Spalding v. State
| Decision Date | 09 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A04–1210–CR–534.,49A04–1210–CR–534. |
| Parties | Eddie SPALDING, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Valerie K. Boots, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Katherine Modesitt Cooper, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Eddie Spalding appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss and discharge. We affirm.
Spalding raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly denied his motion to dismiss and discharge.
On March 7, 2011, Spalding was arrested and charged with Class A misdemeanor operating while intoxicated, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and Class B misdemeanor public intoxication. On March 10, 2011, Spalding was released on bond. On April 1, 2011, Spalding was held in the Marion County Jail on a United States Marshal Service (“USMS”) hold. Although a hearing was scheduled for April 11, 2011, Spalding failed to appear. A re-arrest warrant was issued and served that same day. On April 12, 2011, Spalding appeared at a hearing and, according to jail records, was returned to the jail. On May 10, 2011, the State moved for a continuance of the June 30, 2011 trial date, which the trial court granted. On June 2, 2011, Spalding was released to the USMS.
A pretrial conference was held on June 30, 2011, at which Spalding failed to appear, and defense counsel informed the trial court that Spalding was apparently in federal custody but confirmation was needed. The trial was rescheduled for July 1, 2011, and Spalding again failed to appear.
On July 19, 2011, Spalding wrote a letter informing the trial court that he was in federal custody in Kentucky and awaiting transfer to a facility in Oklahoma. The trial court forwarded this letter to the State on July 25, 2011. On August 29, 2011, the State petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum requesting that Spalding be transported for a September 28, 2011 hearing, which the trial court granted. Although the writ was issued, federal authorities did not transport Spalding to that hearing.
From October 21, 2011, through January 23, 2012, Spalding was incarcerated in the Marion County Jail on a federal hold. It is not clear from the record why Spalding was in the Marion County Jail during this time.
On March 13, 2012, Spalding filed a motion to dismiss and discharge alleging that 372 days had passed since his arrest and that all of the delay was attributable to the State. At a March 14, 2012 hearing, defense counsel informed the trial court that Spalding was still in federal custody awaiting the adjudication of an alleged probation violation. On March 28, 2012, another hearing was held, and the trial court ruled that the delays from July 1, 2011, through July 25, 2011, September 28, 2011, through October 21, 2011, and March 13, 2012, through March 28, 2012, were attributable to Spalding. The trial court informed the parties, “from the date defense filed the motion, March 13th of this year to today and any further proceedings will be charged to the defense.” Tr. p. 27. That same day, the trial court granted defense counsel's request to certify the issue for interlocutory appeal.
On April 26, 2012, Spalding informed the trial court of his intent not to file an appeal at that time and requested that a bench trial be set before June 4, 2012.1 At an April 30, 2012 hearing, defense counsel informed the trial court that Spalding was in a federal facility in Illinois. Defense counsel objected to a proposed trial date of June 7, 2012, and requested that trial be set before June 4, 2012. A trial was scheduled for May 31, 2012.
Spalding was not transported to the May 31, 2012 trial, and defense counsel stated that Spalding was still in federal custody and that his earliest release date was “[e]arly 2013.” Id. at 41. The trial court indicated that Spalding would not be transported until he had executed his sentence. Defense counsel voiced his concerns about Spalding's right to a speedy trial and stated that he believed the Indiana Criminal Rule 4 date had already passed and that, even based on the trial court's calculations, the deadline would be June 5, 2012. Defense counsel objected to setting a trial date beyond that. The trial court set a status hearing for November 1, 2012.
On June 18, 2012, Spalding filed another motion to dismiss and discharge arguing that, based on the trial court's March 28, 2012 calculations, 370 days of delay were attributable to the State. On August 23, 2012, after a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. On September 27, 2012, Spalding belatedly requested the certification of the order for interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. We accepted jurisdiction, and Spalding now appeals.
Spalding argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss and discharge because the time limit for trying him has passed. This issue is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Pelley v. State, 901 N.E.2d 494, 498 (Ind.2009).
Spalding contends that, of the 470 days from the date he was charged until the date he filed his second motion to dismiss and discharge, only seventy-five days were attributable to him. According to Spalding, the State failed to timely bring him to trial in violation of Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C), which provides:
No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because of congestion of the court calendar; provided, however, that in the last-mentioned circumstance, the prosecuting attorney shall file a timely motion for continuance as under subdivision (A) of this rule. Provided further, that a trial court may take note of congestion or an emergency without the necessity of a motion, and upon so finding may order a continuance. Any continuance granted due to a congested calendar or emergency shall be reduced to an order, which order shall also set the case for trial within a reasonable time. Any defendant so held shall, on motion, be discharged.
The State responds by arguing, “because Defendant was in a foreign jurisdiction for several months following his arrest and the filing of charges against him in Indiana, Criminal Rule 4(C) does not apply to those time periods when he was outside the jurisdiction.” Appellee's Br. p. 9. Effectively, however, the State asks us to apply Criminal Rule 4(C) and attribute the time Spalding was incarcerated out of state to him. According to the State, when considering the time Spalding was in federal custody outside of Indiana, only 181 days are attributable to the Criminal Rule 4(C) time limit and, therefore, the motion to dismiss and discharge was properly denied.
When a defendant is incarcerated in another jurisdiction, there are two methods for securing his or her presence in Indiana—the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), codified at Indiana Code Section 35–33–10–4, and a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum (“writ”), codified at Indiana Code Section 35–33–10–5. See Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86, 95 (Ind.1998), cert. denied. “The decision of whether to use a detainer or a Writ to obtain custody of a prisoner only arises when the prisoner is confined in a federal prison; Writs are not available with respect to prisoners incarcerated or confined in other states.” Id. at 97. There is no statutory mandate obligating the State to file a detainer within a set time frame and, absent the filing of a detainer, the provisions of the IAD are not triggered. Fisher v. State, 933 N.E.2d 526, 529–30 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). Here, the State did not file a detainer. Thus, the IAD and its provisions for discharge do not apply. This does not necessarily mean, however, that Criminal Rule 4 does apply.
Our supreme court has observed:
While it may be reasonable to impose the time limit of Criminal Rule 4(B) when a criminal defendant is within the exclusive control of the State of Indiana, for purposes of certainty and ease of administration of the rule, it becomes irrational to extend its application to a defendant who is incarcerated in another jurisdiction which has an interest in retaining the defendant in its custody, either for trial or to serve a sentence.
Smith v. State, 267 Ind. 167, 171, 368 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (1977) (). In other words, “Indiana has long held that Criminal Rule 4 does not apply when a person is incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction.”
Howard v. State, 755 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind.Ct.App.2001); see also Fisher, 933 N.E.2d at 529 (). Our supreme court has clarified, “the inapplicability of Criminal Rule 4 to defendants in foreign jurisdictions should not extend to defendants who are brought into Indiana under Writs or other forms of temporary custody.” Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 100.
In Howard, the defendant was arrested in Indiana on September 2, 1998, and formal charges were filed on September 9, 1998. We observed that, for purposes of Criminal Rule 4, the clock began to tick on September 9, 1998. Id. at 246. On September 15, 1998, at Howard's initial hearing, defense counsel informed the State that Howard was incarcerated in Kentucky. Relying on Smith, we concluded, ...
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