Spencer v. State
| Decision Date | 02 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. S97A0721,S97A0721 |
| Citation | 268 Ga. 85,485 S.E.2d 477 |
| Parties | , 97 FCDR 1924 SPENCER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
L. Clark Landrum, Tifton, for Marvin Spencer.
C. Paul Bowden, Dist. Atty., Tifton, Paula K. Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, Patricia Beth Attaway, Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for State.
Marvin Spencer was convicted of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, aggravated assault and arson in the death of Pamela Byron. He appeals from the denial of his amended motion for new trial. 1
1. The jury was authorized to find that Byron, age 15, lived with several family members, including her cousin, Spencer. Prior to the murder, Spencer had been observed touching Byron on her breasts and buttocks. Spencer had been living at the residence approximately two months when the Sylvester Fire Department was called to the home around 1:08 a.m. on April 2, 1996. A fire in the utility room was extinguished. In the course of picking up debris in the area, one of the firefighters attempted to pick up an electric drill; the drill's cord, which had been wrapped three times around Byron's neck, pulled her body into view. The doctor who performed the autopsy on Byron testified that she had been nude at the time of her death and that the cause of death was ligature strangulation with the drill cord; the fire began after she was dead. Physical evidence taken from the scene of the fire showed that the fire had been started by a specific brand of charcoal lighter fluid which another resident of the house testified she had seen in the house a week before the fire. Another witness testified that he heard "screaming, hollering" coming from the direction of the utility room after midnight and that he saw Spencer move a dog that was chained to a fence near the utility room. Spencer then returned to the utility room and the "hollering" stopped. Other witnesses testified that Spencer was in the house at the time of the fire and that Spencer had told them that Byron had called out to him from the burning utility room. Spencer, on the other hand, told several witnesses that he was at a grocery store when the fire began. A review of the store's videotape did not disclose Spencer's appearance there during that time period.
We find this evidence sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Spencer guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Spencer contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a similar transaction, specifically contending that the State failed to prove that the past act was similar to the crime charged. Linda Abbs testified that in 1986 Spencer came up behind her, grabbed her, covered her nose and mouth and choked her until she lost consciousness. When she regained consciousness, Spencer was feeling her breasts and pelvic region. Abbs was able to break free from Spencer and seek assistance. Prior crime evidence is admissible when the State satisfactorily makes the three affirmative showings required by Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640(2)(b), 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991). See also Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3(B). "[T]he independent act does not have to be identical in character to the charged offense if there is a sufficient connection between them." Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 46, 47(2), 440 S.E.2d 188 (1994). Both situations at issue involved female victims who were sexually assaulted and choked during the assault. The commission of the two offenses were sufficiently similar such that the attack on Abbs was relevant to show course of conduct and bent of mind; that the prior transaction was substantially similar; and that it was clearly established that Spencer committed the prior similar transaction. Willingham v. State, Ga. (case no. S97A0293, decided 5/5/97). We find no error in the admission of this evidence.
3. Spencer contends that the trial court's charge in regard to the jury's consideration of evidence of a similar transaction was inadequate. We disagree. The charge given was in substantial conformity...
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