Soward v. Mahan, 68473

• Decision Date: 28 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 68473,68473
• Parties: 111 Ed. Law Rep. 1017 Rosalind SOWARD, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. David J. MAHAN and The Board of Education of the City of St. Louis, Defendants/Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 138

926 S.W.2d 138

111 Ed. Law Rep. 1017

Rosalind SOWARD, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. David J. MAHAN and The Board of Education of the City of St.

Louis, Defendants/Respondents.

No. 68473.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division Three.

May 28, 1996.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court

Denied July 10, 1996.

Application to Transfer Denied

Aug. 20, 1996.

Hugh R. Law and David Arthur, St. Louis, for appellant.

Daniel K. O'Toole, St. Louis, for respondents.

RHODES RUSSELL, Judge.

Rosalind Soward ("Teacher") appeals a decision of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis in favor of the Board of Education of the City of St. Louis ("Board") which dismissed her from employment as a permanent elementary school teacher for inefficiency. We affirm.

Teacher taught elementary school for 26 years prior to being terminated on November 23, 1993. During the last eight years Teacher worked at the Meramec School in the St. Louis School District teaching first and second grades. Her performance evaluations were generally satisfactory through the spring semester of 1991. In the fall of 1991, Beverly Wilkins ("Principal") became acting principal of the Meramec School. Wilkins documented several problems with Teacher's performance in the fall of 1991. Of most concern were Teacher's inability to discipline her students and the general untidiness of her classroom. Jeanette Pulliam, a curriculum specialist for reading, and Edward Ortleb, a curriculum specialist for science, also observed Teacher's classroom during the 1991 fall semester. Both documented concerns with her teaching style and discipline of the students.

On December 11, 1991, Principal completed a "Summative Evaluation Report" on Teacher. She was rated as "unsatisfactory" in 13 categories and as "needs improvement" in seven categories. She received only one "satisfactory" evaluation. Principal gave Teacher an overall "unsatisfactory" rating for the semester. An appointment to discuss the evaluation was scheduled for December 12, 1991, but Teacher went on sick leave that day and did not return to work until August of the following year. A summative evaluation form was submitted for Teacher for the spring semester of 1992, even though she did not teach that semester. While most of the form was left blank, the comment section contained the following:

Ms. Soward has not returned to duty since her unsatisfactory evaluation on December 12, 1991. Upon her return from leave, it will be recommended that she begin her 100 days of probation.

Principal testified that the spring evaluation was mailed to Teacher, although Teacher denies ever receiving it.

Teacher returned to work on August 26, 1992, a few days prior to the beginning of fall semester classes. Upon observing her, Principal felt that she was not capable of returning to work. She testified that Teacher behaved erratically and was uncooperative. Teacher was placed on medical leave from August 28, 1992, to September 25, 1992. She returned to work on September 28, 1992, after a doctor certified that she was capable of returning. She was assigned to a second grade classroom at the Meramec School.

In a certified letter dated September 21, 1992, Superintendent David T. Mahan ("Superintendent") informed Teacher that she had one semester to improve her inefficiencies as a teacher. The letter noted several areas of concern, including preparation for instructions, implementation of varied teaching strategies, classroom organization, noise level and interpersonal relations. Teacher denies ever receiving the letter and suggested that it may have been delivered to a street named Wallington Walk, instead of to her at Wallington Court. On October 8, 1992, Principal sent Teacher a note requesting a meeting concerning her semester warning period. Teacher claims that this was the first she heard of the warning. The next day Principal did meet with her and showed her a copy of the warning letter. Principal testified that Teacher routinely denied receiving documents, and as a result she began requiring her to sign documents when she received them. When she refused to sign, Principal so noted.

Following the October 9, 1992 meeting, Principal and Winifred Deavens, a curriculum supervisor employed by the district, observed and evaluated Teacher's classroom performance. Following these observations, the evaluators generally met with Teacher to discuss the observations and suggest ways in which her teaching could be improved. At least five such conferences were held. The evaluators noted the same deficiencies in her teaching style that had been complained of in the warning letter.

On March 23, 1993, Superintendent sent a letter to Teacher notifying her that she had not demonstrated satisfactory progress during the warning period and that he was therefore recommending that the Board discharge her for inefficiency in the line of duty. Teacher was thereafter suspended without pay. The letter also informed her of her rights under § 168.221 RSMo 1994. ¹

A hearing before the Board was held on July 20, July 21 and August 9, 1995. Teacher was represented by counsel and exercised her right to introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses. On November 23, 1995, the Board issued its decision finding that Teacher was inefficient in the line of duty. As a result, the Board decided to discharge her from her position as a teacher. Teacher thereafter filed a petition with the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis to review the decision of the Board. After a hearing, the circuit court entered a judgment in favor of the Board. This appeal now follows.

In the first point on appeal, Teacher claims that the provisions of § 168.221.3 were not followed in that she did not receive a full semester warning period in which to improve her teaching. Section 168.221.3 in relevant part reads:

... Inefficiency in line of duty is cause for dismissal only after teacher or principal has been notified in writing at least one semester prior to the presentment of charges against him by the Superintendent....

Teacher interprets this statute as requiring a calendar semester, rather than any specific number of days. Since Teacher claims she received the notification letter on October 9, 1992, or at the earliest September 21, and was suspended on the following March 23, she claims that she did not receive a calendar semester to improve herself. She contends that the notice period did not begin to run until the beginning of the spring semester as she did not receive the warning letter until the middle of the fall semester, therefore, she had until the end of the spring semester to improve her teaching. The Board argues that § 168.221.3 only requires a teacher be given a period of time equivalent to one semester to improve. In this case the Board contends that Teacher, whether receiving notice on September 21 or October 9, 1992, was given a probation period of some 22 weeks, well in excess of the 18 weeks which generally makes up a calendar semester.

In an action such as this, we review the findings and conclusions of the board of education, an administrative agency, rather than the circuit court. Johnson v. Francis Howell R-3 Board of Education, 868 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Mo.App.1994). The issue of whether the board complied with the requirements of the statute is a question of law, and we review under Rule 73.01 as interpreted in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo.banc 1976). This court will affirm the decision of the board unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, or unless it erroneously declares or applies the law. Id. at 32.

The primary rule of statutory construction requires courts to ascertain the intent of the legislature by considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute. Conagra Poultry Co. v. Director of Revenue, 862 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Mo.banc 1993). We must construe the statute in light of the purposes the legislature intended to accomplish and the evils it intended to cure. Wilson v. Director of Revenue, 873 S.W.2d 328, 329 (Mo.App.1994). Courts should avoid interpretations which are unjust, absurd, or...