Spencer v. Staton

• Decision Date: 15 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-30020.,06-30020.
• Citation: 489 F.3d 658
• Parties: Bernice Louise SPENCER, Individually and on Behalf of Shadow and Raevyn Spencer, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jack STATON, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Dewayne Brumley, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Guffey Lynn Pattison, Individually and in His Official Capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

489 F.3d 658

Bernice Louise SPENCER, Individually and on Behalf of Shadow and Raevyn Spencer, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jack STATON, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Dewayne Brumley, Individually and in His Official Capacity; Guffey Lynn Pattison, Individually and in His Official Capacity, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-30020.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 15, 2007.

Henry Clay Walker, IV (argued), H. Clay Walker, V, Walker & Lyons, Shreveport, LA, for Spencer.

David F. Bienvenu (argued), Shawn Louise Holahan, Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, New Orleans, LA, Ronald E. Corkern, Jr., Corkern & Crews, Natchitoches, LA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and GARZA, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Chief Judge:

In this civil-rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff-Appellant Bernice Spencer appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees Detective Jack Staton, Detective Dewayne Brumley, and Sheriff Guffey Lynn Pattison. Because material fact issues exist regarding (1) whether the arrest warrant Staton and Brumley obtained was supported by probable cause, and (2) Staton's and Brumley's entitlement to qualified immunity, we reverse the district court's dismissal of Spencer's federal claims; affirm dismissal of the state-law tort claims against the Detectives; affirm as to Sheriff Pattison; and remand for further consideration.

BACKGROUND

Bernice Spencer arrived in Louisiana from California on August 22, 2003. Her husband, John Spencer, had left California several weeks earlier to care for an ailing aunt in Pleasant Hill, Louisiana. During their stay, they lived in a mobile home along with John Spencer's brother-in-law, Vasco Zinnerman. John Spencer's aunt, his cousin Jimmy Turner, and several members of his extended family lived nearby.

On August 24, Andrew and Nancy Johnson, the owners of a Pleasant Hill feed store, were shot to death in a botched robbery attempt. Suspicion quickly coalesced around John Spencer, Turner, and Zinnerman, whom witnesses had seen near the store shortly before the murders. In the course of investigating the incident, Detectives Jack Staton and Dewayne Brumley traveled to the Spencer mobile home in the early-morning hours of August 25. Staton and Brumley questioned the Spencers and Zinnerman at a local police station.

During her interrogation, Bernice Spencer denied any involvement in the murders. She claimed to be unaware who owned a .22 caliber rifle recovered from the mobile home or that it was widely known in the community that "people [were] walking around [the mobile-home park] with guns" on the day of the shooting. Further, she told Staton and Brumley that her husband had been with her "the majority of the day," except for a brief visit he made to his aunt's nearby mobile home. To the question when she planned to return to California, she replied: "Um, probably next couple of days." All three suspects were released after a few hours.

As their investigation progressed, however, Staton and Brumley discovered that both John Spencer and Zinnerman owned handguns they frequently used for target shooting behind the mobile home; that John Spencer had attempted to buy ammunition on the day of the shootings; and that a witness had overheard Zinnerman ask John Spencer: "Are you sure that the [expletive denoting murder victims] are dead?"

Because of this newly acquired information, Staton and Brumley returned to the mobile home on August 26, only to learn that the Spencers and Zinnerman had left for California earlier that morning. Fearing that the three were attempting to flee, the Detectives obtained arrest warrants for the Spencers and Zinnerman, charging the men with armed robbery and first-degree murder, and Bernice Spencer as an accessory after the fact.

On August 28, the Spencers were apprehended in California. John Spencer later confessed that he had been waiting outside the feed store in a car when his cousin Jimmy Turner shot the Johnsons to death. Bernice Spencer was held in the Solano County, California, jail until Louisiana authorities secured her extradition. The accessory charge against Bernice Spencer was eventually dismissed as part of a plea agreement between a Louisiana district attorney and John Spencer.

