Wojciechowski v. Spreckels Sugar Refining Co.

• Decision Date: 06 October 1896
• Docket Number: 485
• Citation: 177 Pa. 57,35 A. 596
• Parties: Valenti Wojciechowski v. Spreckels' Sugar Refining Company, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

35 A. 596

177 Pa. 57

Valenti Wojciechowski v. Spreckels' Sugar Refining Company, Appellant

No. 485

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 6, 1896

Argued January 14, 1896

Appeal, No. 485, Jan. T., 1895, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. No. 1, Phila. Co., June Term, 1894, No. 313, on verdict for plaintiff. Reversed.

Trespass for personal injuries. Before BREGY, J.

At the trial it appeared that on September 12, 1892, plaintiff was injured while working in the defendant's sugar refinery. The circumstances of the accident are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

Some time after the accident negotiations for a settlement commenced between the plaintiff and the agent of an insurance company which had insured the refining company, in consequence of which the agent of the insurance company, the plaintiff, and two interpreters went to the office of the insurance company's attorney, Gavin W. Hart, Esq. The plaintiff could not speak English. One of the interpreters was a friend of plaintiff, the other was a police officer who spoke Polish, and who was paid by plaintiff to act as interpreter. Through the interpreters the plaintiff told Mr Hart that he desired to settle the case for $300. Mr. Hart thereupon drew the following release, using a printed form:

Know all men by these presents, That I, Valenti Wojciechowski hereinafter called the releasor, for and in consideration of the sum of $300 to me in hand paid by the Spreckels Sugar Refining Company hereinafter called releasee, at and before the sealing of these presents, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledge, do hereby remise, release, quit claim, and forever discharge the said releasee, their successors and assigns, of and from all actions, causes of action, suits claims and demands whatsoever, for, upon or by reason of any damages, loss or injury which heretofore have been, or which hereafter may be, sustained by the said releasee in consequence of the loss of my leg at the refinery of said releasee on the twelfth day of September, 1892, or thereabouts, while employed by them.

It being expressly understood that the payment of the said sum of $300 is not to be construed as an admission on the part of the said releasee that any liability whatever has attached to them in consequence of the said accident.

In witness whereof, I have hereto set my hand and seal, this tenth day of December, 1892.

VALENTI WOJCIECHOWSKI. [SEAL]

Signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of:

CHAS. W. BACHMANN,

December 10th, 1892, at Philadelphia.

HARRY CASPAR,

GAVIN W. HART.

After this paper was drawn some conversation took place between the interpreters and the plaintiff, and the plaintiff then, through the interpreters, demanded that he should be promised a situation. Mr. Hart said that defendant would not promise any future employment; that it would settle for the money and nothing else. Another conversation then took place between the plaintiff and the interpreters, and the plaintiff, through the interpreters, then intimated that he would decline to settle without a promise of employment. Mr. Hart then said:

"Very well, then, I will not settle on the basis of anything except the cash. I will not promise future employment, because it always produces difficulty."

Another conversation then took place between the plaintiff and the interpreters, and finally plaintiff said, through the interpreters, that he would accept the settlement. Mr. Hart told the interpreters to read plaintiff the release, which was apparently done in Polish by both interpreters. He then told them to explain the release to him, which they apparently did. The release was then executed. Mr. Hart wrote the following paper:

I, Henry Caspar, hereby certify that upon the signing of the release of Valenti Wojciechowski to the Spreckels Sugar Refining Company, I read the same to him in the Polish language at the office of Gavin W. Hart, No. 207 South Sixth Street, in the city of Philadelphia. A question having arisen as to a promise to give him work at the refinery, I instructed him that the company would not make any promise, but that he signed the same as an entire and full consideration and release.

I am a police officer of the city of Philadelphia, my number being 163.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this tenth day of December, 1892.

HENRY CASPAR.

I also certify to the above.

MICHAEL RACZYSCHOWSKI.

The above was drawn by me and read to Caspar and the others present December 10th, 1892.

GAVIN W. HART.

This paper Mr. Hart caused the interpreters to read before signing, and also directed them to translate it to the plaintiff, which they apparently did. The insurance agent, the plaintiff and the two interpreters then left the office of the attorney and went to the office of the Spreckels' Sugar Refining Company. There, through the interpreters, the plaintiff again demanded a promise of future employment.

