Spanier v. Louis J. Freeh & Freeh Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP

• Decision Date: 30 June 2014
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court
• Parties: Graham B. SPANIER, Appellee v. Louis J. FREEH and Freeh Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP, Appellants.

95 A.3d 342

2014 PA Super 133

Graham B. SPANIER, Appellee

v.Louis J. FREEH and Freeh Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP, Appellants.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 21, 2014.

Filed June 30, 2014.

Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Philadelphia, for appellee.

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J.

OPINION BY PANELLA, J.

Appellants, Louis Freeh and Freeh Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP (collectively “Freeh Sporkin”), appeal from the trial court's order to stay the filing of the complaint filed by Appellee, Graham B. Spanier, until the completion of Spanier's criminal proceedings. Freeh Sporkin contends that the trial court erred in ordering the stay as it stripped them of their right to remove the case to federal court. Furthermore, Freeh Sporkin argues that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the trial court's stay order “is a collateral order appealable under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313.” Appellants' Brief, at 1.

We disagree with Freeh Sporkin and find that the trial court's order does not qualify as a collateral order and therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the trial court's order to stay the filing of the complaint. As such, we dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.

On July 12, 2012, Freeh Sporkin released a report (“the Report”) detailing the actions of the Pennsylvania State University concerning the child abuse perpetrated by Gerald A. Sandusky. The Report stated that Dr. Spanier concealed critical facts about the Sandusky scandal from the authorities. Following publication of the Report, Spanier was criminally charged for endangering the welfare of children, perjury, obstruction of justice, criminal conspiracy, and failure to report sexual assault. Presently, Spanier's criminal proceedings have not been scheduled for trial, but the trial is anticipated to take place within a year's time.

On July 11, 2013, Dr. Spanier filed a praecipe for a writ of summons to initiate a defamation action against Freeh Sporkin, and Pepper Hamilton, LLP. A writ was issued on the same day and later reissued by request of Plaintiff on August 2, 2013. An amended writ was subsequently issued, dropping Pepper Hamilton, LLP from the instant action.

Freeh Sporkin filed a praecipe to file complaint pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1037(a) and a Rule was issued by the prothonotary on the same day. Spanier then filed a motion to stay the civil proceedings, requesting a stay be granted in the above-mentioned action until the criminal charges against him were resolved. The trial court granted the stay on February 25, 2014, holding that the Spanier satisfied the six-factor balancing test set forth in In re Adelphia Communications Sec. Litig., 2003 WL 22358819 (E.D.Pa.2003), and Anderson v. Scott, 2011 WL 10795429 (C.P. Lawrence 2011).

After the February 25 order, Freeh Sporkin filed an emergency motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. This timely appeal followed.

Before turning to the merits of the matter before us, we must determine if we have appellate jurisdiction in this matter. An order issuing a stay within an action or proceeding is usually considered interlocutory and not appealable absent a statute, which renders the stay immediately appealable. See Washington v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 995 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Pa.Super.2010). Among other exceptions, the appeal of a grant of a motion to stay civil proceedings is appealable and within our jurisdiction if it satisfies the collateral order doctrine pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313. See Melvin v. Doe, 575 Pa. 264, 836 A.2d 42, 46 (2003); Ben v. Schwartz, 556 Pa. 475, 729 A.2d 547, 550 (1999).

Rule 313 states:

(a) General rule. An appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order of an administrative agency or lower court.

(b) Definition. A collateral order is an order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.

Pa.R.A.P. 313. Our case law has made it clear that all three prongs of the rule must be satisfied in order to qualify as a collateral order for our review. See Melvin, 836 A.2d at 46. The collateral order doctrine is “a specialized, practical application of the general rule that only final orders are appealable as of right.” Id. (quoting Geniviva v. Frisk, 555 Pa. 589, 725 A.2d 1209, 1214 (1999)). As such, this Court must stringently apply the requirements of the collateral order doctrine. See id.; see also Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Ass'n, 602 Pa. 65, 977 A.2d 1121, 1126 (2009). Absent the satisfaction of all three prongs of the collateral order test, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider an appeal of an otherwise non-final order. See Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 583 Pa. 208, 876 A.2d 939, 943 (2005).

