Speights v. Hertz Corp.

• Decision Date: 09 September 2013
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 7:12-CV-4028-SLB
• Parties: VERNA SPEIGHTS, Administrator ad Litem of the Estate of Leander Russell, Jr., Plaintiff, v. THE HERTZ CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

VERNA SPEIGHTS, Administrator ad Litemof the Estate of Leander Russell, Jr., Plaintiff, v. THE HERTZ CORPORATION, Defendant.

CASE NO. 7:12-CV-4028-SLB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA WESTERN DIVISION

Done: September 9, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case is presently pending before the court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 3.) Plaintiff, Verna Speights, Administrator ad Litem of the Estate of Leander Russell, Jr., has sued defendant, the Hertz Corporation, alleging negligence, wantonness, and breach of warranty in the death of decedent, Russell. Upon consideration of the record, the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant law, the court is of the opinion that defendant's Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 3), is due to be granted.

I. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The purpose of such a motion, authorized by Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is to test the facial sufficiency of the plaintiff's statement of a claim for relief. Brooks v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997). "Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading containa short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." American Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010)(internal citations and quotations omitted).

When addressing a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, the court accepts the allegations in the Complaint as true and construes those allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir. 2011)(quoting Am. Dental Ass'n, 605 F.3d at 1288). To survive a Motion to Dismiss, "the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Am. Dental Ass'n, 605 F.3d at 1289 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)))(internal quotations omitted). A claim is "plausible" if the alleged facts are sufficient "to allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, "courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986))(internal quotations omitted). Also, the court does not assume that plaintiff can prove facts she has not alleged or that defendant has violated the law in ways that have not been alleged. Id. at 563 n.8 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983)). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation toprovide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555 (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]hile notice pleading may not require that the pleader allege a 'specific fact' to cover every element or allege 'with precision' each element of a claim, it is still necessary that a complaint 'contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.'" Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 8, 1981)).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following facts are derived from plaintiff's Complaint.

Decedent, Leander Russell, Jr., rented a Chevrolet Aveo, a compact car,¹ from defendant, the Hertz Company, on or about December 1, 2010. (Doc. 1 ¶ 10.) After driving the car from several days, decedent was in a fatal accident on December 6, 2010. (Id. ¶ 11.) Decedent apparently lost control of the car, left the road, and struck a tree. (Id.) He was not wearing a seat belt. (See id.)

At the time he rented the car, decedent was over 6 feet tall and weighed approximately 400 pounds. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that decedent was unable to wear the seat belt because of his size. (Id. ¶ 11.)

On December 5, 2012, plaintiff filed the instant action, alleging claims of negligence, wantonness, and breach of implied and express warranties. (See generally id.)

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant has moved to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because defendant owed decedent no duty and a wrongful death claim cannot be based on a breach of warranty. (Doc. 3.) "As a federal court sitting in diversity, [this court is] required to apply the law as declared by the state's highest court." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 182 F.3d 788, 790 (11th Cir. 1999)(citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). "In the absence of authority directly on point, [the court] must determine the issues of state law as [it] believe[s] the [Alabama] Supreme Court would." Id. (citing Towne Realty, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 854 F.2d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 1988)).

A. NEGLIGENCE AND WANTONNESS

Defendant contends that plaintiff's negligence and wantonness claims are due to be dismissed because defendant did not owe decedent a duty. Plaintiff's negligence and wantonness claims are based on two alleged duties: (1) "Defendant Hertz had a duty to the general public . . . to lease/rent to decedent Leander Russell a vehicle which was reasonablysafe for him to drive;" and (2) Hertz owed a duty to Leander Russell to adequately warn him of any dangers with leasing/renting a vehicle which was inappropriate and inadequate for his size." (Doc. 1 ¶ 14.) Plaintiff contends that defendant breached these duties as follows:

a. Hertz provided a vehicle which was not reasonably safe for Leander Russell to drive given his size and the corresponding size of the vehicle.

b. Hertz negligently failed to properly warn decedent Leander Russell that the Aveo was an inappropriate vehicle for him to drive given his size in relation to the size of the vehicle, as well as the fact the seat belt provided for the front seat driver was not of sufficient length such that Leander Russell was able to use the seat belt.

c. Hertz failed to provide a seat belt extender that Leander Russell could use with the seat belt provided in the Aveo so he would be able to use the seat belt when driving the Aveo.

d. Hertz, through its authorized agents, failed to exercise reasonable care in the leasing/renting of the Aveo to Leander Russell.

e. Hertz failed to provide a vehicle to Leander Russell which had sufficient driver occupant space for a man of his size.

(Id. ¶ 15.)

In Alabama,

The elements of a negligence claim are a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damage. At common law, a duty of due care can accompany a contractual obligation. In addition, a duty of due care can arise in the absence of a contract, based on a number of factors, including public policy, social considerations, and foreseeability of harm. The ultimate test of the existence of a duty to use due care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if care is not exercised. Due care is relative always and much depends upon the facts of the particular case.

[The Alabama Supreme Court] has defined "wanton conduct" [as] [t]he doing of some act or something with reckless indifference to the consequencesof said act, or a failure or omission to do something, with reckless indifference to the consequences of such failure or omission, that is, that the party acting or failing to act is conscious of his conduct, and even though without any actual intent to injure is aware from his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions that his conduct would probably result in injury to another or in damage to his property.

Armstrong Business Services, Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 817 So. 2d 665, 679-80 (Ala. 2001)(internal quotations and citations omitted).

"Both [plaintiff's] negligence claim and [her] wantonness claim require proof that [defendant] owed [decedent] a duty." Bryan v. Alabama Power Co., 20 So. 3d 108, 115-16 (Ala. 2009)(citing DiBiasi v. Joe Wheeler Elec. Membership Corp., 988 So. 2d 454, 460 (Ala. 2008); George v. Alabama Power Co., 13 So. 3d 360, 364 (Ala. 2008)). "In Alabama, the existence of a duty is a strictly legal question to be determined by the court." Id. at 116 (quoting Taylor v. Smith, 892 So. 2d 887, 891 (Ala.2004); citing Baugus v. City of Florence, 985 So. 2d 413, 419 (Ala. 2007)); see also Rose v. Miller & Co., Inc., 432 So. 2d 1237, 1238-39 (Ala. 1983)("The existence of a legal duty under a given statement of facts and circumstances is essentially a question of law for the court. It is elementary that where there is no duty, there can be no negligence.")(citations omitted).

1. Duty to Warn Decedent That Seat Belt Would Not Fit

In Alabama, "[t]he duty to warn end users of the dangers of products arises, in a pure negligence context, from § 388, Restatement (Second) of Torts." Ex parte Chevron Chemical Co., 720 So. 2d 922, 924 (Ala. 1998). This section provides:

One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier

(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and

(b) has no reason to believe that those

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