Spence v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 18 August 1914 |
| Docket Number | 525. |
| Citation | 82 S.E. 646,142 Ga. 267 |
| Parties | SPENCE v. JOHNSON. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
In a suit for slander, if the words spoken do not impute a crime the mere general allegation that they do so is demurrable.
(a) If words are susceptible of two constructions, one of which is innocent, and the other charging a crime, by proper allegations as to the circumstances and meaning intended a question for the jury may be raised; but, if language is neither doubtful nor ambiguous, its meaning cannot be enlarged by an innuendo.
One who conducts a general farming business is included in a proper interpretation of that division of the Civil Code of 1910, § 4433, which declares that slander may consist in charges made in regard to another "in reference to his trade, office or profession, calculated to injure him therein," and that in such a case it is not essential to show special damage in order to support the action.
(a) The allegations, except as indicated in the first headnote, were sufficient to withstand a demurrer.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
"Libel" and "slander" are both methods of defamation; the former being expressed by print, writing, pictures, or signs the latter by oral expressions.
The word "trade" originally meant a track or course. Hence it came to mean a way of life, business, or occupation, and especially a handicraft by which one earns a livelihood, or a mercantile business, as opposed to the liberal arts or professions. A still further development makes the word synonymous with commerce.
Error from Superior Court, Warren County; B. F. Walker, Judge.
Action by E. R. Spence against J. L. C. Johnson. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
L. D. McGregor, of Warrenton, for plaintiff in error.
E. P. Davis and M. L. Felts, both of Warrenton, for defendant in error.
Spence brought an action against Johnson to recover damage for an alleged slander. The suit was dismissed on demurrer, and the plaintiff excepted.
1. One paragraph of the petition alleged that the defamatory words previously set out charged the plaintiff with a crime against the laws of the state, namely, that of being a cheat and swindler, and imputed such a crime to him. This allegation was properly stricken on demurrer. It was neither an allegation as to facts preceding or surrounding the alleged slander, nor as to the meaning which the defendant intended to convey by the use of certain words--what are termed in the language of the law a colloquium and innuendo. Moreover, the office of an innuendo is to explain what is of doubtful or ambiguous meaning in the language employed in an alleged libel or slander, but it cannot enlarge the meaning of the words plainly expressed therein. If such language is plain and unambiguous, and does not impute a criminal offense, its meaning cannot be enlarged and extended by an innuendo. If it is capable of being misunderstood in a double sense, the one criminal and the other innocent, the plaintiff may by proper allegation aver the meaning with which he claims that it was published, and the jury may find whether it was published with that meaning or not. Park v. Piedmont & A. Life Insurance Co., 51 Ga. 510, 513. In the case at bar the words alleged to have been spoken did not charge a crime but a breach of contract, and that the plaintiff would not keep his word and was of no account. No charge of criminality appears on the face of the language employed, and there is nothing alleged from which an intent to charge a crime could be inferred. Therefore the mere direct allegation that the language charged a crime was demurrable.
2. It was further contended on behalf of the defendant that the words spoken were not actionable per se; that farming was not a trade, office, or profession; that the petition failed to set forth any language in reference to the trade, office, or profession of the plaintiff; and that no special damages were alleged. Every man has the right to the enjoyment of a good reputation unassailed as he has a right to life, liberty, or property. It was long ago said that "a good name is rather to be chosen than great riches." Prov. XXII: 1. A suit for defamation is based on the injury done to reputation. Libel and slander are both methods of defamation. The former is expressed by print, writing, pictures, or signs; the latter is expressed orally. On account of the greater deliberation and permanency of libel, the courts came to hold certain things to be libelous per se which would not have been sufficient as the basis of an action of slander without showing special damage. It has been doubted whether such a distinction should have been drawn originally but it has become firmly fixed. Of course, if words are slanderous they would not become less defamatory by publishing them in writing, though words which might not be actionable per se as slander may be libelous per se when put in writing or print. In some of the discussions this distinction has been overlooked, and the question of whether language was libelous has been treated as though libel and slander were identical.
The Civil Code of 1910, § 4433, reads as follows:
We have already held that the plaintiff's petition did not show that the defendant imputed to him a crime punishable by law. It did not fall within the second division of the Code section above quoted. No special damages were alleged. Accordingly, whether the demurrer to the petition was properly sustained depends on whether the allegations are sufficient to show "charges made on another in reference to his trade, office, or profession, calculated to injure him therein." It was not claimed that the plaintiff held an office or was engaged in a profession.
The determination of the case therefore rests upon the inquiry whether the petition set out charges made against the plaintiff "in reference to his trade," calculated to injure him therein. It was contended that farming was not a trade within the meaning of the Code section above set out. This section did not arise from a legislative act, but was a codification of the common law. It is therefore permissible to consider the meanings which have been given to the word "trade," in order to determine in what sense it was employed by the codifiers, and by the Legislature in adopting the Code. If the etymology of the word "trade" be considered, it originally meant a track of course, and this meaning still survives in the word "trade wind." Hence it came to mean a way of life, business, or occupation and specially a handicraft by which one earns a livelihood, or a mercantile business, as opposed to the liberal arts or...
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