Sparr v. Ward, No. 01-3401.

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: Bye
• Citation: 306 F.3d 589
• Parties: Barbara SPARR, Plaintiff — Appellee, v. Janet WARD, individually and in her official capacity as an employee of the Pulaski County Tax Assessor's Office, Defendant, B.A. McIntosh, individually and in his official capacity as an employee of the Pulaski County Tax Assessor's Office, Defendant — Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 01-3401.
• Decision Date: 07 October 2002

306 F.3d 589 Barbara SPARR, Plaintiff — Appellee,
v.
Janet WARD, individually and in her official capacity as an employee of the Pulaski County Tax Assessor's Office, Defendant,
B.A. McIntosh, individually and in his official capacity as an employee of the Pulaski County Tax Assessor's Office, Defendant — Appellant. No. 01-3401. United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. Submitted: May 15, 2002. Filed: October 7, 2002.

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Robert S. Shafer, argued, Little Rock, AR (Frederick S. Ursery, on the brief), for appellant.

Lucien R. Gillham, argued, Little Rock, AR, for appellee.

Before LOKEN, BOWMAN, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

BYE, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment based upon the defense of qualified immunity in a civil rights action alleging unlawful termination of employment in retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights to free speech. Because we find no violation of a clearly established constitutional right, we reverse.

I.

Barbara Sparr was employed by the Pulaski County Assessor's office from January, 1991, until her discharge on August 22, 2000. During her tenure with the Assessor's office the County Assessor was B.A. McIntosh. At the time of her termination, Sparr was working as an administrative assistant to McIntosh and the Chief Deputy Assessor, Janet Ward.

In 2000, McIntosh chose to retire and Ward decided to run for County Assessor. Ward told Sparr she would promote her to Chief Deputy Assessor if Ward won the election. Initially, Sparr supported Ward's candidacy but later changed her mind and refused to support Ward or to accept the Chief Deputy Assessor position. Sparr advised Ward of her change of heart in a memorandum dated August 21, 2000.¹

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Before giving the memorandum to Ward, Sparr showed it to McIntosh. She asked for his advice and sought assurances that he would protect her job. McIntosh encouraged Sparr to give the memorandum to Ward. He noted, however, that Sparr had copied the memorandum to Temperlene Smith, Pulaski County Personnel Director, and instructed Sparr not to provide Smith with a copy. McIntosh wanted to keep the matter "in house" and was concerned problems would escalate if the memorandum was circulated outside the Assessor's office. Sparr nevertheless met with Smith and gave her a copy of the memorandum. Smith read the memorandum, discussed it with Sparr and Smith's supervisor, and placed it in Sparr's personel file. At no time did Sparr ask or expect Smith to take any further action regarding the memorandum. Shortly thereafter, Sparr delivered a copy of the memorandum to Ward. Later that day, McIntosh discovered Sparr had given the memorandum to Smith. The next day he called Sparr and terminated her position.

Sparr brought this action seeking relief under the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17; and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, Ark.Code Ann. § 16-123-101 to 16-123-108. (Supp.2001). Sparr claims she was discharged in retaliation for speaking out about sexual harassment in the Assessor's

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office, and for exercising her First Amendment right to refuse to support Ward's candidacy.

McIntosh moved for summary judgment in his individual capacity arguing he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court rejected McIntosh's qualified immunity defense finding Sparr's speech was on a matter of public concern and her right to free speech outweighed the interests of her employer. On appeal, McIntosh contends the district court erred by finding Sparr's speech protected by the First Amendment, and by finding her right to free speech outweighed the interests of her employer.

II.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense for which the defendant carries the burden of proof. The plaintiff, however, must demonstrate that the law is clearly established. Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir.1989). The district court's denial of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity is subject to de novo review, Cornell v. Woods, 69 F.3d 1383, 1390 (8th Cir.1995), taking as true Sparr's factual allegations and drawing all inferences from the underlying facts in Sparr's favor. Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 927 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir.1991).

The purpose of qualified immunity is to allow public officers to carry out their duties as they believe are correct and consistent with good public policy, rather than acting out of fear for their own personal financial well being. See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Toward this end, the rule has evolved that an official performing discretionary functions will generally be immune from liability unless a reasonable person in his position would have known his actions violated clearly established law. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). An official loses immunity if the law he violated was clearly established at the time of the violation, and the applicability of the law to his particular action was evident. Id.

The inquiry "focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official's acts," and the qualified immunity defense fails if the official violates a clearly established right because "a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727. To demonstrate the law is "clearly established," the plaintiff must show a "reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violate[s]" plaintiff's rights. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034. We have taken a broad view of what constitutes "clearly established law" for the purpose of qualified immunity, requiring some but not precise factual correspondence with precedents and demanding officials apply "general, well-developed legal principles." Boswell v. Sherburne County, 849 F.2d 1117, 1121 (8th Cir.1988); see also Lappe v. Loeffelholz, 815 F.2d 1173, 1177 (8th Cir.1987). In determining the validity of a qualified immunity defense the issue is not whether the defendant acted wrongly, but whether reasonable persons would know they acted in a manner which deprived another of a known constitutional right. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (holding that police officers applying for warrant were shielded from liability if a reasonable police officer could have believed there was probable cause to support the application). "As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id., at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092.

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III.

Our review follows a two-step inquiry to determine whether Sparr's speech was protected. First, we must determine whether her speech can be "fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public...