Sparks v. Lead Belt Beer Co., 48049
Decision Date | 11 July 1960 |
Docket Number | No. 48049,No. 2,48049,2 |
Citation | 337 S.W.2d 44 |
Parties | Irwin Dale SPARKS, Appellant, v. LEAD BELT BEER COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Edmund W. Albright, William L. Mason, Jr., St. Louis, for appellant.
Robert A. McIlrath, Flat River, for respondent.
Plaintiff has appealed from an order dismissing his case. The petition alleged: that plaintiff was the owner of a certain building in Desloge, Missouri; that defendant was engaged in the distribution of beer; that plaintiff had 'rented' the building for the storage of beer on a month to month basis; that defendant negligently loaded the floors with a grossly excessive number of cases of beer, far exceeding the structural ability of the building; that defendant failed to exercise ordinary care to 'provide for the excessive weight,' and that as a result of this excessive weight the internal parts of the building collapsed and plaintiff had to tear it down; all to plaintiff's damage in the sum of $10,000, for which he prayed judgment. Defendant filed an 'Answer' which consisted of a prayer that the petition be dismissed because it 'does not state a cause of action against the defendant herein upon which relief can be granted.' Within approximately three weeks after this pleading was filed, and on July 3, 1959, the court entered the following order: 'Now at this day defendant's motion to dismiss taken up, considered and by the Court sustained, and it is ordered that cause is hereby dismissed at plaintiff's costs.' On July 9, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing, but on the same day and without any ruling on the motion, he filed his notice of appeal to the St. Louis Court of Appeals; that court has transferred the case here. It may be that the appeal was prematurely taken, but Rule 3.24(b) 1 provides that in such event the notice shall be considered as filed immediately after the time the judgment becomes final.
Although the question of lack of notice of the hearing was raised in the motion for rehearing, plaintiff addresses himself here only to the merits. We shall consider the case in that light. Defendant's counsel has not filed a brief. This has not been helpful to the court, for we are not even advised of the theory upon which the cause was dismissed.
Plaintiff says that this petition states a cause of action for waste, citing 93 C.J.S. Waste Secs. 1, 7; Miller v. Bowen Coal & Mining Co., Mo.App., 40 S.W.2d 485; and Proffitt v. Henderson, 29 Mo. 325. These two cases are not specifically helpful. We have statutes on waste, but they are restricted to tenancies for life or years. Sec. 537.420 to Sec. 537.520 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. (All statutory references will be to this revision.) In Boefer v. Sheridan, 42 Mo.App. 226, it was held that every tenant is liable for voluntary or commissive waste, regardless of the duration of his term, as distinguished from permissive or inactive waste. The early system of pleading at common law was rather technical on this subject (Chalmers v. Smith, 152 Mass. 561, 26 N.E. 95, 11 L.R.A. 769), but we have no further requirement than the pleading of 'a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, * * *.' Section 509.050.
There is an obligation upon a tenant, resulting from the relationship of landlord and tenant, to refrain from injury to the demised premises by his negligence or willful misconduct; and if, by his negligence or misfeasance, the premises are materially injured, he is liable in damages. 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 779, p. 665. In United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53, loc. cit. 65-66, 68, 24 L.Ed. 65, the court said; See, also, Powell v. Dayton, S. & G. R. R. Co., 16 Or. 33, 16 P. 863, 864; Campbell v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 140 Ky. 312, 131 S.W. 20, 22; Kleinman v. Banner Laundry Co., 150 Minn. 515, 186 N.W. 123, 23 A.L.R. 479; Keogh v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318, 147 N.E. 266, 38 A.L.R. 1151; and the early Missouri case of Mason & Farley v. Stiles, 21 Mo. 374, 64 Am.Dec. 242.
In Chalmers v. Smith, 152 Mass. 561, 26 N.E. 95, 11 L.R.A. 769, it was alleged and found by the jury that the defendant had excessively loaded the floors and structure of a rented barn, and that it was thereby substantially damaged. In upholding a judgment for plaintiffs the court there said, loc. cit. 96: ...
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