Spencer v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 27 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civ. Action No. 4:11-cv-02105 |
| Parties | RAMONA SPENCER, Plaintiff, v. ALIEF INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("Motion"). (Doc. No. 23.) After considering the Motion, Plaintiff's response, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the Motion should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff Ramona Spencer ("Plaintiff" or "Spencer"), a forty-year-old African American woman, has been employed with Alief Independent School District ("the District" or "Defendant") since 2007. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3-4, 7.) For this Memorandum and Order only, the Court assumes the allegations in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint are true. Plaintiff has been in the field of education for twenty-five years. (Id. ¶ 8.) While employed with Defendant, Plaintiff suffered disparate treatment, including denial of promotions "and not being provided comparable conditions ofemployment." (Id. ¶ 9.) Defendant has "a policy of not posting jobs for promotion" and of "assign[ing] jobs to individuals without regard to providing equal opportunity to apply." (Id. ¶10.) Plaintiff has applied for four positions during her tenure with Defendant: Assistant Director of Athletics in 2004; Assistant Principal in May 2009; Summer School Assistant Principal in February 2010; and Principal in July 2010. (Id. ¶¶ 13(i)-(vi).) Plaintiff was denied these positions based on her race, age, and/or gender. (Id.)
Plaintiff takes the "position that race and/or age has been a factor in her employment because younger and/or individuals of a different race have been given benefits of employment, and/or rules modified [sic] to meet their skill levels and then granted promotions [sic]." (Id. ¶ 14.) Further, "[p]romotions by the District have created circumstances wherein the higher positions are occupied by others of a different race, with few African Americans occupying the higher level administrative position [sic]." (Id. ¶ 15.) Although the district is a "majority/minority" district, Defendant's hiring patterns have maintained "the status quo." (Id. ¶ 16.) Specifically, Defendant's "policy/practice" includes "non-posting positions and changing position title/job requirement [sic] (practice) in order to hire and/or place the desired candidate." (Id.) Defendant's promotion policy has had a detrimental effect on Plaintiff's retirement benefits, as the last three years of highest compensation are used to calculate benefits. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII, 32 U.S.C. 2000(e), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), seeking declaratory relief, back wages and benefits, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees. (Id. ¶ 18.) Defendant now seeks to dismiss all claims against it.
"To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint 'does not need detailed factual allegations,' but must provide the plaintiff's grounds for entitlement to relief—including factual allegations that when assumed to be true 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). That is, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim has facial plausibility "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. A pleading need not contain detailed factual allegations, but must set forth more than "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
Ultimately, the question for the court to decide is whether the complaint states a valid claim when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, but legal conclusions are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (citation omitted). The court should not "'strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiffs'" or "accept 'conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions, or legal conclusions.'" R2 Investments LDC v. Phillips, 401F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's § 1981 claims must be dismissed because there is no private right of action under § 1981 against local governmental entities. (Mot. Dismiss 4.) See Jett v. Dallas Independennt School District, 491 U.S. 701, 731-33, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) (); Oden v. Oktibbeha County, Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff does not mention § 1983 in her Second Amended Complaint. Even if she did bring her allegations under § 1983, however, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claims would be precluded by the statute of limitations. (Mot. Dismiss 5-6.) The statute of limitations for a suit brought under § 1983 is determined by the general statute of limitations governing personal injuries in the forum state; in Texas, the statute of limitations is two years. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Pete v. Metcalf, 8 F.3d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1993); Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff filed her Original Complaint on June 6, 2011. (Doc. No. 1.) Therefore, Plaintiff can only bring claims under § 1983 for events that accrued after June 6, 2009. A cause of action under § 1983 "accrues when the plaintiff 'knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.'" Price v. City of San Antonio, Tex., 431 F.3d 890, 894 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Jackson v. Johnson, 950 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Plaintiff knew or should have known of the injuries alleged in her Second Amended Complaint that occurred prior to June 6, 2009. In other words, Plaintiff knew or should have known that she was not given the job of Assistant Director of Athletics in 2004, and was denied the position of Assistant Principal in May 2009. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13(i), 13(iv).)1 Therefore, those claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff does allege, however, that she applied for two positions after June 6, 2009: Summer School Assistant Principal in February 2010, and Principal at the Alief Learning Center in July 2010. (Id. ¶¶ 13(v)-(vi).)
According to Defendant, any claims for racial discrimination arising from denial of these two promotions must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to plead facts that would support municipal liability under § 1983. (Mot. Dismiss 4-5.) "Section 1983 only proves a cause of action against local governmental units ... when the allegedly improper action was taken pursuant to an official policy or governmental custom." U.S. v. Matagorda County, Tex., 181 F.Supp.2d 673, 683 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). Further, § 1983 does not provide for governmental liability premised upon a theory of respondeat superior. Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037). "[M]unicipal liability under section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose 'moving force' is the policy or custom." Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). "The three attribution principles identified here—a policymaker, an official policy and the movingforce of the policy—are necessary to distinguish individual violations perpetrated by local government employees from those that can be fairly identified as actions of the government itself." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
A custom or policy can stem from a policy statement formally announced by an official policymaker. Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 168 (5th Cir. 2010). Alternatively, a custom or policy can be demonstrated through a "'persistent widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.'" Id. at 168-69 (quoting Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984)). Importantly, "[i]t is not enough that an illegal custom exist; municipal policymakers, who are the persons capable of subjecting a municipality to liability, must be chargeable with awareness of the custom." Milam v. City of San Antonio, 113 Fed.Appx. 622, 626 n.3 (5th Cir. 2004). In other words, "a plaintiff must show the policy was promulgated by the municipality's policymaker." Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff does allege that she was discriminated against, and that the moving force of the discrimination was a policy or custom. Specifically, Plaintiff states: (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff goes on to claim: ...
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