We begin with the first prong of the collateral order doctrine. Our Supreme Court has noted that

a claim is sufficiently separate from the underlying issues for purposes of collateral order review if it is conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff[']s claim, that is, where even if practically intertwined with the merits, it nonetheless raises a question that is significantly different from the questions underlying plaintiff's claim on the merits.

Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 588 Pa. 405, 905 A.2d 422, 433 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

An appeal from an order to stay civil proceedings can be heard without reaching the merits of the underlying claim. See Sew Clean Drycleaners & Launders, Inc. v. Dress for Success Cleaners, Inc., 903 A.2d 1254, 1258 (Pa.Super.2006). The issue of the trial court's order to stay the filing of the complaint can be decided without reaching the merits of Spanier's defamation cause of action. Therefore, the first prong of the collateral order doctrine is satisfied.

We now turn to our analysis of the second prong of the collateral order doctrine. In order to satisfy the second prong of the collateral order doctrine, it is not sufficient that the issue be important to the particular parties. See Melvin, 836 A.2d at 47. Rather, the issue must involve rights deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand. See Ben, 729 A.2d at 552.

Here, Freeh Sporkin assert that the trial court's order to stay the civil proceedings infringes upon the right of a defendant to remove civil proceedings from state court to federal court. The Appellants contend that this is an important public right that warrants our review of this matter. The longstanding right of removal to federal court was first established by the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Wis. Dep't of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 386, 118 S.Ct. 2047, 141 L.Ed.2d 364 (1998). This right was designed and deeply rooted in public policy to protect out-of-state litigants from local prejudice and extends to all non-resident litigants. See Landsman & Funk PC v. Skinder–Strauss Assocs., 640 F.3d 72, 89 (3d Cir.2011); see also Grassi v. Ciba–Geigy, Ltd., 894 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir.1990) (“Congress has created diversity jurisdiction and the right of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 for the purpose of protecting non-resident litigants from local prejudice.”). In light of this history, it is a recognized statutory right presumed to exist for all civil actions provided that the federal court had original jurisdiction to hear the matter. See Caterpillar v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996). It is clear from federal case law that a defendant's statutory right of removal is too important to be denied review. Therefore, the second prong of the collateral order doctrine is satisfied.

Lastly, we must examine if the instant matter satisfies the third prong of the collateral order doctrine. We conclude that it does not.

The third prong requires us to examine whether the claim would be irrevocably lost if review were postponed until final judgment. See Melvin, 836 A.2d at 47. In Melvin, a case dealing with a defamation action against an anonymous source, our Supreme Court determined that the right to prevent the disclosure of the appellant's identity would be irreparably lost if the order compelling the disclosure of appellant's identity was not reviewed until final judgment. See id. at 50. Because there was no other means to cure the disclosure of an anonymous identity without review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellant would have suffered irreparable harm if not given the immediate right of appeal. See id.

In the instant matter, we must now determine if the order to stay the filing of the complaint totally and irreparably harms Freeh Sporkin's right to remove these proceedings to federal court. We find that the case law in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania is instructive in determining if Freeh Sporkin suffer irrevocable harm as the applicable standards of these courts concerning removal would be applied at the time of attempted removal to federal court. Upon careful review of the Third Circuit's precedent, and precedent from the Middle District of Pennsylvania, we find that the trial court's order to stay the filing of the complaint does not irreparably infringe upon Freeh Sporkin's removal rights.

The applicable federal removal statute states, in relevant part:

(c)(1) A case may not be removed under subsection (b)(3) on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 (28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012)) more than 1 year after commencement of the action, unless the discretion court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant from removing the action.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) (2012).

The Middle District of Pennsylvania has consistently interpreted the § 1446(c)(1) one-year limit to be an absolute bar running from the...