Spearman v. Couch, 16456
| Decision Date | 29 January 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 16456,16456 |
| Citation | 218 S.C. 430,63 S.E.2d 161 |
| Parties | SPEARMAN v. COUCH et al. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Watkins & Watkins, Anderson, George L. Grantham, Easley, for appellants.
Culbertson & Foster, Greenville, W. G. Acker, Pickens, for respondent.
The highway from Easley, South Carolina, to Pickens, South Carolina, runs practically east and west. About 6:30 or 7:00 o'clock P.M. on December 24, 1948, respondent was walking west on the north side of said highway on the sidewalk. When he got to a point directly opposite the intersection of a street which runs southeast from said highway, respondent started to cross the highway from the north to the south side, and, in so doing, he stepped into the highway and then saw a taxi coming from the east. Before he could get back to the sidewalk, the taxicab struck him and he suffered serious injuries. The highway at that point was a 40 foot, four lane highway. The speed limit for vehicles at that point was 35 miles per hour under the law. The foregoing facts are gathered from the agreed statement in the Transcript of Record.
This action was commenced, and the appellants, The Travelers Insurance Company and The Travelers Indemnity Company, were made parties by reason of the issuance by said appellants of automobile liability policies aggregating $5,000, as required by an ordinance of the City of Easley.
The case was tried before the Honorable G. Duncan Bellinger and a jury at the October, 1949, term of Civil Court at Pickens, South Carolina, and resulted in a verdict for the respondent for $5,000 against all of the appellants.
A motion for a directed verdict for the appellants was made at the conclusion of all of the testimony, which was overruled by the Presiding Judge, and after the verdict was returned by the jury, a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto was made by the appellants, which motion was also overruled by an order of the Presiding Judge bearing date December 6, 1949.
The appellants, in due time, served notice of intention to appeal from said order, which appeal is bottomed upon the exceptions which raise issues as follows:
1. Did the Court err in holding that the respondent, a pedestrian, had equal rights with motor vehicles on the highway at the point he undertook to cross said highway?
2. Was it error to refuse the appellant's motion for a directed verdict and the motion for judgment non obstance veredicto?
The determination of the first question is not decisive of the issues involved. It involves a consideration of applicable statutes in force at the time of the accident.
Subsection 28 of Section 1616 of the Code of 1942, then in effect, reads, in part, as follows: 'Every pedestrian crossing a highway, except where traffic control signals are provided, shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the highway.'
The record discloses that at the time of the injury to the respondent, he was undertaking to cross the 40 foot four lane highway from the north side to the south side so as to reach a point at the south side thereof where a street runs southeast from the highway, and there is no testimony that at the intersection referred to there were any traffic control signals.
Judge Bellinger, in his order refusing the motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, held that a pedestrian has an equal right with motor vehicles in crossing a street at an intersection, and is not required, as a matter of law, to yield the right of way to motor vehicles. We think he was in error in the conclusion, as applied to an intersection of the character involved in the action, where...
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Gillespie v. Ford
...hardly be cited to sustain them, but see generally the following recent decisions which are taken from appellant's brief: Spearman v. Couch, 218 S.C. 430, 63 S.E.2d 161; Dawson v. South Carolina Power Co., 220 S.C. 26, 66 S.E.2d 322; Hopkins v. Derst Baking Co., 221 S.C. 497, 71 S.E.2d 407,......
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Bruin v. Tribble
...imply wantonness, wilfulness or recklessness on his part. Marks v. I. M. Pearlstine & Sons, 203 S.C. 318, 26 S.E. 2d 835; Spearman v. Couch, 218 S.C. 430, 63 S.E.2d 161; Dawson v. South Carolina Power Co., 220 S.C. 26, 66 S.E.2d 322. Secondly, a negligent plaintiff may recover if the defend......
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Collins v. Risner, 7864.
...imply wantonness, wilfulness or recklessness on his part. Marks v. I. M. Pearistine & Sons, 203 S.C. 318, 26 S.E.2d 835; Spearman v. Couch, 218 S.C. 430, 63 S.E.2d 161; Dawson v. South Carolina Power Co., 220 S.C. 26, 66 S.E.2d 322. * * *" Bruin v. Tribble, 4 Cir., 238 F.2d 12, We are satis......
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Smith v. Canal Ins. Co.
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