Spencer v. General Elec. Co., Civ. A. No. 87-1214-A.

• Decision Date: 04 October 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 87-1214-A.
• Citation: 697 F. Supp. 204
• Parties: Anne E. SPENCER, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. and James Russell Neal, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

697 F. Supp. 204

Anne E. SPENCER, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. and James Russell Neal, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 87-1214-A.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.

October 4, 1988.

Jane Lang McGrew, Weissbrodt, Swiss & McGrew, Paul C. Sprenger, Sprenger, Olson & Shutes, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.

Bernard J. DiMuro, Philip J. Hirschkop, Hirschkop, DiMuro & Mook, Alexandria, Va., for Neal.

Peter G. Nash, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash Smoak & Stewart, Washington, D.C., C. Richard Miserendino, Fairfax, Va., for G.E.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELLIS, District Judge.

This is yet another of the lamentably growing number of cases involving sexual harassment in the workplace. Alleged assaults and harassing conduct over an extended period gave rise to multiple claims. Specifically, plaintiff, Anne Spencer, a General Electric (GE) employee, brought suit alleging that her former supervisor, James Neal, sexually harassed and assaulted her over a three-year period and raped her in October, 1986. Against Neal, Spencer alleged state tort claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These same torts were alleged against GE on grounds of respondeat superior and ratification of Neal's acts. Against GE, Spencer also brought state tort claims for negligent supervision and failure to provide a safe workplace. Finally, Spencer asserted a Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., sexual harassment claim against GE on both hostile environment and quid pro quo grounds.

Against Spencer's array of claims, defendants aimed a flurry of eleventh hour pretrial motions. Some claims fell. Claims against GE for negligent supervision and failure to provide a safe workplace were dismissed; neither claim is cognizable under Virginia law.¹ The Court held, however, that GE could be liable for Neal's alleged acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Spencer v. General Electric, Civil Action No. 87-1214-A (E.D.Va. May 24, 1988) (unpublished Order). The Court further held that Spencer's suit was not barred by the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Worker's Compensation Act, Va.Code Ann. § 65.1-23 (1987), because of the allegations that Neal committed intentional torts with the intent to injure her. Id.; see also McGreevy v. Racal-Dana Instruments, Inc., 690 F.Supp. 468 (E.D.Va.1988) (adopting intentional tort exception to the Virginia Worker's Compensation Act).

This matter then proceeded to trial on Spencer's claims under state tort law and Title VII. The Court denied defendants' motion to try separately the tort claims and Title VII claims. At the conclusion of Spencer's case in chief, the Court granted GE's motion for a directed verdict on the state tort claims on the ground that plaintiff had not made out jury issues on the two essential questions: (1) whether Neal's alleged acts occurred within the scope of his employment and (2) whether GE ratified the alleged acts of assault, rape and harassment. The Court, in essence, found that the evidence provided no basis for holding GE liable for Neal's acts. At this point, given the demise of her state claims against GE, Spencer elected to request a nonsuit on her state claims against Neal and proceed solely on her Title VII claim. The Court granted this request and, after excusing the jury, completed the trial of the Title VII claim. It is Spencer's Title VII claim that is the subject of this Memorandum Opinion.

FINDINGS OF FACT²

A. Introduction

Spencer is a 41-year-old female who was hired by defendant GE as a Graphics Specialist in June, 1983. She was assigned to work in a group engaged in classified endeavors for the government. After obtaining a required security clearance, she reported for duty in January, 1984. She filed the present action on November 24, 1987, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., alleging sexual harassment, sexual assault and rape by her supervisor, GE Graphics Manager James Neal.

B. The Graphics Office

During the relevant time period, Spencer worked in the Graphics Office (hereinafter the "Graphics Office" or "Office") at a GE facility in Springfield, Virginia. The Graphics Office is located in one of a group of trailers connected by a series of hallways. These trailers also house a number of administrative offices. (Kudick, TR 3190-98). Due to the classified nature of the Graphics Office work, the Office was "secured"; access could only be obtained through cipher-locked doors. Entry through these doors was accomplished by pushing buttons in a three-digit sequence, and it normally took two to three seconds to open the doors. (Kudick, TR 3-136). Only the Graphics Office employees knew the cipher combinations; all other employees, including Neal's supervisors, knocked at the door to gain entry. (Ellis, TR 5-450-52).

