Spaulding v. State
| Decision Date | 18 June 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 28895,28895 |
| Citation | 232 Ga. 411,207 S.E.2d 43 |
| Parties | Noble Atlas SPAULDING v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Johnson & Bostic, Harris C. Bostic, Atlanta, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Raoul Lerow, Morris H. Rosenberg, Atlanta, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
Noble Atlas Spaulding was convicted of armed robbery and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to serve 15 years and five years imprisonment respectively to run concurrently. He appeals from these convictions. Held:
1. The evidence shows that on the morning of March 13, 1973, the victim of the robbery and her two children were at their apartment alone at 8:00 a.m. when she heard a knock at the door; when she responded she saw the appellant and his male companion walking down the steps. About 8:45 a.m. she heard a crash at the door and the appellant and his companion entered her apartment through the door-way which they had broken open; the appellant had a revolver in his hand which he held on her while his companion looked for valuables in the apartment; the companion then held a revolver on the victim while the appellant ransacked the house; the appellant had a can of Schlitz beer in his other hand which he left in the apartment; the robbers took several items of clothing, $103 cash, a radio and tape recorder which were worth about $700, and left the apartment in a beige Volkswagen car with a scratch or oil on the front side of it. The victim called the police and her husband who was at work. The victim's husband took the victim and the children to her sister's home after the police had gone. About 10:30 a.m. that morning while they were at her sister's home the victim saw a Volkswagen which she thought was the one used in the robbery and which she thought was occupied by the persons who robbed her. The victim, her husband and brother-in-law followed the Volkswagen and its occupants. When their car approached the Volkswagen, the victim identified the occupants as the robbers. They blocked the Volkswagen and got out of their car. The appellant was seated in the driver's seat and when the victim's husband asked him to return their property, the robbers fired at them. They returned the shots and the robbers fled into the woods. The husband of the victim then turned off the motor of the Volkswagen. They found their tape recorder in the Volkswagen. A wallet and address book was also found in the vehicle.
The fingerprints of the appellant were found on the can of beer which had been left in the victim's apartment by the appellant.
The appellant testified that his Volkswagen was stolen on the day of the robbery March 13, 1973, about 8:00 a.m., that the car keys were in it, that he had never seen the wallet or the address book which had been found in his car; that the wallet and address book both contained his telephone number and that of his girl friend; that he was at the home of his girl friend from 8:00 a.m. that day until 10:00 a.m. when he left to play football; and that he injured his hand playing football. The appellant reported on March 14, 1973, to the police that his car had been stolen the previous day.
The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict and the motion for new trial based on the general grounds is without merit.
2. When the appellant was at the police station reporting the theft of his automobile, the victim was called to the station and identified him as one of the perpetrators of the robbery. The appellant contends that his constitutional rights were denied him in the identification procedure. We do not agree. The identification at the station was made by the victim before the appellant was indicted or even arrested. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411.
The evidence also shows that the in-court identification of the appellant had an origin independent of the complained of identification confrontation. Mathis v. State, 231 Ga. 401(6), 202 S.E.2d 73.
3. The appellant contends that he is 21 years of age and is entitled to be tried by a jury composed of his peers. He contends his age group was not represented on the jury. There is no merit in this contention.
The fact that no one 21 years of age was on the jury, standing alone, does not prove that there were no jurors of that age in the jury box; nor does it show a deliberate exclusion of such persons from jury service. No evidence was offered to prove the jury list was not a fairly representative cross section of the intelligent and upright citizens of the...
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Wilson v. State
...is almost identical to that approved by our Supreme Court in Ratcliff v. Ratcliff, 219 Ga. 545, 134 S.E.2d 605, and Spaulding v. State, 232 Ga. 411, 413(4), 207 S.E.2d 43. A similar Allen charge was approved in Ponder v. State, 229 Ga. 720, 721, 194 S.E.2d 78, 79, which ended with the exhor......
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Anglin v. State
...App. 572, 573-574 (3), 226 S.E.2d 769 (1976). But we subsequently reversed that holding as inconsistent with Spaulding v. State, 232 Ga. 411, 413-414 (4), 207 S.E.2d 43 (1974), in which we approved an Allen charge that did not include such language. See State v. Greeson, 237 Ga. 193, 193 (1......
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Smith v. State, No. S03A0968.
...error is waived. See id. at 38, 315 S.E.2d 871. Finally, the Allen charge given by the trial court was approved in Spaulding v. State, 232 Ga. 411(4), 207 S.E.2d 43 (1974); its use here was not error. See Burchette v. State, 260 Ga.App. 739(3), 580 S.E.2d 609 10. After Mwangi testified for ......
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Watkins v. State
...to reach a verdict if they could do so. This charge was substantially the same charge approved by this court in Spaulding v. State, 232 Ga. 411(4), 207 S.E.2d 43 (1974). We do not agree with appellant's contention that the charge given by the trial judge and his subsequent inquiries of the ......