Bernice Spencer sued Detectives Staton and Brumley and Sabine Parish Sheriff Guffey Lynn Pattison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and conspiracy, and several state-law tort claims. The Defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Finding that a reasonable police officer could have concluded that there was probable cause to arrest Bernice Spencer, the district court granted summary judgment and dismissed the federal and state charges. Spencer appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court's summary judgment grant, applying the same standard used below. Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 291 (5th Cir.2005) (citing Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir.2002)). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and that "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c).

B. Malley Violation¹

Bernice Spencer alleges that the warrant application submitted by Staton and Brumley was facially invalid and unsupported by probable cause. Review of the Detectives' assertion of qualified immunity requires us first to ask "whether a reasonably well-trained officer ... would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1098, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). The Detectives' determination that the warrant was valid entitles them to qualified immunity from suit unless, "on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue" under the circumstances. Id. at 341, 106 S.Ct. at 1096.

Staton's warrant application to the issuing judge is a textbook example of a facially invalid, "barebones" affidavit.² After reciting Spencer's biographical and contact information, the affidavit states nothing more than the charged offense, accompanied by a conclusory statement that Spencer assisted her husband and Zinnerman in evading Louisiana authorities. It does not supply the factual basis for probable cause necessary for issuance of an arrest warrant. See United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir.1993); United States v. Brown, 941 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir.1991).

Staton asserts, however, that he supplemented the affidavit with oral testimony based on his personal knowledge and investigation such that — in the aggregate — the information conveyed to the judge supports probable cause for Spencer's arrest. Because the Fourth Amendment does not require written warrants, an otherwise invalid warrant can be rehabilitated by sworn oral testimony before a judicial officer given contemporaneously upon presentation of the warrant application. United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 315, 320 (5th Cir.1974) ("It has been accepted principle in this and other circuits that a federal court . . . may consider an affiant's oral testimony, extrinsic to the written affidavit, which is sworn before the issuing magistrate, in determining whether the warrant was founded on probable cause"); Lopez v. United States, 370 F.2d 8, 10 (5th Cir.1966) (probable cause analysis may take into account information "brought to the magistrate's attention . . . in the form of oral statements").³

The record in this case, after careful review, reveals significant uncertainty concerning what oral testimony Staton imparted to the issuing judge, and when he did so.⁴ The judge's and Staton's sworn deposition statements are insufficient to demonstrate as a matter of law that Staton's testimony constituted "sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant." Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 564, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 1035, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971).⁵ Moreover, Staton does not allege that the statements he provided were made under oath.

Because Detective Brumley appears to have participated fully with Staton in the investigation, there is a material fact issue whether he was "in a position to see the whole picture, to understand his responsibility [under Malley], and thus fully to assess probable cause questions." Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 261 (5th Cir.2005). Michalik holds that "such an officer, who is not the affiant [who provided the affidavit to support an arrest warrant], may be held liable, along with the affiant, under the principles of Malley." Id. Michalik also notes, however, that Malley liability does not extend beyond the affiant and a person "who was fully responsible for" a warrant application. Id. Brumley may be in the latter position if the evidence reveals that he not only assisted in the investigation but also participated in preparation of the affidavit or presentation of the warrant and supporting affidavit to the judge.

For purposes of qualified immunity, the evidence in the record does not establish that, as a matter of law, a reasonable police officer could have believed the evidence he had was sufficient to constitute probable cause, justifying a warrant, for Bernice's arrest.⁶ The district court thus erred in finding the warrant constitutionally sufficient to justify Spencer's arrest.⁷

C. State Law Claims

Spencer has not alleged facts sufficient to support the various state law claims she asserts against the Appellees. First, Spencer's malicious prosecution claim fails for want of any evidence that Brumley, Staton, or Pattison acted with malice.

Second, her defamation claim fails...