Sparks v. Character and Fitness Committee of Kentucky, 85-5629

• Decision Date: 18 October 1988
• Docket Number: No. 85-5629,85-5629
• Citation: 859 F.2d 428
• Parties: Gerald M. SPARKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARACTER AND FITNESS COMMITTEE OF KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 428

859 F.2d 428

57 USLW 2250

Gerald M. SPARKS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHARACTER AND FITNESS COMMITTEE OF KENTUCKY, et al Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85-5629.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Aug. 15, 1988.

Decided Oct. 18, 1988.

Gerald M. Sparks, Louisville, Ky. (argued), pro se.

William A. Barth, John T. Ballantine (argued), Louisville, Ky., for defendants-appellees.

Before ENGEL, Chief Judge, ^* and KRUPANSKY and RYAN, Circuit Judges.

RYAN, Circuit Judge.

This case has been returned to us by the United States Supreme Court which vacated our earlier judgment and directed that we give the matter "further consideration" in light of Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555; --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 744, 98 L.Ed.2d 757 (1988). We have done so and now hold that the Supreme Court's opinion in Forrester is entirely distinguishable from this case and, therefore, does not require that we change our previous decision. See Sparks v. Character & Fitness Comm., 818 F.2d 541 (6th Cir.1987). Accordingly, we once again affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.

I.

Plaintiff Sparks filed a complaint in the district court on March 1, 1985 against the chief justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court, a member of the Board of Law Examiners, the Kentucky Character and Fitness Committee, its members, and two of its employees. The complaint alleged violations of various constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, and asserted several state law claims arising out of the Kentucky Supreme Court's refusal to admit Sparks to membership in the bar of the state of Kentucky.

In our earlier decision, we described the factual background for Sparks' lawsuit as follows:

Sparks averred that in 1980, when he was first a candidate for admission to the Kentucky bar, he was interviewed, pursuant to Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 2.040, by Junius J. Beaver, Jr., an associate member of the [Kentucky Character and Fitness] Committee. At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Beaver addressed a letter to the Kentucky State Board of Bar Examiners stating that because Sparks was not possessed of the requisite character and moral fitness, he could not recommend that Sparks take the upcoming Kentucky Bar Examination.

Sparks contends that despite Mr. Beaver's adverse recommendation, of which Sparks had no knowledge, "the powers that be still allowed him to take the Kentucky Bar exam four times ... knowing full well that the plaintiff had been blackballed." Sparks failed the bar examination three times; his fourth examination was never graded.

818 F.2d at 542.

The district court dismissed the action against the Honorable Robert F. Stephens, Chief Justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court, on the ground that Chief Justice Stephens was entitled to absolute immunity because consideration of an application for admission to the bar is a judicial act for which a judge cannot be held liable in damages. The district court also dismissed the action against the remaining defendants, holding that given the extensive authority exercised over the Board of Bar Examiners and the Character and Fitness Committee by the Kentucky Supreme Court, the actions of the Board of Bar Examiners and the Committee relating to Sparks' application for admission to the bar "cannot be divorced from the actions of the Supreme Court of Kentucky" and are also "clothed with judicial immunity." The district court therefore dismissed plaintiff's complaint.

On appeal, we affirmed the district court's holding. 818 F.2d 541 (6th Cir.1987). After noting, inter alia, that the Kentucky Constitution charges the Kentucky Supreme Court with the duty to "govern admission to the bar and the discipline of members of the bar," Ky.Const. of 1891, Sec. 116 (1976), we held that "the act of considering an application for admission to the bar, particularly when that duty is imposed upon the judiciary by constitution, is a judicial act. When it is performed by a judge, he or she is entitled to absolute judicial immunity." 818 F.2d at 543. Our reasoning, in part, was as follows:

In [Stump v.] Sparkman [435 U.S. 349, 362, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1107, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) ], the Supreme Court stated:

"The relevant cases demonstrate that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a 'judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity."

....

The power to determine who should practice before the courts has been aptly summarized by Chief Justice Taney:

"And it has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed."

Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1856). This power is not only exclusive; it is inherently judicial. Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774, 780 (D.C.Cir.1980). Accord Louis v. Supreme Court of Nevada, 490 F.Supp. 1174, 1182 (D.Nev.1980); Galahad v. Weinshienk, 555 F.Supp. 1201, 1204 (D.Colo.1983).

....

The court's exercise of its inherent power to choose its officers is substantially determinative of the character and quality of our entire judicial system, state and federal. Our system of justice depends, in substantial measure, upon the service of competent and qualified attorneys. The decision whether to admit or deny an applicant admission to the bar, and thus to determine the composition and quality of the bar, affects both the quality of justice in our courts and the public's perception of that quality. The decision is therefore integral to the very essence of the judicial process.

818 F.2d at 542-43. We therefore affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint against the chief justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court. Id. at 543.

We then addressed the question whether the remaining defendants, who are not judges, nevertheless enjoy immunity for their activities with regard to plaintiff's application for admission to the Kentucky bar. We explained in some detail that since the "nonjudicial" defendants were acting pursuant to a command imposed upon them by the Kentucky Supreme Court under a provision of the Kentucky Constitution, their actions, at the very least, were quasi-judicial and, that being so, they were entitled to absolute immunity as well. We stated, in part:

Public policy requires "absolute immunity ... for all persons--governmental or otherwise--who [are] integral parts of the judicial process." Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 [103 S.Ct. 1108, 1115, 75 L.Ed.2d 96] (1983). In Campbell [v. Patterson, 724 F.2d 41, 43 (6th Cir.1983) ], we held that Michigan's Attorney General, obligated by statute to perform duties of a quasi-judicial nature, enjoys absolute immunity even when the action taken is erroneous.

A survey of the case law reveals that public policy requires absolute immunity for public officials performing quasi-judicial functions in a number of circumstances. It has been granted to members of an attorney disciplinary committee, Simons, 643 F.2d at 780; to a state bar association conducting disciplinary proceedings, Clark v. State of Washington 66 F.2d 678 (9th Cir.1966); to lawyers serving on a mediation panel, Mills v. Killebrew, 765 F.2d 69 (6th Cir.1985); to the court's clerk for acts within the scope of his quasi-judicial duties, Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir.1973); to "friends of the court," Johnson v. Granholm, 662 F.2d 449 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1120 [102 S.Ct. 2933, 73 L.Ed.2d 1332] (1982); and to prosecutors engaging in prosecutorial activity, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 [96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128] (1976).

....

In Hoover [v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 104 S.Ct. 1989, 80 L.Ed.2d 590 (1984) ], the plaintiffs, who had failed the Arizona Bar Examination, brought suit against the members of the Arizona Supreme Court Committee on Examinations and Admissions, alleging that the committee members had conspired to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act by artificially reducing the number of competing attorneys in Arizona. The Supreme Court determined that the actions of the committee members, in using a grading formula to determine admissions to the bar, could not be divorced from the actions of the Arizona Supreme Court. The Court noted that the members were appointed by the supreme court and the court "retained strict supervisory powers and ultimate full authority over its actions." Id. at 572 . The Court concluded that the conduct challenged was "in reality that of the Arizona Supreme Court," and therefore, the committee members were absolutely immune from anti-trust liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity announced in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 [63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315] (1943). Hoover, 466 U.S. at 573. .

Similarly, in the Simons case, two attorneys sued the members of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law. They alleged that the defendants maliciously harassed them during an illegal investigation of their law practice. The court concluded that the committee members' work was "functionally comparable to the work of judges ... they serve as an arm of the court and perform a function which traditionally belongs to the judiciary." 643 F.2d at 781.

....

The acts complained of in this case were performed by the defendants in obedience to duties imposed upon them by the Kentucky Supreme Court which is charged under the Kentucky Constitution with the obligation to enact rules "govern[ing] admission to the bar and discipline of members of the bar." In response to this constitutional command, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted Supreme Court Rule 2.000 creating the Board of Bar Examiners and describing its duties, and...