Specialty Earth Scis. v. Carus Corp.
| Decision Date | 14 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 15-cv-06133 |
| Parties | SPECIALTY EARTH SCIENCES, LLC, Plaintiff, v. CARUS CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Specialty Earth Sciences, LLC (“SES”) invented an environmental remediation technology and, in late 2008, began looking for an established partner to help commercialize the technology. SES ultimately awarded an exclusive license for its technology to Defendant Carus Corporation (“Carus”) for at least three years. Yet SES now alleges that Carus failed in multiple ways to meet its obligations under the parties' licensing agreement and never actually intended to develop a market for SES's technology. SES's five-Count First Amended Complaint in this case asserts claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, common law fraud, promissory fraud, and constructive fraud. Before the Court are SES's motion to partially strike the opinions, expert report, and testimony of Carus expert Michelle Crimi and to strike the opinions expert report, and testimony of Carus's expert George Wheeler (Dkt. No. 250), SES's motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 244), and Carus's motion for summary judgment on Counts I-V of the First Amended Complaint (Dkt No. 242). For the reasons that follow, SES's motion to strike is granted, its motion for partial summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part, and Carus's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
Before summarizing the material facts, the Court must first address the parties' competing accusations of noncompliance with Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1. Local Rule 56.1 requires the party moving for summary judgment to submit a statement of material facts that it contends entitle it to summary judgment. L.R. 56.1(a)(2). The statement of material facts must consist of “concise numbered paragraphs” and “[e]ach asserted fact must be supported by citation to the specific evidentiary material including the specific page number that supports it.” L.R. 56.1(d)(1), (d)(2). “The court may disregard any asserted fact that is not supported with such a citation.” L.R. 56.1(d)(2).
The party opposing summary judgment must then file a response to the statement of material facts. L.R. 56.1(b)(2). The response must consist of numbered paragraphs that correspond to the numbered paragraphs in the statement of material facts and set forth the asserted fact and the opposing party's response to that fact. L.R. 56.1(e)(1). “Each response must admit the asserted fact, dispute the asserted fact, or admit in part and dispute in part the asserted fact.” L.R. 56.1(e)(2). Any dispute of an asserted fact must be supported by a citation to “specific evidentiary material that controverts the fact” and a concise explanation of how the cited material controverts the asserted fact. L.R. 56.1(e)(3). “Asserted facts may be deemed admitted if not controverted with specific citations to evidentiary material.” Id.
To the extent the opposing party wishes to present any additional facts, it may do so by submitting a separate statement of additional facts that complies with Local Rule 56.1(d), which governs the moving party's statement of material facts. L.R. 56.1(b)(3). Then, the moving party must submit a response to those additional facts subject to the requirements for the opposing party's response to the statement of material facts set forth by Local Rule 56.1(e). L.R. 56.1(c)(2). No. submission under Local Rule 56.1 may contain legal argument except responses may make objections, “including objections based on admissibility, materiality, or absence of evidentiary support.” L.R. 56.1(d)(4), (e)(2).
The Seventh Circuit has “repeatedly held that the district court is within its discretion to strictly enforce compliance with its local rules regarding summary-judgment motions.” Patterson v. Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 2009). “This is because ‘compliance with local rules like Rule 56.1 ensures the facts material to the issues in the case and the evidence supporting such facts are clearly organized and presented for the court's summary judgment determination.'” Rivera v. Guevara, 319 F.Supp.3d 1004, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (alteration omitted) (quoting Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 2015)). A district court is therefore entitled to “limit its analysis of the facts on summary judgment to evidence that is properly identified and supported in the parties' statements.” Bordelon v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000).
Carus makes the first accusation of noncompliance with Local Rule 56.1 in responding to SES's motion for partial summary judgment. In particular, Carus states that it objects to the “form and substance” of many of SES's statements of material fact as “convoluted and argumentative, ” and it further contends that several asserted facts fail to cite evidence in the record. (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts (“DRPSF”) at 1 n.1, Dkt. No. 269.) However, the Court finds that Carus overstates its case. First, the Court is unable to identify any significant failure by SES to support its asserted facts with citations to the record nor does Carus cite any specific instance of such a failure. And while certain of SES's statements of fact are improperly argumentative or reflect SES's characterization of the evidence, the Court finds that most of SES's factual assertions are complaint with Local Rule 56.1. Moreover, Carus properly objects in its response when it believes a particular statement contains “argumentations and characterizations, ” (e.g., id. ¶ 8), and where it agrees, the Court is fully able to disregard the noncompliant portions of the statement. There is no reason to go any further and strike the entirety of SES's statement of material facts just because it contains some instances of argumentation and characterization. See Rivera, 319 F.Supp.3d at 1018 (“The noncompliant paragraphs will not be stricken, however, as doing so would in some cases throw out a properly supported assertion along with a legal argument or conclusion.”). In short, SES commits only minor violations of Local Rule 56.1 and its submission still effectively presents the material facts in a clear and organized fashion.
In its reply in support of its motion for summary judgment, Carus doubled down on its accusations of noncompliance, directing them toward SES's statement of additional facts in opposition to Carus's motion for summary judgment. Carus contended that that most of SES's numbered paragraphs consist of “attorney characterization and argument” and “the vast majority of the[] ‘facts' are statements taken out of context.” (Def.'s Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 1 n.1, Dkt. No. 280.) Therefore, Carus initially declined altogether to respond to SES's statement of additional facts and instead moved to strike the entire submission. Of course, “[m]otions to strike all or portions of an opposing party's [Rule] 56.1 submission are disfavored.” L.R. 56.1(e)(2). Accordingly, the Court denied Carus's request to strike SES's statement of additional facts, finding that the issue was not as egregious as Carus claimed. (Dkt. No. 385.) As with its statement of material facts in support of its motion for summary judgment, SES's statement of additional facts consisted largely of well-supported factual assertions and the Court saw no basis to throw those assertions out based on small violations elsewhere in SES's submission. While the Court had discretion to treat all of SES's factual assertions as admitted, L.R. 56.1(e)(2), it instead directed Carus to submit a response to the statement of additional facts that complied with Local Rule 56.1.
Notably even as Carus was requesting that the Court take the drastic action of striking SES's submissions under Local Rule 56.1, Carus was itself committing far more substantial violations of that rule. First, as highlighted by SES, Carus does not submit a statement of additional facts in support of its opposition to SES's motion for partial summary judgment. Rather, it cites directly to the record in its response brief in plain violation of Local Rule 56.1. Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., LLC, 401 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2005) ; Mervyn v. Nelson Westerberg, Inc., 142 F.Supp.3d 663, 664 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (collecting cases). “Local Rule 56.1 statements and responses establish the bridge between the record and the parties' arguments, and the value of those statements and responses is largely lost if the parties' briefs ignore them and instead cite the record.” Mervyn, 142 F.Supp.3d at 666. By setting forth new facts in its response brief, Carus precluded SES from properly responding to those factual assertions and made the summary judgment process more burdensome, contrary to the purpose of Local Rule 56.1. See Sojka v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 686 F.3d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 2012) (). For that reason, the Court will disregard the new facts set forth in Carus's response in opposition to SES's motion for partial summary judgment. Cichon, 401 F.3d at 809-10 (...
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