Spath v. Larsen

Decision Date20 April 1944
Docket Number29136.
Citation148 P.2d 834,20 Wn.2d 500
PartiesSPATH et ux. v. LARSEN et ux.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Action by Louis J. Spath and wife against Adolph M. Larsen and wife to quiet plaintiff's title to certain tidelands, in which defendants filed a cross-complaint to quiet their title to such tidelands or appoint commissioners to establish the boundary between the parties' respective tidelands. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

Appeal from Superior Court, Clallam County; H. G. Sutton, judge.

Wm. J Conniff, of Port Angeles, for appellants.

Max Church, of Port Angeles, for respondents.

Skeel McKelvy, Henke, Evenson & Uhlmann and A. P. Curry, both of Seattle, and Smith Troy and John Spiller, both of Olympia amici curiae.

BEALS, Justice.

Plaintiffs Louis J. and Laura B. Spath, are the owners of government lot 3, section 27, township 30 north, range 3 W.W.M., and defendants, Adolph M. and Cynthia Larsen, are the owners of government lot 4 (less the south 150 feet), in the same section, which lies immediately south of lot 3. These government lots are on the west side of Sequim bay, and, as to the southerly portion of lot 3 and all of lot 4, border with a concave shore line on a smaller bay, or indentation in the shore line, all as shown on the plat made a part of this opinion.

In this opinion, when we refer to the meander line defining the easterly boundary of lot 3 as a portion of a cove or bay, we intend the southerly portion of lot 3, that being the part of that tract relevant to the facts of this case.

May 22 1906, plaintiffs' grantor acquired title to the tidelands adjacent to lot 3 by deed from the state of Washington, conveying the following description: 'All tide lands of the second class, owned by the state of Washington, situated in front of, adjacent to and abutting upon lots 1, 2 and 3, section 27, township 30 north, range 3 West W. M.'

The deed also contains a description of the government meander line, the description terminating on the south at the point where the meander line crosses the southerly boundary of lot 3. The state's grantee in the deed referred to conveyed the tidelands to plaintiffs by the following description: 'Government lot three (3) of section twenty-seven (27) in township thirty (30) north of range three (3) west of the Willamette Meridian, together with the tide lands of the second class extending to extreme low tide lying in front of, adjacent to and abutting upon said government lot three (3) * * *'

In 1930, defendants entered into a contract with the state of Washington for the purchase of the second class tidelands situated in front of that portion of lot 4 above described, and on January 28, 1937, received from the state a deed conveying to them 'All tide lands of the second class, owned by the state of Washington, situate in front of, adjacent to or abutting upon lot 4, except the south 150 feet thereof, section 27, township 30 north, range 3 west, W. M., * * *'

Neither of these tideland descriptions purported to define the lateral boundary between the two parcels of tidelands conveyed. As the government meander line defining the easterly boundaries of lots 3 and 4 is concave, presenting a decided curve, it is apparent that the fixing of the boundary line between the two parcels of tidelands cannot be determined by the simple method employed when the shore line is straight, by erecting a line across the tidelands perpendicular to the meander line.

Both lots 3 and 4 were conveyed to the predecessors in interest of the parties to this action while Washington was a territory, and consequently the uplands extend easterly either to the government meander line or the line of ordinary high tide as the same existed at the date Washington was admitted as a state, whichever line was then the farthest out. This matter is not important here; the meander line is accepted by all parties.

September 30, 1942, plaintiffs instituted this action, alleging that they were the owners in fee simple and in possession of 'those certain tide lands of the second class, lying and being in front of government lots 3 (and 4, if it so be) in section 27, township 30, north, range 3 west,' particularly describing the tidelands as 'Beginning at the intersection of the south line of government lot 3, aforesaid, with the government meander line; thence in a southeasterly direction along a line running on a right angle to said government meander line to the extreme low water line;' thence in a general northeasterly, etc., direction, following the line of extreme low water to a point where the north line of government lot 3 produced easterly intersects the low water line. The description is then closed by metes and bounds, with which we are not concerned. Plaintiffs then excepted from the foregoing tract of tidelands a tract on the northerly side thereof.

