Spacil v. Crowe

Decision Date13 February 1974
Docket NumberNo. 73-3599.,73-3599.
Citation489 F.2d 614
PartiesDusan SPACIL, Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Guthrie F. CROWE, United States District Court Judge for the District of the Canal Zone, et al., Respondents.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Leonard B. Boudin, Michael Krinsky, New York City, Bruno Ristau, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Civil Div., Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Guthrie F. Crowe, Judge, Balboa Heights, Canal Zone, Robert E. Herzstein, Washington, D. C., Betty Olchin, Balboa, Canal Zone, Donald W. Doyle, Howard J. Smith, Donald W. Doyle, Jr., New Orleans, La., for respondents.

Before WISDOM, AINSWORTH and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Circuit Judge:

This case concerns executive preemption of the decision to grant a foreign sovereign immunity from suit in our courts.

On November 13, 1973, we granted a petition for a writ of mandamus in this action, directing the district court for the district of the Canal Zone "to order the release of the vessel `M/V Imias' and to refrain from exercising any jurisdiction over that ship and over the action entitled Industria Azucerera Nacional, S.A., et al v. Empresa Navegacion Mambisa". Because of the urgency of the matter, we granted the petition without then stating our reasons in an opinion. We now state the reasons for our order granting the writ.

I.

The controversy grew out of the recent military coup in Chile. On September 11, 1973, a military junta overthrew the government of President Salvador Allende Gossens. That same day the M/V Playa Larga, a vessel owned by the Cuban corporation Empresa Navegacion Mambisa (Mambisa), abruptly left Chilean waters.1 The Playa Larga had transported raw sugar from Cuba and had only partially unloaded its cargo at a pier in Valparaiso. The vessel left port so precipitately that it still had on board four unloading cranes owned by the Chilean corporation, Compania de Refineria de Azucar de Vina del Mar (Refineria). After leaving Chilean territory on September 11, the Playa Larga was damaged by strafing from Chilean Air Force planes and shelling from a Chilean destroyer. A second Mambisa vessel, the M/V Marble Island, also transporting sugar from Cuba, abandoned its course for Chile on September 12, 1973.

The sugar carried by both the Playa Larga and the Marble Island was consigned to Industria Azucarera Nacional, S.A. (Azucarera), a Chilean corporation. Azucarera instituted a breach of contract action against Mambisa in the Canal Zone district court, contending that it had fully paid for the sugar. Refineria joined as plaintiff, asserting a claim for the conversion of the four cranes carried off by the Playa Larga. The claims totaled more than $4 million. On October 2, 1973, the District Court for the Canal Zone issued a writ attaching the M/V Imias.

The Czechoslovak Ambassador, Dusan Spacil, representing the interests of Cuba in the United States, promptly requested the State Department to file a suggestion of immunity in the district court urging the release of the Imias and the dismissal of the action. In conformity with established procedures,2 members of the Legal Adviser's Office of the State Department heard arguments on behalf of the parties. On October 25 the Legal Adviser apprised the Attorney General of the United States of the State Department's decision:

"The Department has been informed by the Embassy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as representative of the interests of the Government of the Republic of Cuba in the United States of America, that the M.N. Imias is a vessel belonging to the Government of Cuba and that the Government of Cuba requests that the said vessel be granted immunity from the jurisdiction of United States courts.
The Department recognizes and allows immunity of the M.N. Imias from the jurisdiction of United States courts for the purpose of arrest, attachment, suit, or any other legal process in the above captioned action.
The Department would be grateful to you if you would cause an appropriate suggestion of immunity to be filed with the United States District Court for the Canal Zone." (Emphasis added.)

In compliance with this request, the United States Attorney for the Canal Zone, at the direction of the Attorney General, certified a suggestion of immunity to the court, stating:

"The issue of immunity arises in connection with a determination reached by the Executive Branch of the Government of the United States in the implementation of its foreign policy and in the conduct of its international relations, which determination should be given effect by this Court."

