Spees v. Boggs
| Decision Date | 07 January 1901 |
| Docket Number | 81 |
| Citation | 198 Pa. 112,47 A. 875 |
| Parties | Spees v. Boggs |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued October 23, 1900
Appeal, No. 81, Oct. T., 1900, by defendants, from judgment of C.P. No. 2, Allegheny Co., July T., 1898, No. 560, on verdict for plaintiff, in case of Clara Spees v. R. H. Boggs and Henry Buhl, trading as Boggs & Buhl. Reversed.
Trespass for personal injuries. Before WHITE, P.J.
The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Defendants presented the following point:
1. That under the pleadings and evidence in this case the verdict of the jury should be in favor of the defendants. Answer Refused.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $7,500. Defendants appealed.
Error assigned among others was the answer to defendants' point.
The judgment is reversed.
Edwin S. Craig, for appellants. -- Employers are not insurers. They are liable for the consequences, not of danger, but of negligence, and the unbending test of negligence in methods machinery and appliances is the ordinary usage of the business: Keenan v. Waters & Son, 181 Pa. 247; Leonard v. Herrmann, 195 Pa. 222; Titus v. Bradford, etc., R.R. Co., 136 Pa. 618; Service v. Shoneman, 196 Pa. 63; Wojciechowski v. Spreckels's Sugar Refining Co., 177 Pa. 57; Higgins v. Fanning & Co., 195 Pa. 599; Mensch v. Penna. R. Co., 150 Pa. 598.
In order that workmen should be fellow-servants within the meaning of the rule that a master is not responsible to a servant for an injury caused by his fellow-servant, it is not necessary that the workman causing, and the workman sustaining, the injury, should both be engaged in the same particular work: Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Jones, 86 Pa. 432; Reading Iron Works v. Devine, 109 Pa. 246; Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v. Hambly, 154 U.S. 349.
S. Schoyer, Jr., with him S. B. Schoyer and W. L. Kaufman, for appellee. -- The falling of a passenger elevator while in transit carrying passengers, is so unusual, so entirely alien to the purpose and intent of it to carry passengers safely, that the conclusion is irresistible that the falling was due to negligence, want of care, or some derangement or lack of proper inspection of the machinery: McGroarty v. Wanamaker, 187 Pa. 132; McGregor v. Reid, Murdoch & Co., 178 Ill. 464.
The duty of the master to his servant in the matter of providing safe machinery and appliances is well settled: Pennsylvania, etc., Canal & R.R. Co. v. Mason, 109 Pa. 296; O'Donnell v. Allegheny Valley R.R. Co., 59 Pa. 239; Leland v. Hearn, 49 App.Div. Rep. (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) 111.
Before McCOLLUM, C.J., MITCHELL, FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT and POTTER, JJ.
The plaintiff while in the employ of the defendants was injured while riding in a passenger elevator provided for the use of employees in their store. The elevator did not fall. It appeared from the undisputed testimony that nothing connected with it broke or was out of repair. For some reason wholly unexplained, the boy in charge of the elevator failed to stop it at the first floor, and it passed without any slackening of its speed to the basement of the building, where it struck the floor with considerable force. The elevator was inspected regularly once a week, and it had been inspected a few hours before the accident and found to be in good condition. It was in good condition immediately after the accident. The plaintiff produced testimony to show that the elevator had failed to stop or had slipped at other times, but was unable to fix a time which was within a year of the accident, and the slipping at other times was not shown to have resulted from defective construction or from want of repair. The only prior time when there had been trouble with the elevator which was fixed with any degree of certainty was a year before. The boy in charge was then cautioned by the manager of the store and there had been no further difficulty in the management of the elevator until the happening of the accident in which the plaintiff was injured. After the accident a device which acted automatically to check the speed of the elevator if it became too great was so adjusted that the safety clutches would be thrown out six inches or a foot higher in the elevator shaft. The boy in charge of the elevator was eighteen years of age. He had been fully instructed in his duties and had operated the elevator three months. No question as to his competency was raised.
The safety device was intended to operate automatically in case of excessive speed of the elevator resulting from the breaking of the machinery or its failure to operate. It was not intended to check the usual speed of the elevator as it descended from floor to floor of the building, and that was the only speed in the case. The elevator did not stop at the first floor, but went on down to the basement with the same or possibly a slightly increased speed. The adjustment of the device after the accident to cause it to act under a less degree of speed may have been a wise precaution against the neglect of the operator, but it was not evidence of defective original construction or of want of proper inspection.
Under the facts developed at the trial a verdict cannot be sustained against the defendants without making them insurers of the safety of...
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