Speicher v. Columbia Twp. Bd. of Trs.
| Citation | 303 Mich.App. 475,843 N.W.2d 770 |
| Decision Date | 14 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 306684. |
| Parties | SPEICHER v. COLUMBIA TOWNSHIP BOARD OF TRUSTEES (On Reconsideration). |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan (US) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Silverman, Smith & Rice, PC, Kalamazoo (by Robert W. Smith), for plaintiff.
Plunkett Cooney, Kalamazoo, (by Mary Massaron Ross, Christine C. Oldani, and Robert A. Callahan) for defendants.
Before: WILDER, P.J., and O'CONNELL and KIRSTEN FRANK KELLY, JJ.
ON RECONSIDERATION
Plaintiff Kenneth J. Speicher moves for reconsideration of the portion of this Court's opinion in Speicher v. Columbia Twp. Bd. of Trustees, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 22, 2013 (Docket No. 306684), 2013 WL 238553, which held, despite the violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), MCL 15.261 et seq., by defendants Columbia Township Board of Trustees and Columbia Township Planning Commission, that “given that the technical nature of this OMA violation resulted in no injunctive relief being warranted, plaintiff is not entitled to any attorney fees or costs under MCL 15.271(4) on remand.” Because we concluded that plaintiff was entitled to declaratory relief, by virtue of a long line of cases issued by this Court—Craig v. Detroit Pub. Sch. Chief Executive Officer, 265 Mich.App. 572, 697 N.W.2d 529 (2005), Herald Co., Inc. v. Tax Tribunal, 258 Mich.App. 78, 669 N.W.2d 862 (2003), Morrison v. East Lansing, 255 Mich.App. 505, 660 N.W.2d 395 (2003), Nicholas v. Meridian Charter Twp. Bd., 239 Mich.App. 525, 609 N.W.2d 574 (2000), Manning v. East Tawas, 234 Mich.App. 244, 593 N.W.2d 649 (1999), and Schmiedicke v. Clare Sch. Bd., 228 Mich.App. 259, 577 N.W.2d 706 (1998)—he is also entitled to attorney fees. Accordingly, as we are required to do under MCR 7.215(J)(1), we follow these cases and remand to the trial court to award costs and attorney fees to plaintiff under MCL 15.271(4).
However, we disagree that, under the plain language of the OMA, plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees under the facts of this case. In accordance with MCR 7.215(J)(2), we note our disagreement with these cases and call for the convening of a special panel of this Court pursuant to MCR 7.215(J)(3).
We first note that plaintiff did not request attorney fees at the trial court or in his claim of appeal. Plaintiff's first request for attorney fees was prompted by this Court's holding that, because plaintiff was entitled to declaratory relief but not injunctive relief, he would not be entitled to an award of attorney fees. Upon reconsideration, we concede that existing caselaw requires an award of attorney fees in such instances, apparently even when plaintiff has not requested attorney fees. However, because we disagree with this caselaw, this issue having been squarely raised on reconsideration, we now address it directly. We observe that this issue is one of law and the record is factually sufficient to review it, and therefore, despite the fact that this issue was not properly presented to us in the classic sense, this Court may review it in the interest of judicial efficiency. See Detroit Leasing Co. v. Detroit, 269 Mich.App. 233, 237–238, 713 N.W.2d 269 (2005); Tingley v. Kortz, 262 Mich.App. 583, 588, 688 N.W.2d 291 (2004).
This Court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Eggleston v. Bio–Medical Applications of Detroit, Inc., 468 Mich. 29, 32, 658 N.W.2d 139 (2003). The primary goal when interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Mich. Ed. Ass'n. v. Secretary of State (On Rehearing), 489 Mich. 194, 217, 801 N.W.2d 35 (2011). “The words contained in a statute provide us with the most reliable evidence of the Legislature's intent.” Green v. Ziegelman, 282 Mich.App. 292, 301, 767 N.W.2d 660 (2009). In interpreting a statute, this Court considers both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase “as well as [its] placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.” Id. at 302, 767 N.W.2d 660.
The pertinent section of the OMA, MCL 15.271(4), provides:
If a public body is not complying with this act, and a person commences a civil action against the public body for injunctive relief to compel compliance or to enjoin further noncompliance with the act and succeeds in obtaining relief in the action, the person shall recover court costs and actual attorney fees for the action.
This Court in Leemreis v. Sherman Twp., 273 Mich.App. 691, 704, 731 N.W.2d 787 (2007), identified the three elements a plaintiff must satisfy in order to obtain attorney fees under the statute: “(1) a public body must not be complying with the act, (2) a person must commence a civil action against the public body ‘for injunctive relief to compel compliance or to enjoin further noncompliance with the act,’ and (3) the person must succeed in ‘obtaining relief in the action.’ ” As discussed earlier, plaintiff has satisfied the first two elements. The central question at issue is whether, when plaintiff obtained declaratory relief but not injunctive relief, he succeeded in “obtaining relief in the action.”
