Spellman v. Metropolitan Transit Authority

• Decision Date: 29 February 1952
• Citation: 104 N.E.2d 493,328 Mass. 446
• Parties: SPELLMAN v. METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 493

104 N.E.2d 493

328 Mass. 446

SPELLMAN v. METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued Jan. 10, 1952.

Decided Feb. 29, 1952.

T. H. Mahony, E. F. Mahony and S. L. Jacobs, Boston, for plaintiff.

P. J. Dolan, Boston, for defendant.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, RONAN, WILKINS, SPALDING and WILLIAMS, JJ.

RONAN, Justice.

This is an action of tort to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been received while the plaintiff was alighting from a street car on September 4, 1945, at the defendant's Lechmere station. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff's exception is to the admission of a letter dated September 8, 1945, which she wrote and sent to the defendant's predecessor.

The issue at the trial was whether the car started as the plaintiff was alighting, as she testified, or whether after she alighted she was thrown down on the platform by some men hurrying to catch a bus. The plaintiff's letter stated in part that 'I am filing a claim for personal injuries I received when I was pushed off a street car at Lechmere Sq. Sept. fourth at five forty-five five P. M.' Her counsel purporting to act under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 233, § 23A, inserted by St.1945, c. 424, § 1, on April 8, 1948, made a written request on the defendant for copies of all statements signed by the plaintiff or anyone in her behalf concerning the accident. There was no response to this request. At the trial the letter was introduced in evidence over the exception of the plaintiff.

The statute so far as material provides, 'In any action to recover damages for personal injuries * * * no statement in writing signed by any party to the action, concerning the facts out of which the cause of action arose, given by such party * * * to any other party to the action * * * shall be admissible in evidence, in, or referred to at, the trial of such action or in any proceeding connected therewith unless a copy of such statement is furnished to the party making the same or to his attorney within ten days after written request therefor * * *.'

The defendant contends that the object of the statute as manifested by its legislative history, its title, and its language was to make inadmissible, unless a copy was furnished on request, only such signed statements as were procured by investigators for the purpose of being used in defence of the claim or action and were secured during or as a result of a personal interview between the injured party and the investigator. The statute, it contends, does not apply to a letter unsolicited by it, although signed by the injured party, and stating facts concerning the accident for which a claim for damages was made.

This legislation in its original form, House No. 1115, in accordance with its title which stated that it related to the furnishing of copies of written statements taken by investigators from persons interviewed in connection with actions or claims for damages, merely provided that investigators of insurance, adjustment or investigating companies employed to interview persons, upon receiving a written statement concerning an action or claim for damages, should furnish such person with an exact copy thereof. A penalty was provided for the failure to furnish a copy. This bill was superseded by House No. 1772 which was captioned 'An Act relative to the admissibility in evidence of written statements obtained from persons who have sustained personal injuries in accidents.' This title has since remained. This new bill, however, made no reference to investigators or to interviews by them with injured persons. It mentioned no penalty. It provided that a written statement obtained from an injured person by or on behalf of the person from whom damages were claimed should not be admissible in evidence unless a copy was furnished to the injured party or his attorney, within ten days after a written request therefor. This bill was superseded by Senate No. 559, which read in part as follows: 'no statement in writing signed by any party to the action, concerning the facts out of which the cause of action arose or the damages were claimed, given by such party.' Afterwards the words italicized were deleted and the bill was enacted into law. Senate No. 559 not only changed considerably the form of House No. 1772 but it spoke no longer of a statement obtained from the injured person but of a statement given by such person.

From this brief summary, it is apparent that the statute cannot be confined to written statements received as the result of a personal interview. The recipient of the written statement may now be the party himself against whom damages are claimed or his agent or attorney, or his insurer or its agent or attorney. The statement may be given by the injured party or someone in his behalf to any one of them. We think that a written statement given by an injured person of his own accord is just as much within the statute as if it...