Spencer v. Annett Holdings, Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11–1032.,11–1032. |
| Citation | 815 N.W.2d 410 |
| Parties | Douglas SPENCER, Petitioner–Appellee, v. ANNETT HOLDINGS, INC., Respondent–Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karen A. Romano, Judge.
Employer appeals from a district court judicial review ruling reversing the decision of a deputy workers' compensation commissioner in an alternate care proceeding. REVERSED.
Sasha L. Monthei of Scheldrup Blades, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Christopher Spaulding of Berg, Rouse, Spaulding & Schmidt, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by DANILSON, P.J., BOWER, J., and MILLER, S.J.*
Our workers' compensation statute requires an employer to “furnish reasonable services and supplies to treat an injured employee.” Iowa Code § 85.27(4) (2009). The statute gives the employer “the right to choose the care,” subject to the employee's right to apply for alternate care under certain circumstances. Id . Here, the deputy commissioner determined the employer is entitled to choose an alternate provider upon the retirement of its chosen treating physician. The district court reversed, concluding the retiring physician's referral did not require the employer's permission. Because the employer is entitled to choose the provider in the first instance, and the worker did not prove that care was unreasonable, we reverse the district court's ruling reversing the deputy's denial of the alternate care petition.
The facts are not in dispute. Douglas Spencer sustained a work-related injury. His employer-selected treating physician, Dr. Anthony P. Dalton, “due to ... retirement,” referred Spencer to Dr. J. Thomas McClure. The employer, Annett Holdings, Inc., learned of Dr. Dalton's retirement upon Dr. McClure's request for payment for services performed. Annett designated Dr. Blake Garside as the authorized treating physician.
Spencer filed a petition for alternate care, contending “once a physician is authorized, ... reasonable and necessary referrals from that authorized treating physician then become authorized medical care.” Annett resisted, contending it is the right of the employer to choose medical care upon the resignation of its treating physician.
On June 11, 2010, a deputy commissioner denied the application, concluding:
The retiring doctor here was not referring for additional care such as a specialist for which defendants would be bound, but was recommending his own replacement. The defendants are merely exercising their right to choose the primary provider when the primary provider retired, as opposed [to] interfering in care or attempting to direct the care provided.
Therefore the claimant has not met his burden of proof that the care authorized by the defendant is not designed to be effective in managing his medical problems resulting from his work injury.
On June 29, 2010, Spencer filed a motion for reconsideration of the agency's ruling.
On July 19, 2010, Spencer filed a petition for judicial review in the district court.
Annett filed a motion dismiss the petition as untimely filed. Spencer resisted the motion to dismiss, asserting his motion for rehearing was deemed denied twenty days after its filing or July 19 and his petition for judicial review was filed within thirty days of that deemed denial. Annett responded:
1. Respondent acknowledges that if Petitioner filed an Application for Rehearing of the Alternate Medical Care Decision pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.16 and Iowa Administrative Code 876–4.24, Petitioner likely filed his Petition for Judicial Review within the statutory time period.
2. Nevertheless, neither Petitioner nor Agency served Respondent with said Application for Reconsideration.
3. According to Iowa Code section 17A.16(2), “[a] copy of the application for rehearing shall be timely mailed by the presiding agency to all parties of record not joining in the application.”
4. According to Iowa Admin Rule 876–4.24,
5. Because Respondent did not receive proper service of such Application for Rehearing, the Application was never completely filed and the Petition for Judicial Review is still late.
6. If either Petitioner or Agency can show Respondent did receive proper service, Respondent will withdraw its Motion to Dismiss.
Spencer in turn submitted a file-stamped copy of his motion for reconsideration, which included a notation that a copy was mailed to counsel for Annett, as well as an affidavit verifying mailing a copy to defense counsel. Annett, however, continued to assert the appeal was untimely for lack of certificate of service.
The district court ordered a limited remand to the deputy commissioner to address (1) whether the motion for reconsideration “was properly filed with the Workers' Compensation Commission” and (2) whether the commissioner considered the motion and “chose not to respond” or “refused to consider Claimant's Motion because it did not contain a certificate of service.”
On December 9, 2010, the deputy issued a remand decision stating, “The motion for reconsideration was considered, and deemed denied without comment pursuant to Iowa Code Section 17A.16(2).”
On June 28, 2011, after receiving arguments, the district court ruled in pertinent part:
The deputy erred in concluding the “defendants are merely exercising their right to choose the primary provider when the primary provider retired, as opposed to interfering in care or attempting to direct the care provided.” [footnote omitted] Finding that Dr. Dalton referred Spencer to Dr. McClure, but then concluding that Annett Holdings was not bound by the referral because the referral was to another orthopedic surgeon upon Dr. Dalton's retirement is not in line with the general principles set forth in prior agency rulings. Under agency law, which the court finds to be persuasive authority, “[a]n employer's right to select the provider of medical treatment to an injured worker does not include the right to determine how an injured worker should be diagnosed, evaluated, treated, or other matters of professional medical judgment.” ...
... As Spencer's authorized treating physician, Dr. Dalton managed Spencer's medical treatment and provided for its continuation upon his (Dr. Dalton's) retirement. Spencer followed his authorized treating physician's instructions by treating with Dr. McClure. The referral from Dr. Dalton made Dr. McClure Spencer's authorized treating physician.
The district court ruled the “authorized treating physician made a valid referral to Dr. McClure” and reversed the deputy's denial of the application for alternate medical care.
Annett appeals, contending the district court erred (1) in failing to dismiss the judicial review petition as untimely and (2) in ruling a retiring physician can name a replacement.
Our supreme court recently summarized our scope and standard of review stating:
We review an appeal of a workers' compensation decision under the standards set forth in chapter 17A of the Iowa Code. We apply the standards “to determine whether the conclusions we reach are the same as those of the district court.” If we reach the same conclusion as the district court, we affirm, but if we reach a different conclusion, we reverse.
Westling v. Hormel Foods Corp., ––– N.W.2d ––––, –––– (Iowa 2012) (citations omitted).
A. Petition was timely filed. Annett first argues the district court erred in failing to dismiss Spencer's petition for judicial review because it was not timely filed. See Sharp v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 492 N.W.2d 668, 669 (Iowa 1992) (); but see Fed. Am. Int ‘ l, Inc. v. Om Namah Shiva, Inc., 657 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Iowa 2003) (). Because the petition for judicial review was timely, we disagree.
Spencer filed a “motion for reconsideration” with the workers' compensation commissioner on June 29, 2010. Technically, the “motion” was an application for rehearing pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.16(2) ().1 The workers' compensation commissioner was deemed to have denied Spencer's motion when it was not granted within twenty days of its filing. See id. ().
Spencer filed a petition for judicial review on July 19, 2010, well within thirty days of the date his application for rehearing was deemed denied. See id. § 17A.19(3) (); Fee v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 463 N.W.2d 20, 21 (Iowa 1990) ().
Annett's contention that Spencer's judicial review petition was untimely is based upon its claim that because Spencer's motion for rehearing did not contain a certificate of service, we must conclude it was...
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Spencer v. Annett Holdings, Inc.
...Spencer sustained a work-related injury.” Pl.'s Partial Summ. J. App. at 43 (quoting Spencer v. Annett Holdings, Inc., No. 11–1032, 815 N.W.2d 410, 2012 WL 1058205 at *1 (Iowa Ct.App. Mar. 28, 2012)). Spencer then filed a Petition for Further Review with the Iowa Supreme Court, and Annett r......