Ridenour v. Board of Ed. of City of Dearborn School Dist., Docket No. 53376
| Decision Date | 28 January 1982 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 53376 |
| Citation | 111 Mich.App. 798,314 N.W.2d 760 |
| Parties | , 2 Ed. Law Rep. 226 Jack B. RIDENOUR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF DEARBORN SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Hurwitz, Karp & Wygonik, Dearborn, for plaintiff-appellee.
Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone by Larry J. Saylor, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Michigan Ass'n of School Administrators by MacLean, Seaman, Laing & Guilford, Lansing, amicus curiae.
Michigan Community College Ass'n by Thrun, Maatsch & Nordberg, P. C., Lansing, amicus curiae.
Before RILEY, P. J., and CYNAR and GAGE, * JJ.
Defendant appeals as of right from a declaratory judgment and order entered on August 8, 1980. We affirm.
On June 16, 1980, defendant, Board of Education of the Dearborn School District, adopted a resolution scheduling a closed executive session for June 26, 1980, for the purpose of evaluating the performance of the president of the Henry Ford Community College and the superintendent of the school district. Both of the officials to be evaluated at the meeting scheduled for June 26, 1980, requested in writing that the meeting be closed.
In his complaint, filed June 20, 1980, plaintiff, a resident of the school district, contended a closed meeting would violate the Open Meetings Act, M.C.L. § 15.261 et seq.; M.S.A. § 4.1800(11) et seq., and cause irreparable harm if defendant was not enjoined from holding the meeting. At a hearing on June 23, 1980, the circuit court issued a restraining order prohibiting the board from holding a closed meeting for the purpose of evaluating the performance of its officials and employees and compelling the board to show cause why a permanent injunction should not be issued.
At a show cause hearing on July 25, 1980, defendant argued that §§ 8(a) and 8(h) of the Open Meetings Act authorized closed meetings for the purpose of evaluating performances. This, defendant claimed, is necessary to allow unsubstantiated charges to be discussed without harm or embarrassment to the employee. Defendant further contended that the decision of the board is not made in the closed session, but rather is made in a subsequent public meeting.
The court rejected these arguments, reasoning in effect that the people of Dearborn, in order to evaluate the decision of the board of education, need to know the basis upon which the decision is made. Declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff was granted. Upon defense counsel's promise that defendant would comply with the court's interpretation, the judge determined that an injunction would not be necessary. The court accordingly dissolved the restraining order and denied the prayer for injunctive relief.
As a final matter, plaintiff's counsel asked for attorney fees and costs. Defendant contends the statute authorized fees only when injunctive relief is awarded. The trial court indicated a permanent injunction would issue. Defense counsel thereupon stated it was not necessary to burden the record with a permanent injunction since the defendant would comply with the court's interpretation. The court held plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees and costs since he obtained the equivalent of an injunction.
Michigan Association of School Administrators and Michigan Community College Association each filed an amicus curiae brief upon leave being granted.
The first of the two questions to consider is whether the Open Meetings Act precludes a board of education from meeting in a closed session for the purpose of evaluating the performance of the president of the junior college and the superintendent of education.
The Open Meetings Act states:
M.C.L. § 15.263(1); M.S.A. § 4.1800(13)(1).
The act defines "meeting" as follows:
" 'Meeting' means the convening of a public body at which a quorum is present for the purpose of deliberating toward or rendering a decision on a public policy." M.C.L. § 15.262(b); M.S.A. § 4.1800(12)(b).
Closed sessions are permitted for a number of purposes. However, in Wexford County Prosecutor v. Pranger, 83 Mich.App. 197, 268 N.W.2d 344 (1978), this Court held that the Open Meetings Act must be strictly construed against exemptions to public meetings. Section 8(a) of the Open Meetings Act, M.C.L. § 15.268(a); M.S.A. § 4.1800(18)(a), permits a body to meet in closed session "(t)o consider the dismissal, suspension, or disciplining of, or to hear complaints or charges brought against, a public * * * employee * * * when the named person requests a closed hearing". 1
Section 8(h) of the Open Meetings Act, M.C.L. § 15.268(h); M.S.A. § 4.1800(18) (h), permits a public body to conduct a closed session "(t)o consider material exempt from discussion or disclosure by state or federal statute". Section 13(1) of the Freedom of Information Act, M.C.L. § 15.243(1)(a); M.S.A. § 4.1801(13)(1)(a), permits a public body to exempt from disclosure "(i) nformation of a personal nature where the public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual's privacy". Information exempt from disclosure under the latter section could therefore be discussed at a closed meeting.
The language of the legislation is clear: all meetings of a public body where a quorum is present for purposes of deliberation or decision on a public policy shall be open meetings. There are some exceptions. Section 8(a) of the Open Meetings Act includes several separate grounds for conducting a closed meeting. A closed meeting may be held "to consider the dismissal, suspension, or disciplining of" a public employee. There is no basis to anticipate the application of dismissal, suspension, or disciplining in this matter.
Further, § 8(a) also permits a closed meeting "to hear complaints or charges against" such employees. The Legislature did not define the phrase "complaints or charges" in § 8(a) of the act. These terms should be interpreted broadly and in accordance with their everyday meanings. Production Credit Ass'n of Lansing v. Dep't of Treasury, 404 Mich. 301, 273 N.W.2d 10 (1978); Bingham v. American Screw Products Co., 398 Mich. 546, 248 N.W.2d 537 (1976). "Complaint" is defined as either "something that is a cause or subject of protest or outcry" or as "a formal allegation against a party". Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 228 (1979). "Charge" is defined as "to make an assertion against (especially) by ascribing guilt for an offense; to assert as an accusation". Id., 185.
If the purpose of the closed meeting herein related to a hearing concerning a complaint or charge, a closed meeting would be warranted. The present action does not support the position of defendant. The closed meeting in this case was scheduled for the purpose of evaluating the performance of the president of the community college and superintendent of schools. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Second Edition (1961), defines "evaluate" as "to determine the worth of; to find the amount of value of; to appraise". There were no allegations that anyone specifically brought any complaint or charges. It may very well be that at a meeting held for purposes of evaluation a charge or complaint if presented would be considered as part of the entire presentation in evaluating or appraising performance. However in this instance, for purposes of result, words should not be stretched out of their ordinary meaning. A closed meeting is not permissible under § 8(a) based on the record in this case.
The second applicable provision of the Open Meetings Act is § 8(h), which permits a public body to conduct a closed session "(t)o consider material exempt from discussion or disclosure by state or federal statute". M.C.L. § 15.268(h); M.S.A. § 4.1800(18)(h). Under Michigan's Freedom of Information Act, a public body is permitted to exempt from disclosure "(i)nformation of a personal nature where the public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual's privacy". M.C.L. § 15.243(1)(a); M.S.A. § 4.1801(13)(1)(a)...
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