Sparks v. Metalcraft, Inc.

Decision Date17 June 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-311,86-311
Citation408 N.W.2d 347
PartiesRonald B. SPARKS and Ruth Sparks, Appellants, v. METALCRAFT, INC., Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Tyler C. Johnston of Joe Johnston Law Firm, Iowa City, for appellants.

Steven R. Regenwether and William M. Tucker of Phelan, Tucker, Boyle & Mullen, Iowa City, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, P.J., and LARSON, CARTER, WOLLE, and LAVORATO, JJ.

LAVORATO, Justice.

The plaintiffs, Ronald B. Sparks and Ruth Sparks, appeal from a summary judgment ruling dismissing their causes of action against Metalcraft, Inc. (Metalcraft) for injuries allegedly sustained by Ronald while working with solvents and tags manufactured by Metalcraft. Ruth's action is for loss of spousal consortium. The summary judgment disposed of the actions on the basis of the statute of limitations. A cause of action based on violation of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA), 15 U.S.C.A. sections 1261-1276 (West Supp.1986), was dismissed earlier by the court as was Ruth's claim for loss of consortium based on that action. This dismissal is also the subject of this appeal. Because the district court was correct in both instances, we affirm.

Ronald was employed by the University of Iowa from October 1964 until August 8, 1980, as an inventory tagger. His job consisted of attaching identification plates on university-owned equipment. He did this by putting a liquid solvent on the back of a metal identification tag to activate adhesive on the tag, then pressing the tag to the equipment. Two different types of solvents were used in this procedure and both were manufactured by Metalcraft. One solvent contained methylene chloride, and chlorinated hydrocarbons and esters. The other contained 1.1.1 trichloroethane.

In 1973 Ronald began complaining of fever, chilling, and severe headaches that he attributed to the solvents. Ronald sought medical attention for these symptoms from his personal physician, Dr. George S. Anderson. On that visit Ronald brought with him a can of one of the solvents. Dr. Anderson noted in his chart that Ronald seemed to have a number of headaches when exposed to the solvent.

Dr. Anderson referred Ronald to Dr. Maurice Van Allen for further evaluation. In his referral letter to Dr. Van Allen, Dr. Anderson noted that Ronald "has had headaches for several months without any gross findings. He is exposed to an activating solution in his work which has noxious fumes associated with it and he wonders whether this is contributing to his problem."

In April 1977 Ronald saw Dr. F.J. Kilpatrick at the University of Iowa's Environmental Health Service. Ronald asked the doctor about the possible toxicity of the solvent used in his job. Again, Ronald brought along a container of one of the solvents.

In a memorandum to the University, Dr. Kilpatrick noted that methylene chloride, a chemical listed on the container label, is "a moderately toxic substance. If inhaled or ingested in sufficient quantities it acts as a central nervous system depressant. It may also cause irritation of exposed skin and mucous membranes." He noted Ronald's complaints were characteristic of chronic methylene chloride intoxication. Dr. Kilpatrick suggested Ronald be advised to limit his exposure as far as possible by "wearing goggles, gloves and by keeping his head (breathing zone) as far as practical from surfaces where the solvent is applied."

In August 1980 Ronald was hospitalized with the diagnosis of heat exhaustion. That day he had worked in a very hot environment using the solvent.

The following month Dr. Bertram W. Carnow, director of the Great Lakes Center for Occupational Safety and Health, examined Ronald. In November Dr. Carnow wrote Ronald a five-page report. The report noted the purpose of the examination was to determine whether Ronald's occupation played some part in his symptoms of ill health dating back to the early 1960's. The report summarized those symptoms as generalized fatigue, heat intolerance, headaches, nausea, numbness of both feet, chest pains, and depression.

Dr. Carnow stated in his report that Ronald had brought with him two cans containing solvents Ronald used in his job. Both cans had the same trade name: "Adhesive Activity Solvent for Mounting Autographs" made by Metalcraft, Inc., of Mason City, Iowa. Methylene chloride, and chlorinated hydrocarbons and esters were listed as major ingredients on one can, and 1.1.1 trichloroethane was listed as a major ingredient on the other can.

