Spencer v. General Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 January 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 87-1214-A.
• Parties: Anne E. SPENCER, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. and James Russell Neal, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

703 F. Supp. 466

Anne E. SPENCER, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. and James Russell Neal, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 87-1214-A.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.

January 17, 1989.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Paul C. Sprenger, Paul C. Sprenger & Associates, Jane Lang McGrew, Weissbrodt, Swiss & McGrew, F. Joseph Nealon, Amy S. Owen, Miles & Stockbridge, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.

Peter G. Nash, Frances C. Moran, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Washington, D.C., C. Richard Miserendino, Fairfax, Va., Bernard J. DiMuro, Hirschkop, DiMuro & Mook, Alexandria, Va., for defendants.

ORDER

ELLIS, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's motion to amend this Court's judgment of October 6, 1988.¹ Specifically, plaintiff seeks permanent injunctive relief compelling defendant General Electric (GE) to "issue, disseminate and implement a comprehensive anti-sexual harassment policy."² By Order dated November 1, 1988, this Court, inter alia, denied plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment and grant plaintiff's proposed permanent injunctive relief. The Court took under advisement, however, whether to order some form of injunctive relief short of plaintiff's proposal.³ The Court did so because plaintiff raised substantial questions concerning the effectiveness of GE's remedial steps. Accordingly, GE was ordered to submit additional materials regarding its sexual harassment policy, and plaintiff was granted leave to file an additional brief. Both parties submitted additional briefs and materials. Based on counsels' oral arguments and review of the briefs and supporting materials, the Court concludes that a permanent injunction is unnecessary. GE has remedied the sexual harassment which triggered Title VII liability and has acted effectively to prevent future illegal conduct by the adoption of a comprehensive anti-sexual harassment policy. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion is hereby DENIED.

Where, as here, a violation of Title VII is found, a court has the power, and indeed the obligation,⁴ to award any equitable remedies necessary "to advance the dual statutory goals of eliminating the effects of past discrimination and preventing future discrimination." Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 843 F.2d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir.1988) citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2372, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). In the case at bar, specific actions have already been taken to alleviate the effects of the past harassment. Plaintiff was, at her request, promptly transferred to a similar position in a different GE office at the same pay level and with similar opportunities for advancement. Spencer, 697 F.Supp. at 215. Neal, the harassing employee, was demoted by GE and later terminated. Id. at 216. And the Court awarded plaintiff nominal damages for her success in proving that GE maintained a hostile work environment.⁵Id. Those actions remedied, to the extent legally practicable, the effects of the proven sexual harassment.

The second goal of Title VII, preventing future illegal discrimination, is the crux of the instant motion. Injunctive relief is uniquely designed to prevent illegal conduct.⁶ Such relief, however, is not mandatory in all Title VII cases.⁷ Only where there are lingering effects or a not insubstantial risk of recurring violations is such relief necessary. At the same time, injunctive relief is not automatically precluded simply because the offending party has ceased the illegal conduct,⁸ demonstrated its good faith intent to comply with the law, or even implemented an affirmative plan to remedy past discrimination.⁹ Rather, the court must carefully examine the circumstances of each case, taking into account "the bona fides of defendant's expressed intent to comply, the effectiveness of the discontinuance and, in some cases, the character of the past violations." United States v. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 898, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953). Before granting injunctive relief, the court must then conclude that a "cognizable danger of recurrent violation" exists.¹⁰Unit- ed States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210 (4th Cir.1972) citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633, 73 S.Ct. at 898. Here, the Court is satisfied GE has, in good faith, taken sufficient action to prevent future illegal harassing behavior and to ensure that any alleged harassment is promptly investigated and, if found to exist, halted and punished. There is no "cognizable danger of recurrent violation," and injunctive relief, therefore, is unwarranted.

Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief is predicated on her position that GE's remedial actions — that is, the termination of Neal, the offending employee, and the implementation of a sexual harassment policy — are simply too little, too late. She first contends that the termination of Neal is irrelevant to the present need for injunctive relief. GE's Title VII liability, plaintiff correctly points out, was also grounded in its own management failures which allowed the creation and maintenance of a hostile work environment. The potential for future discriminatory or harassing conduct may remain in the absence of other corrective measures by GE. Plaintiff's point is well-taken. Neal's termination is not dispositive. It is nonetheless relevant; it weighs against the necessity for injunctive relief where, as here, there is no evidence that the illegal conduct was widespread — that employees elsewhere in the company were involved.¹¹ It also reflects well on GE's bona fides in addressing the issue.

Even so, plaintiff questions GE's good faith in implementing its sexual harassment policy. Specifically, plaintiff claims that GE's policy was issued on the eve of trial and, therefore, constituted little more than last-minute posturing. If this were the case, it might well undermine confidence in GE's good faith commitment to eradicate illegal harassing conduct.¹² The facts, however, do not show this. Instead, the record reflects that GE's new sexual harassment policy is not its first attempt to address this serious problem. See Spencer, 697 F.Supp. at 216. Indeed, even before plaintiff began her employment with GE in 1983, the GE employee handbook included some form of a sexual harassment policy. Since 1986, the new employee orientation program has specifically included information regarding that policy. The latest version of GE's policy, issued in draft form in May, 1988, represented the culmination of a year-long in-house review process. That process began in early 1987, triggered by internal GE recommendations that GE issue a policy document on sexual harassment. By May 1987, prior to the filing of plaintiff's complaint, a draft policy had been prepared. This draft was submitted to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in response to plaintiff's complaints. Plaintiff, therefore, was fully aware of GE's efforts to revise its policy long before the issuance of the May, 1988 draft. In short, GE's draft, contrary to plaintiff's allegations, was not a last-minute pre-trial ploy. Instead, the record reflects GE's ongoing efforts to implement, review, and strengthen its sexual harassment policy. This demonstrates a genuine, not transitory, commitment to banning sexual harassment in the workplace.

Plaintiff further argues that GE's policy is neither comprehensive nor sufficiently detailed to preclude injunctive relief.¹³ Plaintiff's concerns are, in essence, the following: First, plaintiff contends that the policy is directed only to managerial, and not to all, employees. Second, plaintiff alleges that GE's policy has no specific complaint procedure. While conceding that the policy mentions that Employee Relations Representatives process complaints, she complains that specific process steps are not explained nor is confidentiality expressly guaranteed. Third, she complains the policy does not explicitly prohibit retaliation by GE against any employee complaining of sexual harassment.¹⁴ And finally, she asserts that GE's policy fails to require proper training for GE managers and employees.¹⁵

GE's detailed responses to each of plaintiff's charges ultimately persuade the Court that the scope and detail of GE's sexual harassment policy render injunctive relief unnecessary. GE has already essentially complied with plaintiff's demands. Moreover, GE's policy is neither inadequate in scope or detail. First, contrary to plaintiff's claims, the policy is explicitly directed to all employees, not just management. Article I of GE's Military and Data Systems Operations¹⁶ Policy/Instruction 7.34 on Sexual Harassment (hereinafter M & DSO Policy), issued May, 1988, explicitly states, in pertinent part:

It is imperative that managers and employees at all M & DSO locations comply with both the spirit and intent of federal, state, and local laws, government regulations, executive orders and, where applicable, conciliation agreements, consent decrees, and court orders which relate to sexual harassment. There is a continuing and urgent need for managers at all levels to assure a work environment free of sexual harassment.....

M & DSO Policy, Art. I (May, 1988) (emphasis added). Article III(C) further emphasizes that "each employee will be responsible for complying with both the spirit and the letter of this Policy to achieve Operation objectives." Clearly, the policy encompasses all employees.

GE's policy also provides a specific complaint procedure that bypasses employees' immediate supervisors, if necessary. See M & DSO Policy, Art. III(D); Spencer, 697 F.Supp. at 216. Under GE's general Problem Solving Procedure, complaining employees have the option of lodging their complaints first with their Employee Relations Representative. See Space Systems Division Policy/Instruction 7.9 (SSD Policy), Art. II(B)(1) at 2 (Jan.1987). The M & DSO Policy also explicitly notes that Employee Relations Representatives are ...