Spencer v. Inhabitants of Kingsbury
| Decision Date | 07 April 1921 |
| Parties | SPENCER v. INHABITANTS OF KINGSBURY. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Exceptions and Motion for New Trial from Supreme Judicial Court, Piscataquis County, at Law.
Action on the case by George B. Spencer against the Inhabitants of Kingsbury to recover damages for personal injuries. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepts and moves for a new trial. Exceptions and motion overruled.
Argued before SPEAR, PHILBROOK DUNN, WILSON, and DEASY, JJ.
Hudson & Hudson, of Guilford, for plaintiff.
J. S. Williams, of Guilford, for defendant.
This is an action on the case to recover damages for personal injuries received by the plaintiff while traveling upon a public highway, to wit, while he was crossing a bridge which, it was admitted, is a part of an established highway in the defendant plantation. The plaintiff recovered a verdict for $775. The case is before us upon a general motion for a new trial and exceptions. The bill of exceptions states the following grounds:
(1) The plaintiff called as a witness one Mark Gerald to testify as to certain statements that he made to the road commissioner of said plantation, a short time before the date of the accident, regarding the condition of the bridge. The defendants objected to the testimony offered as being inadmissible for the purpose for which the same was offered.
(2) In rebuttal the plaintiff recalled one Maud Gerald to testify in contradiction of testimony that said plaintiff had brought out from Daniel Woodbury, a witness for the defendants, upon cross-examination by plaintiff's counsel, to which defendants objected on the ground that such testimony, elicited on cross-examination by the plaintiff of defendant's witness, could not be thus contradicted.
(3) At the conclusion of the testimony for the plaintiff, the defendants moved that a verdict for themselves be directed by the presiding justice, which motion was denied. To the admission of these two pieces of testimony, and the denial of the motion, the defendants seasonably took and now present their exceptions.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, the notice given by the plaintiff to the defendants, required by R. S. c. 24, § 92, setting forth his claim for damages, and specifying the nature of his injuries and the nature and location of the defect which caused such injury, the charge of the presiding justice, and the report of the evidence, were all made part of the bill of exceptions.
In argument before this court, the defendants were silent upon the first two exceptions, and we shall therefore treat them as waived: In passing, however, it is proper to say that in his charge to the jury the presiding justice clearly and correctly stated the reasons for admitting the testimony referred to in these two exceptions by explaining that it was not on the question of notice to any plantation officer of the particular defect, but simply as contradicting one of the defendants' witnesses and for the purpose of affecting the credibility of his testimony.
The defendants' argument centers about four propositions:
(1) The insufficiency of the notice given under R. S. c. 24, § 92.
(2) That the bridge was safe and convenient within the meaning of the statute in view of the casualties that might reasonably be expected to happen to travelers.
(3) That neither of the municipal officers nor the road commissioner had 24 hours' actual notice of the defect as required by statute.
(4) That the verdict was excessive as to damages and unwarranted.
We will consider these points in their order, but before doing so we present the notice which the defendant claims is insufficient:
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