Speed v. American Workmen
| Decision Date | 17 February 1942 |
| Docket Number | 15377. |
| Parties | SPEED v. AMERICAN WORKMEN. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Georgetown County; L. D Lide, Judge.
Action by Hannah Speed against the American Workmen for fraudulent breach of an insurance contract. From an adverse judgment the defendant appeals.
The order of Judge Lide follows:
This is an action for fraudulent breach of an insurance contract or policy. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is a colored woman residing in Georgetown, uneducated and unable to read or write, and that the defendant is a corporation engaged in the insurance business, and was at the times mentioned doing business in Georgetown "through its local agent, James Rogers;" and that some time before November 9, 1938 this agent sold to her a policy of insurance on the life of her son, Herman Cooper, under which she was the beneficiary and that subsequently thereto and prior to May 24, 1939, the same agent sold to her a policy of insurance on the life of her daughter, Butha Gadson, under which she was also the beneficiary; and that the agent guaranteed this to be the same kind of policy as that issued on her son, Herman Cooper that thereafter Butha Gadson died while the policy was in full force and effect, all premiums having been paid; and that the plaintiff "delivered to the agent of the defendant company, the said policy of insurance for collection from said defendant company;" and that thereafter the defendant company wrote her that they were ready to pay the sum of $26.10, that being "the amount that the policy called for;" whereupon she demanded the return of the policy, but that the company sent her a different policy of insurance, although exactly like the one she had held, except that the color of the border was purple instead of green and that it also contained provisions under which 10% only of the policy was payable since the insured Butha Gadson died within six months; and thus was unlike the Herman Cooper policy. Hence the plaintiff alleges in effect that the action of the defendant amounted to a fraudulent breach of the contract, and she seeks actual and punitive damages in the sum of $2,500. The gist of the controversy is that if the policy was like the Cooper policy, as plaintiff alleges, she is entitled to $296, and she alleges that the policy the company returned to her was not the one she delivered to the agent after the death of her daughter.
The answer of the defendant company admits the issuance and delivery of a policy on the life of Butha Gadson, and also the issuance and delivery of a policy on the life of Herman Cooper, but it alleges that the policy issued on the life of Butha Gadson provided that in the event of death of the insured within six months ten per cent of the amount only would be payable to the beneficiary, and that under another provision of the policy this would be reduced by half if death was due to heart disease or certain other diseases; and it should be stated here that it is admitted that the deceased did die of heart disease, and this latter provision is the same as that in the Cooper policy. The answer further alleges that tender was made of the amount due on the policy and this tender was refused. And there is a specific denial of all charges of fraud, and a plea of contributory negligence or gross negligence is also interposed. The defendant alleges in effect that the policy which it returned after the death of Butha Gadson is the identical policy originally issued on her life.
The allegation of the complaint to the effect that the plaintiff after the death of Butha Gadson delivered the policy to the agent of the defendant company for collection was admitted in the answer, on information and belief.
The cause came on to be tried before the undersigned as presiding Judge and a jury at the May, 1941, term of the Court of Common Pleas for Georgetown County, to wit, May 20, 1941. Motions for nonsuit and direction of verdict made by counsel for defendant were overruled, and the cause submitted to the jury which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $296 actual and $800 punitive damages. Whereupon the defendant made a motion for a new trial, which was noted on the minutes of the Court, and by express agreement of counsel was marked heard; and was argued before me at my chambers at Marion, on July 9, 1941, and after full argument of counsel for the respective parties was taken under advisement.
There are four grounds of the motion for a new trial, the first of which is as follows: "Error in admitting in evidence letter purportedly written by Jas. Rogers dated February 2, 1941 (1940) addressed to plaintiff at Georgetown, S. C., the error being that the letter was introduced for the purpose of establishing, in the form of admission against interest, the terms of the contract and as evidence that the policy returned to plaintiff by defendant was not the original policy but a substitute and there is no evidence to establish that Jas. Rogers was the agent of defendant at the time the letter was written nor was there evidence that the letter was written in the scope of his employment, discharge of his duties or that he had authority to write the letter for the defendant or make such admissions which were binding upon the defendant."
When the letter referred to was originally offered in evidence in behalf of the plaintiff, the only objection made by counsel for the defendant was that it had not been properly proven, but the Court held that the plaintiff testifying that it was received through the mail it would be admissible; and counsel for the defendant then stated: "Our ground is that the signature has not been proven and is not connected as authentic with any one from the company." The Court again ruled that it was admissible because received through the mails. It should be stated in this connection, however, that later in the trial of the case there was plenary proof of the genuineness of the signature of the agent James Rogers to the letter.
The letter is as follows:
The date of the letter was doubtless intended to be February 2, 1940.
Since, as above stated, the objection made to the letter was to its authenticity, it is unnecessary to consider the grounds upon which the admissibility of the letter is now questioned, but even if this be waived, I am persuaded that the admission of the letter was entirely proper under the circumstances.
Paragraph 6 of the complaint is as follows: "That the plaintiff, Hannah Speed, delivered to the agent of the defendant company, the said policy of insurance for collection from said defendant company." And it is admitted that after the insured, Butha Gadson, died plaintiff delivered the policy to James Rogers, the agent who had sold it to her and who had collected the premiums thereon, and that she delivered it for collection. The answer of the defendant specifically admits, on information and belief, the allegations of Paragraph 6 of the complaint. It is therefore a fact admitted by the pleadings that James Rogers was not only the agent who sold the policy and collected the premiums, but that he was likewise the agent with reference to the collection of the amount due the beneficiary on the policy. And the plaintiff testified that she sent...
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