in the afternoon. Pneumonia shortly set up, and on the 12th of January following Jackson died. Payment was refused on the policy, and this suit was brought by the widow (who was the beneficiary) to recover $500 under the insurance contract, and $100 which was provided for in the policy as a monument fee. A jury was waived, and the case heard by the court, who rendered judgment in favor of the widow in the sum of $600, and from that judgment, this appeal is prosecuted by plaintiff in error.
The principal questions raised on this appeal are the following:
(1) Whether William Jackson was regularly initiated into the lodge so as to entitle the beneficiary to recover on the certificate.
(2) Whether the deceased was in good health at the time the certificate was delivered to him.
(3) Whether the widow is entitled to recover the monument fee of $100.
The benefit certificate issued to Jackson contained the following provision:
Section 58 of the constitution and by-laws of the order makes the fulfillment of substantially the same provisions a condition precedent to a recovery upon the certificate.
The local lodge of regularly initiated members, each one attending camp, and alike furnishing and receiving the mutual support and strength of the order, is the root, branch, and stock of the fraternal insurance organization. The reasons why initiation is made a condition precedent to a participation in the benefits of the organization are sound both in theory and in fact. Upon these reasons, even after the candidate has been accepted for membership by vote of the lodge, and after his physical examination has been approved by the central offices and the certificate issued, should the candidate refuse to be initiated into the lodge in conformity with its by-laws, it would have the right to refuse to accept the payments of dues by the candidate and withhold delivery of the certificate. in a fraternal organization, where each member is supposed to contribute his attendance to the meetings, and his personal influence and interest in the order, the lodge has the right to make conformity to these personal ends and purposes of the lodge a condition precedent to the completion of its insurance contract and liability on its part. They are in their way as much a part of the consideration of the benefits of the order as the payment of the premiums, or dues, as they may be called. The lodge has the right to fix the mutual duties and obligations of the members, and the requirement of initiation is as binding as any other condition precedent of the contract. However, if the lodge desires to insist upon strict compliance with the precedent conditions of the contract, it must do so at the proper time. The evidence in this case is not satisfactory as to whether the formal condition precedent of initiation was complied with or not, but we feel persuaded from the evidence that the deceased was not initiated. This was sufficient reason for the officers of the lodge to refuse to accept his dues and withhold delivery of the certificate, and, if the lodge had stood on its rights at the proper time, the defense would now be good here. But the lodge did not do this, but, on the contrary, enrolled Jackson as a member, made delivery of his policy, took his receipt therefor, collected his insurance premium or dues, sat up with him in his sickness and paid for his nurse, and buried him with the honors of the lodge when he was dead.
The organization, having collected the premium (or dues) on the certificate, and having treated Jackson as sufficiently a member for the collection of his dues, and having received those dues and delivered the policy (or certificate), cannot now be heard to say that he was not a member. If he was a member for the payment of dues, he was a member for the protection of the insurance which those dues paid for. The time for the plaintiff in error to have questioned his membership was before the delivery of the certificate and the collection of his dues, and, not having questioned it then, it cannot question it now. Plaintiff in error cites no case where the fraternal organization with like stipulation in its policy and by-laws and under like facts has been permitted to question a man's membership after it has enrolled him as a member and delivered the certificate and collected the premiums.
The case of Matkin v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, 82 Tex. 301, 18 S.W. 306, 27 Am. St. Rep. 886, is cited and quoted from at length by plaintiff in error on this question, but that case is not at all in point here. Under the facts of that case Matkin had failed to present himself for initiation, but had tendered the dues for his policy. The lodge had refused to accept his dues, and had not delivered him the policy. In that case the court properly held that Matkin was not a member. No question of waiver of initiation by the organization was presented, nor was there any element of estoppel in the case. The lodge, not having treated Matkin as a member while he was living, was not required to so treat him when dead. Not only so, but the same court (Supreme Court of Texas), in the case of Fraternal Mystic Circle v. Crawford, 32 Tex.Civ.App. 603, 75 S.W. 844, held that, where one has not been initiated, yet the fraternal organization delivers the insurance certificate to him and receives his assessments, the lack of initiation is no defense, but will be held to have been waived. The court said:
See, also, Perine v. Grand Lodge, 48 Minn. 82, 50 N.W. 1022.
This we think, is sound. The central organization's interest in the payment of the dues is direct, but its interest in the initiation, the attendance of the members at lodge meetings, and the strength and support of the activity and influence of the member is only indirect. On the contrary, the initiation of the member and his attendance and support and influence is a matter of direct interest to the local camp, and the...
To continue reading
Request your trial