Spain v. Houston Oilers, Inc., A2156

• Decision Date: 12 December 1979
• Docket Number: No. A2156,A2156
• Citation: 593 S.W.2d 746
• Parties: 88 Lab.Cas. P 55,249 Ken SPAIN, Appellant, v. HOUSTON OILERS, INCORPORATED, Appellee. (14th Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 746

593 S.W.2d 746

88 Lab.Cas. P 55,249

Ken SPAIN, Appellant, v. HOUSTON OILERS, INCORPORATED, Appellee.

No. A2156.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Dec. 12, 1979.

Stevens F. Mafrige, Houston, for appellant.

William R. Eckhardt, Houston, for appellee.

Before J. CURTISS BROWN, C. J., and MILLER and PAUL PRESSLER, JJ.

PAUL PRESSLER, Justice.

This is an appeal involving an arbitration clause in the employment contract between the parties. The court below granted appellee's motion to dismiss and ordered appellant to submit his claim to arbitration.

On January 14, 1972, appellant signed a National Football League (NFL) Standard Player Contract (the contract) which by its terms was in effect from February 1, 1970 through January 31, 1974. The terms and conditions of employment specified in the contract were the result of collective bargaining between the National Football League Player's Association (NFLPA), the exclusive bargaining representative of professional football players in the NFL, and the National Football League Player Relations Association (NFLPRA), the exclusive bargaining representative of the Member Clubs of the NFL. During 1972, appellant received a disabling injury while performing his responsibilities under the contract. On August 29, 1972, appellant was released by appellee.

Article XIV of the contract provided that a player would receive at least certain minimum benefits while employed. Under this provision, appellant claims that appellee was obligated to continue paying appellant's salary while he was injured and not playing, for the duration of the season. Appellee refused to do so and appellant brought this suit. Various continuances were granted, delaying trial for approximately four years. Each of the parties requested continuances on different occasions for varying reasons and each participated in pre-trial discovery. The contract in question was negotiated under the collective bargaining provisions of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act.

While state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction in cases involving the alleged breach of contracts negotiated pursuant to the Taft-Hartley Act, it is clear that substantive federal law must govern the interpretation and application of the terms of those contracts. National Labor Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965). This section provides for the filing of a suit in Federal District Court where it is "for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, . . ." The U. S. Supreme Court, in Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 77 S.Ct. 390, 1 L.Ed.2d 456 (1957), determined that professional football is "commerce" as defined in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. As that definition is virtually identical to the definition of "commerce" under the Taft-Hartley Act, the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act and the court decisions interpreting it apply to the contract negotiated by the organizations representing the NFL players and member clubs.

Article XI, § 6, of the contract provides for mandatory arbitration of disputes relating to injuries incurred by a player while performing services required of him under the contract. Appellant contends in his first point of error that the court erred in dismissing his suit and compelling arbitration because appellee waived its right to arbitration as a matter of law. The right to have a dispute submitted to arbitration, like any other contractual right, may be waived either expressly or implicitly. Burton-Dixie Corporation v. Timothy McCarthy Construction Co., 436 F.2d...