Spencer v. City of W. Palm Beach & Johnny Radziul
| Decision Date | 04 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO.:15-CV-80019 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
| Parties | SUSAN SPENCER, individually and as personal representative of the estate of JOSEPH FERRANS, II, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH and JOHNNY RADZIUL, Defendants. |
This cause is before the Court on two motions to dismiss. (DEs 9, 10). The motions are ripe for consideration. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that the motions should be granted in part and denied in part.
This action arises from the death of Joseph Ferrans II following a high-speed police pursuit in West Palm Beach, Florida. (DE 1-2). At the time of the incident, Defendant Johnny Radziul was an officer in Defendant West Palm Beach's ("the City") police department. (Id. ¶ 11). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Radziul was in an unmarked police vehicle when he witnessed Mr. Ferrans, who was driving a motorcycle, perform a "minor traffic infraction of making a lane change without signal." (Id. ¶¶ 18, 20). Thereafter, Defendant Radziul initiated ahigh speed pursuit of Mr. Ferrans.1 (Id. ¶ 19). Plaintiff alleges that, during the course of the pursuit, Defendant Radziul caused his unmarked vehicle to "collide, come into contact, or be maneuvered in a way" to cause Mr. Ferrnans to lose control of his motorcycle and crash into a tree. (Id. ¶ 25). Mr. Ferrans died of his injuries. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Radziul's actions "were intended to harm, injure or cause [Mr. Ferrans's] death." (Id. ¶ 27).
Mr. Ferrans's mother and personal representative, Plaintiff Susan Spencer, initiated this action in state court against Defendant Radziul and the City. After an amended complaint asserted federal causes of action, Defendants removed to this court. (DE 1). The Amended Complaint states five causes of action: As to Defendant Radziul, Plaintiff asserts a state-law wrongful death claim (Count I) and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of life and liberty without due process of law (Count IV); Plaintiff asserts the same causes of action against Defendant City (Counts II and III) and also asserts a claim for failure to adequately train and supervise (Count VI) (misnumbered).
Defendants move to dismiss for failure to state a claim and on immunity grounds. (DEs 9, 10).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires "a short and plain statement of the claim" that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ground on which it rests. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). The Supreme Court has held that Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal citation and alteration omitted).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Thus, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 679. The Court must accept all of the plaintiff's factual allegations as true in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for which relief could be granted. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
Because Plaintiff's state-law claims are brought pursuant to this Court's supplemental jurisdiction (DE 1-2 ¶ 6), the Court will analyze whether Plaintiff's federal claims state a claim to relief before considering the state-law claims.
In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Radziul, while acting under color of state law, deprived Mr. Farrens of "life and liberty without due process of law" by engaging in a high-speed pursuit that culminated in Mr. Ferrans's death. (DE 1-2 ¶ 11). Defendant Radzuil argues that the alleged facts "do not state a cause of action" for a violation of the FourteenthAmendment's guarantee of substantive due process. (DE 9 at 8).2
The parties agree that the "applicable standard to apply under the Fourteenth Amendment in high-speed chase cases is whether the conduct of the government shocks the judicial conscience."3 White v. Polk Cnty., No. 04-CV-1227, 2006 WL 1063336, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2006) aff'd, 207 F. App'x 977 (11th Cir.); (see DE 9 at 9; DE 16 at 8). The Supreme Court applied this standard in the context of high-speed police pursuits in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
Lewis involved a high-speed police pursuit during which an officer chased a speeding motorcycle driver, resulting in the death of the motorcycle's passenger after the motorcycle crashed. The Supreme Court faced the question of "whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender." Id. at 836. The Court answered the question in the negative, "hold[ing] that in such circumstances only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience, necessary for a due process violation." Id. The Court held emphatically that"high-speed chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, redressible by an action under § 1983." Id. at 854.
In order to meet the shocking-the-conscious standard, it must be shown that the pursuing officer's "acts were motivated by an intent to harm" the fleeing suspect.4 White v. Polk Cnty., 207 F. App'x 977, 979 (11th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). This motivation must be "unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest" and "unjustifiable by any government interest." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836, 849. That is, "the actions of the officers must be completely unrelated to the legitimate exercise of executing an arrest and must be done with the purpose to cause harm." Levy v. City of Hollywood, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2000); see also Gaillard v. Commins, 562 F. App'x 870, 877 (11th Cir. 2014) ().
Given these principles, Defendant Radziul cannot be held liable under § 1983 for causing Mr. Ferrans death during a high-speed pursuit unless his conduct shocks the judicial conscious, i.e., unless his conduct was motivated by an intent to harm—and only an intent to harm—Mr. Ferrans. Plaintiff alleges that, after witnessing a minor traffic violation, Defendant Radziul collided his vehicle with Mr. Ferrans's motorcycle with an "inten[t] to harm, injure or cause [Mr. Ferrans's] death." (DE 1-2 ¶ 27). Elsewhere, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's actions were "intended to terminate the movement of [Mr. Ferrans's] vehicle by deliberately causing harm tothe operator." (Id. ¶ 58). From these facts, a plausible claim is made that Defendant Radziul acted with more than a mere intent to effect an arrest, and instead acted with intent to harm Mr. Ferrans physically by colliding with his motorcycle. See Patterson v. Walden, No. 13-0109, 2013 WL 3153761, at *4 (S.D. Ala. June 18, 2013) (). Further developments may require that the Court examine the veracity of these allegations; however, they are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The Court also concludes that Defendant Radziul is not entitled to qualified immunity under the facts alleged. The qualified immunity issue requires the Court to address two questions: (1) whether a constitutional right was violated on the facts alleged, and (2) whether that right was clearly established. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). Given the Supreme Court's holding in Lewis, it is now clearly established that an officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment during a high-speed pursuit when he operates his vehicle with the sole purpose of causing injury to a fleeing suspect. See 523 U.S. at 836. Accepting Plaintiff's allegations in that regard as true, Defendant Radziul is not entitled to qualified immunity.
In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant West Palm Beach "instituted and followed polic[ies], procedures and customs" that lead to the deprivation of Mr. Ferrans's life and liberty without due process of law. (DE 1-2 ¶ 48). Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that the City instituted such policies and customs by "failing to discipline its agents for their actions and inactions." (Id. ¶ 49). Plaintiff alleges that the City's policy was the "moving force" behind DefendantRadziul's vehicular pursuit, although Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Radziul knew "that such pursuit violated applicable law and policies, practices and procedures of the West Palm Beach Police Department." (Id. ¶¶ 23, 52; see also id. ¶ 26.c. ("pursuit was not conducted . . . pursuant to a written policy governing high-speed pursuit...
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