Counsel for the plaintiffs requested an opportunity to appeal to the Secretary of State the Legal Adviser's decision to recognize and allow the claim of immunity. Counsel also requested a statement of the reasons for the Legal Adviser's decision. The Legal Adviser responded:

"The Department\'s decision to recognize and allow immunity in this case was made on the basis of the most careful consideration of all the circumstances and after appropriate consultation by the Office of the Legal Adviser with the other interested bureaus and officials in the Department. The Department\'s practice in sovereign immunity cases does not provide for an appeal, or any presentation by counsel, to the Secretary of State. The Department\'s decision has been taken, and, it is the Department\'s view that the public interest and United States foreign relations are best served by the prompt release of the vessel."

On November 1, 1973, the district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the suit and to release the Imias on grounds of sovereign immunity. The district judge stated orally in open court, however, that he would defer the entry of the order until November 5 and that if the plaintiffs posted a $25,000 bond the court would stay the effectiveness of the order pending appeal. The defendant petitioned for writs of mandamus and prohibition, seeking an order of this Court to require the district court to dismiss the action and order the immediate release of the vessel. The defendant and plaintiffs filed briefs in this Court. In addition, the United States filed a brief in support of the petition. Meanwhile the plaintiffs posted the bond, and the district court stayed the effectiveness of the order. This Court permitted counsel for the plaintiffs and the defendant and a representative of the United States to argue the case on November 12. The following day we granted the writ.

II.

An accepted rule of law is that courts should recognize the immunity of a foreign sovereign. "Historically the rule may be traced to a time when most states were ruled by a personal soverign who, in a very real sense, personnified the State`L'Etat C'est moi'". Draft Convention of the Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, 26 Am.J.Int'l L. 451, 527, no. 1. The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity cuts across the rights of individuals when governments engage in commercial or industrial activities reserved in many countries for private enterprise. In applying the doctrine in any particular case the judiciary must be sensitive to the overriding necessity that courts not interfere with the executive's proper handling of foreign affairs.

From the early days of the Republic to the present, the United States judiciary has bowed to suggestions by the executive that certain suits against foreign sovereigns should not be entertained in United States courts. In the famous case of The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 1812, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 3 L.Ed. 287, where the Supreme Court first enunciated the doctrine of immunity for foreign sovereigns, Chief Justice Marshall said: "There seems to be a necessity for admitting that the fact of immunity might be disclosed to the court by the suggestion of the attorney for the United States." 11 U.S. at 147.

The Supreme Court has stated the principle forcefully in later decisions. Writing for the Court in Compania Espanola De Navegacion Maritima v. The Navemar, 1938, 303 U.S. 68, 74, 58 S.Ct. 432, 82 L.Ed. 667, Justice Stone stated unequivocally that the courts would be bound by a claim of sovereign immunity "recognized and allowed" by the executive branch: "It is then the duty of the courts to release the vessel upon appropriate suggestion by the Attorney General of the United States, or other officer acting under his direction." This characterization of the function of the judiciary when faced with an executive suggestion of immunity was echoed in Ex parte Peru, 1943, 318 U.S. 578, 588, 63 S.Ct. 793, 87 L.Ed. 1014:

"Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction, by the seizure and detention of the property of a friendly sovereign, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations. . . . The judicial seizure of the vessel of a friendly foreign state is so serious a challenge to its dignity, and may so affect our friendly relations with it, that courts are required to accept and follow the executive determination that the vessel is immune. . . . Upon recognition and allowance of the claim by the State Department and certification of its action presented to the court by the Attorney General, it is the court\'s duty to surrender the vessel and remit the libelant to the relief obtainable through diplomatic negotiations."

More recently, the Second and Fourth Circuits have reiterated that once the State Department has determined that immunity is warranted, and has submitted that ruling to the court through a suggestion, the matter is for diplomatic rather than judicial resolution. The suit must be dismissed, and any property attached must be released. Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 2 Cir. 1971, 446 F.2d 1198, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985, 92 S.Ct. 452, 30 L.Ed.2d 369; Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 4 Cir. 1961, 295 F.2d 24.

The precedents are overwhelming. For more than 160 years...

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