Plaintiffs then alleged that for more than ten years prior to the institution of the action, they and their predecessors were in the open, notorious and exclusive possession of the tidelands referred to, under claim and color of title made in good faith and adverse to all the world, and that during the period mentioned no other person had asserted any title or interest in or to the tract described, or any portion thereof. If was also alleged in the complaint that defendants asserted some claim to the tidelands described, or a portion thereof, which claim was adverse to plaintiffs and was without right, and prayed for a judgment quieting plaintiffs' title to the tidelands described.

Thereafter, on stipulation of the parties, an order was entered providing for an amendment to paragraph 4 of plaintiffs' complaint, the amendment not affecting the questions here presented.

Defendants answered plaintiffs' complaint, admitting that they claimed an interest in the tidelands described in the complaint, and by way of an affirmative defense, alleged that they were the owners in fee simple of all second class tidelands adjacent to or abutting upon that portion of government lot 4 above described, and that the northerly boundary line of this tract of tidelands had been indicated, marked and established in good faith for more than ten years, by a line of stakes driven into the ground on the tidelands, and that for more than ten years past defendants had been in the open, notorious and exclusive possession of the tidelands up to the line of stakes.

For a second affirmative defense, defendants alleged that they were the owners of the tidelands abutting upon lot 4, that plaintiffs had only recently acquired government lot 3, and that plaintiffs' predecessors in interest had for many years, and within ten years next preceding the institution of plaintiffs' action, acquiesced in the boundary line between the tracts of tidelands adjacent to lot 4 and those adjacent to lot 3, as established by the line of stakes, and as claimed by defendants.

Defendants also pleaded title by adverse possession to the tidelands up to the line of stakes, and by way of a cross-complaint sought to quiet their title against plaintiffs, asking in the alternative that the court appoint commissioners to establish, by survey, the true boundary separating the tidelands owned by plaintiffs from those owned by defendants.

Plaintiffs having replied to the affirmative defenses and cross-complaint with denials, the action was tried to the court, and resulted in the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of plaintiffs. The court found that plaintiffs were the owners in fee simple (subject, of course, to the paramount rights of the state of Washington) of the tidelands abutting upon lot 3, and that the southerly boundary of plaintiffs' tidelands was a line 'Beginning at the intersection of the south line of government lot 3, aforesaid, with the government meander line; thence in a southeasterly direction along a line to the extreme low water line;' thence in a generally northeasterly, etc., direction, the description then following that set forth in plaintiffs' complaint.

Finding No. 3 entered by the court reads as follows: 'That the point where the meander line in front of the said government lot 3 intersects the south boundary of the said lot 3 is on a cove or indentation bearing away sharply in a generally westerly and southwesterly direction, as indicated upon the maps and plats which were offered and admitted in evidence that if the boundary of the uplands common to lots 3 and 4 were produced to the line of extreme low tide, the plaintiffs would be cut off from and deprived of access to their uplands and a portion of their tidelands lying north of such a line; that the general and acceptable rule for defining and fixing the side boundaries between the abutting owners of tidelands is to run the line at right angles to the general course of the shore as that course is defined by the meander line; that where the uplands are patented Before statehood the boundary between the tidelands and the upland ownership is the line of ordinary high tide or the government meander line which ever line is farthest out toward navigable water, as that point existed at the time of statehood, November 11, 1889; that the meander line, where the same crosses the upland boundary common to government lots 3 and 4, is now and was on November 11, 1889, when Washington was erected into statehood, farther out toward the line of navigable water; that the state of Washington acting through the office of the state land commissioner and the state land board has ever since the creation of the said office and board employed the method hereinabove immediately indicated for the determination of the side boundaries of tidelands...

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