In the report, Dr. Carnow informed Ronald that his symptoms appeared to be related to his sixteen-year exposure to the chemicals in the solvents. The doctor also informed Ronald that he found sensory and motor abnormalities suggesting the possibility of central nervous system damage because of Ronald's exposure to these chemicals. Dr. Carnow suggested neurological testing and advised Ronald that he should not be exposed to "this toxic material to any degree" in the future.

On November 23, 1981, the Sparkses filed a lawsuit against the State of Iowa and several University of Iowa employees as defendants. The nub of that lawsuit is that the University required Ronald, as part of his job, to use adhesives and solvents that were toxic, and as a result of the long exposure to these toxic materials, he suffered severe and permanent injuries. The adhesives and solvents referred to in the petition are the same as those that are the subject of the present lawsuit.

Sometime in 1983 in the course of discovery in the lawsuit, the Sparkses found, in the possession of the University, a document from Metalcraft describing the solvents in question as nontoxic. The document also stated that "[p]rolonged exposure to fumes may cause nausea and headaches, but these symptoms quickly disappear upon access to fresh air."

In April 1984 a test performed on Ronald at the University of New Orleans showed that his blood contained a high level of trichloroethane. In July 1984 after reviewing this test and Ronald's medical and work history, Dr. Alan S. Levin opined in writing that Ronald

suffers from chemically acquired immune disregulation. The most probable cause of this disease process is the chemicals to which he was exposed occupationally.... I believe that the overwhelming reaction that Mr. Sparks suffered in August, 1980, was "the straw that broke the camel's back," and he will probably never completely recover from this incident.

The Sparkses filed the present lawsuit against Metalcraft on January 31, 1985. In this suit Ronald seeks damages for personal injuries allegedly resulting from his long-time exposure to the solvents manufactured by Metalcraft. His wife seeks loss of consortium because of Ronald's alleged injuries.

The petition alleges six causes of action: fraud and deceit, violation of the FHSA, negligence or gross negligence, express warranty, implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and innocent misrepresentation.

In May 1985 the district court, the Honorable William R. Eads presiding, sustained Metalcraft's motion to dismiss the cause of action based on violation of the FHSA.

Subsequently, Metalcraft moved for summary judgment alleging the two-year statute of limitations for causes of action founded on personal injuries, Iowa Code § 614.1(2) (1983), precluded relief under any of the remaining actions alleged in the petition. Metalcraft supported its motion with answers to interrogatories and exhibits from the prior suit, which, it argued, established the Sparkses knew as early as 1977, if not before, that the solvents were manufactured by Metalcraft and believed the solvents were the source of their alleged injuries.

The Sparkses filed a resistance to the motion supported by an affidavit from Mrs. Sparks in which she essentially states that although she and Ronald suspected the solvents were causing his complaints, the treating doctors were not able to make a definitive diagnosis until 1984 when Dr. Levin diagnosed Ronald's condition as chemically acquired immune disregulation. In her affidavit, Mrs. Sparks also states neither she nor Ronald knew Metalcraft had represented to the University of Iowa that its product was nontoxic and that difficulties a person might experience from exposure to their product were temporary, until their attorney discovered this information in 1983.

In their brief and resistance to the motion for summary judgment, the Sparkses asserted the two-year provision found in section 614.1(2) applied to all their causes of action except fraud. As to the fraud action, they argued that the five-year provision found in section 614.1(4) applied. They further argued that the discovery exception to the statute of limitations, which was pleaded in the petition, applied to all their causes of action and that they were excusably unaware of their actions until July 1984 at which time their actions accrued and the statute of limitations began to run. Because their actions were brought approximately six months after they argued that all their actions were filed in a timely manner.

Finding as a matter of law that the actions were barred by the statute of limitations, the district court, the Honorable Larry J. Conmey presiding, sustained the motion for summary judgment. The court applied the discovery exception to all of the remaining actions pleaded except fraud. As to the fraud action, the court found that the University was aware of the toxic effect of the solvents as early as April 1977. Thus, the University was aware of any fraud that Metalcraft may have perpetrated on it by 1977, which was more than two years before the present suit was filed. As to the remaining actions, the court found the Sparkses were aware the solvents were the cause of Ronald's medical problems at least by the time they filed suit against the University of Iowa on November 23, 1981, which again was more than two years before the present suit was filed.

On appeal the...

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