It is undisputed that, during the relevant time period, Neal was the manager of the Graphics Office and was the sole immediate supervisor of the employees who worked there. Six GE employees worked under Neal: Spencer, Harriet Standish, Debbie Evans-Doyle, Deborah Fulton Dempsey, Michael Kudick, and Judy Guilliams. Kudick left GE in January, 1986, and Standish left in August, 1986. Neal, in turn, reported to his supervisor, Paul Pelotte, who reported to Donald North, GE Program Resource Integration Manager. After Pelotte was transferred in May, 1985, Neal reported directly to North. (North, TR 6-P3-90). Thus, there was no immediate supervisor of the Graphics Office until approximately January, 1986, when Gary Ellis became Neal's acting supervisor. (Ellis, TR X-XXX-XXX). In approximately October, 1986, Ellis was removed as Neal's superior due to a corporate reorganization, leaving Neal without an immediate supervisor. (Ellis, TR 5-459, 465). After the reorganization, Neal reported directly to Wesley West, a Systems Operations Manager.

C. Spencer's Allegations

Spencer's allegations regarding Neal's conduct may be divided into four categories: (1) sexual solicitations; (2) sexual assaults; (3) a rape in October, 1986; and (4) sexual horseplay. The Court's findings with respect to each category are set forth below.

1. Sexual Solicitations

Spencer testified that in June, 1984, Neal solicited Spencer to have sexual intercourse with him. (TR 3-281; 4-P2-133-34). On other occasions, Neal asked whether he could see Spencer at her home. (TR 5-374). Spencer's testimony was partially corroborated by Michael Kudick, who testified that, on one occasion, Spencer came to his office, upset and frightened, and told Kudick that Neal had asked her to go to bed with him. (TR 3-86-87). On several subsequent occasions, Spencer complained to Kudick that Neal was pressuring her to have sex with him. (TR 3-87). Neal also asked Kudick a number of times whether Spencer was any good in bed. (TR 3-82). Neal flatly denied ever making sexual propositions to Spencer. (TR 8-60). The Court finds Spencer's and Kudick's testimony sufficient to establish that Neal solicited sex from Spencer.

Spencer testified that she "understood" that her employment would suffer if she did not give in to Neal's advances. (TR 3-290). She vaguely added that this understanding was based on Neal's assertion that he "always gets even with anybody that does anything to him." (TR 3-290). Shortly after the June, 1984 solicitations, Spencer also expressed to Kudick her fear that she would lose her job if she rejected Neal. (Kudick, TR 3-87). Significantly, however, Neal did not actually threaten Spencer's job or take any adverse action against her in terms of her employment. (See Kudick, TR 3-168). The evidence fails to support a conclusion that Neal conditioned Spencer's continued employment on submission to his advances.

Spencer also claims that her promotion within the Graphics Office was conditioned on her submission to Neal's advances. She testified that in May, 1985, Neal proposed to promote her from a level 4 graphics specialist to a level 6 illustrator and told her that the promotion would mean a $4,000 increase in pay. (TR 4-P2-112, 5-369-70; see also Neal, TR 8-68). Although her job duties changed, she never received a higher grade level or an increase in pay. (Spencer, TR 3-260-61; Neal, TR 8-71). Additionally, Spencer stated that in October, 1986, in response to her inquiry as to what action had been taken on the promotion, GE's manager of Employee Relations explained that he had never seen any promotion papers. (TR 3-349). Spencer testified that she thought the promotion was offered in exchange for sexual favors, but admitted that Neal never mentioned sex in connection with the promotion. (TR 5-403-05). Apparently, her assumption was based on the fact that Neal allegedly reminded her about the efforts he had made on her behalf and treated her better when his advances succeeded. (TR 5-403-05). Neal, on the other hand, stated that Spencer asked him for a promotion. (TR 8-60). He did the paperwork necessary to recommend Spencer for a grade increase, even though he viewed plaintiff as only marginally qualified for the position. (TR 8-60-62, 66, 68; Spencer, TR 4-P2-114).

Spencer points to Neal's treatment of Debbie Evans-Doyle, with whom Neal was having an affair,³ as evidence that Neal conditioned job benefits on sexual favors. Evans-Doyle received two promotions, one before Spencer started work at the Graphics Office, and one after Spencer was transferred. (PX 44A). Her salary increased 50% over four years, as compared to a 20% increase in plaintiff's salary. (Evans-Doyle, TR 115-16; PX 44A, 47A). Spencer introduced no testimony indicating that Evans-Doyle was not qualified for the promotions or pay increases. The evidence is insufficient to establish that Evans-Doyle received preferential treatment because of her affair with Neal. On the contrary, the Court is satisfied that Evans-Doyle's promotions and salary increases were based on merit, not sexual favors.

2. Sexual Assaults

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