There are three distinct types of relief in the OMA. Id. at 700, 731 N.W.2d 787.
MCL 15.270(1) permits a person to file a civil action to invalidate a decision of a public body made in violation of the act. There is no provision for costs or attorney fees in this section.
MCL 15.271(1) allows a person to seek injunctive relief “to compel compliance or to enjoin further noncompliance with [the] act.” MCL 15.271(4) commands the recovery of costs and attorney fees when the person seeking injunctive relief succeeds “in obtaining relief in the action.”
MCL 15.273 permits a plaintiff to file suit against a public official for intentional violations of the OMA. And if the public official did intentionally violate the OMA, he or she is liable for actual and exemplary damages of not more than $500 total “plus court costs and actual attorney fees.” MCL 15.273(1).
Leemreis, 273 Mich.App. at 701, 731 N.W.2d 787. Accordingly, we conclude that the phrase “obtaining relief in the action” contained in MCL 15.271(4) refers not to a plaintiff's success in obtaining any relief, including declaratory relief, but instead commands the award of costs and attorney fees only when the plaintiff has obtained injunctive relief. Therefore, we would conclude that according to the plain meaning of the statute, a plaintiff can recover attorney fees and costs under MCL 15.271(4) only when a public body violates the OMA, the plaintiff requests injunctive relief, and the plaintiff receives injunctive relief.
Despite our plain-meaning interpretation, we are compelled to follow to this Court's prior determinations that the third element of MCL 15.271(4) is satisfied as long as any relief is granted. The following is a comprehensive review and roadmap of the prior opinions stating this premise.
This Court in Craig, 265 Mich.App. at 581, 697 N.W.2d 529, did not award attorney fees because it found no violation of the OMA, but, without any analysis, it did supply the rule that “[t]he imposition of attorney fees is mandatory upon a finding of a violation of the OMA.” The Craig Court cited Herald Co., 258 Mich.App. 78, 669 N.W.2d 862, as authority for its position.
In Herald Co., the Court stated that “[t]he OMA provides that if relief is obtained in an action against a public body for violating the OMA, that relief shall include ‘court costs and actual attorney fees.’ ” Id. at 91–92, 669 N.W.2d 862, quoting MCL 15.271(4). The Court further explained that “neither proof of injury nor issuance of an injunction is a prerequisite for the recovery of attorney fees under the OMA.” Herald Co., 258 Mich.App. at 92, 669 N.W.2d 862, citing Nicholas, 239 Mich.App. at 534–535, 609 N.W.2d 574.
Also relying on Nicholas is Morrison, 255 Mich.App. 505, 660 N.W.2d 395. The Morrison Court stated in a footnote, “Where a trial court declares that the defendants violated the OMA, but finds it unnecessary to grant injunctive relief, the plaintiffs are entitled to actual attorney fees and costs.” Id. at 521 n. 11, 660 N.W.2d 395, citing Nicholas, 239 Mich.App. at 535, 609 N.W.2d 574. Even though this rule was provided, the issue in Morrison was not whether the plaintiff was entitled to costs; it was whether the plaintiff was entitled to specific costs associated with certain deposition transcripts. Morrison, 255 Mich.App. at 521–522, 660 N.W.2d 395.
In Nicholas, 239 Mich.App. at 535, 609 N.W.2d 574, this Court, without providing any analysis, stated in perhaps the most direct language thus far:
Here, the trial court declared that defendants violated the OMA. This constitutes declaratory relief, thus entitling plaintiffs to actual attorney fees and costs despite the fact that the trial court found it unnecessary to grant an injunction given defendants' decision to amend the notice provision after plaintiffs filed the present suit.
The Nicholas Court then cited several cases as authority for this proposition: Schmiedicke, 228 Mich.App. at 266–267, 577 N.W.2d 706,Menominee Co. Taxpayers Alliance, 139 Mich.App. 814, 362 N.W.2d 871 (1984) and Ridenour v. Dearborn Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 111 Mich.App. 798, 314 N.W.2d 760 (1981). The Nicholas Court also relied on Manning, 234 Mich.App. 244, 593 N.W.2d 649.
The Manning Court stated that “declaratory relief under the OMA ... is sufficient to entitle plaintiffs to an award of costs and attorney fees.” Id. at 254, 593 N.W.2d 649. And like the Nicholas Court, the Manning Court also relied on and cited Schmiedicke and Menominee Co. Taxpayers Alliance for this position. Id.
The Schmiedicke Court, in turn, without...
To continue reading
Request your trial