The testimony of plaintiff was that he was induced to execute and deliver the release by a representation that it contained a promise that the defendant would give the plaintiff light employment or a life pension. The testimony of the defendant was that the secretary of the company, through the interpreters, refused to give it. After some hesitation the plaintiff delivered the release and accepted the money.

Defendant's points and answers were, among others, as follows:

1. In this case there is no evidence of any defect in the machinery or apparatus, and the danger was one which was apparent and needed no special experience or instruction to understand. It is a case, therefore, of an injury to an employee by an apparent danger incident to his employment, and your verdict must be for defendant. Answer: Refused. [1]

2. Subsequent to the accident the plaintiff for a recited consideration of $300, which was paid to him, executed and delivered a release under seal releasing defendant from liability. There is no sufficient evidence of fraud in this case to invalidate the release, and your verdict must therefore be for defendant. Answer: Refused. [2]

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $5,250. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned were, among others, (1, 2) above instructions quoting them; (8) in not directing the jury to find a verdict for defendant.

Judgment reversed.

John G. Johnson, with him Frank P. Prichard, for appellant. -- There being no evidence of any defective construction or inspection of the apparatus, it was error to instruct the jury that if the accident happened as plaintiff said it happened, by reason of the bars giving way under him, the defendant was liable: Shaffer v. Haish, 110 Pa. 575; Phila. & Reading R.R. v. Hughes, 119 Pa. 301; Allison Mfg. Co. v. McCormick, 118 Pa. 519; Mensch v. Penna. R.R., 150 Pa. 598; Augerstein v. Jones, 139 Pa. 183; Bradbury v. Kingston Coal Co., 157 Pa. 231.

Under the evidence in this case the court below should have charged the jury that the release and plaintiff's subsequent conduct were a bar to his claim: Meka v. Brown, 84 Iowa 711; Gibson v. R.R., 164 Pa. 142; Vandervelden v. Chicago, etc. Ry., 61 F. 54; Barker v. Northern Pac. Ry., 65 F. 461; Phillips v. Meily, 106 Pa. 536.

Abram S. Ashbridge, Jr., for appellee. -- It is the duty of those employing workmen to give them a reasonably safe place to work in and a failure to give such safe place is negligence. There was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant to warrant the submission of this case to the jury: Rummel v. Dilworth, 131 Pa. 509; Ross v. Walker, 139 Pa. 49; Kehler v. Schwenk, 151 Pa. 519; Lebbering v. Struthers, 157 Pa. 323.

Shaffer v. Haish, 110 Pa. 575, does not apply because there the machine was a dangerous one, there being no evidence of any defective construction, and the plaintiff had knowledge thereof. So also P. & R.R. Co. v. Hughes, 119 Pa. 301, is the case of a pin giving away from a latent defect. Allison Mfg. Co. v. McCormick, 118 Pa. 519, was a case where the place was not dangerous and the materials, such as were in common use, and the accident was "outside of the range of ordinary prudence."

Mensch v. R.R., 150 Pa. 598, was the case of an employee hurt by a car in bad condition, but which had been repaired a week before and had not been seen by any one in the meanwhile. There was no evidence of faulty construction.

Augerstein v. Jones, 139 Pa. 183, decides that reasonably safe appliances must be given, which is just what the plaintiff contends.

Bradbury v. Coal Co., 157 Pa. 231, was the case of an accident caused by latent defect.

The evidence in the case at bar was of such character as to warrant the jury in finding the plaintiff free from contributory negligence.

There was sufficient evidence adduced at the trial to warrant a jury in setting aside the release given to the casualty Company: Hoge v. Hoge, 1 Watts, 163; Ettinger v. Jones, 139 Pa. 218.

Pa. R.R. Co. v. Shay, 82 Pa. 198, was the case of a man signing a paper without reading it or having it read to him, and he was held to be debarred because of negligence.

Meka v. Brown, 84 Iowa 711, was the case where the false representations were made by one in no way connected with the defendant. In the case at bar false representations were made by Bachman, the agent of the insurance company, and the false interpretation was made by Caspar, Bachman's interpreter, so that it does not apply.

In Gibson v. R.R., 164 Pa. 142, plaintiff claimed that the release was obtained while he was non compos, but it was shown...