Spencer v. The State
| Decision Date | 28 June 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. S10A0453.,S10A0453. |
| Citation | 696 S.E.2d 617,287 Ga. 434 |
| Parties | SPENCERv.The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
287 Ga. 434
696 S.E.2d 617
SPENCER
v.
The STATE.
No. S10A0453.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
June 28, 2010.
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Elizabeth A. Baker, Asst. Dist. Attys., Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, for the appellee.
NAHMIAS, Justice.
A Fulton County jury convicted Gary Spencer of felony murder and other crimes arising out of the shooting death of rival drug dealer Kenneth Morrell. Spencer appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to hold a pre-trial Chandler hearing, see Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991), and failing to ascertain on the record whether he wanted to testify in his own defense. Spencer also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 1
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence at trial showed the following. Spencer and the victim sold drugs on opposite corners of an intersection in downtown Atlanta. There had been previous altercations between Spencer and Morrell, and shortly before midnight on August 30, 2006, Morrell crossed the street and initiated a conversation with Spencer. The two men began to argue, and Spencer pulled out a gun and fired multiple shots at Morrell before fleeing on foot. Morrell died from multiple gunshot wounds. Several witnesses to the shooting testified at trial.
A police officer found a large wad of cash in small bills and a cell phone in Morrell's pocket. He did not find a gun by the body, but a witness testified that after he heard gunfire, he saw someone approach Morrell's body, empty his pockets of some cash and drugs, pick up a gun that was lying on the ground at his fingertips, and give the gun to an associate of Morrell's across the street.
Spencer was arrested nearby. When taken back to the crime scene, he told officers that he had swallowed a large amount of crack cocaine and wanted to die. Spencer later wrote letters to Monique Boyer asking her not to testify or tell the police anything about his involvement in the shooting.
Spencer does not contend that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Nevertheless, in accordance with this Court's practice in direct appeals of murder cases, we have reviewed the record and we
2. (a) Changing the rule that had previously applied, this Court held in Chandler that evidence of a victim's specific violent acts against third parties may be admissible where a defendant claims justification (self-defense). See 261 Ga. at 407, 405 S.E.2d 669. The Chandler Court recognized that procedures were needed to govern the introduction of such evidence, requiring advance notice of the defendant's intention to offer such evidence to avoid “unfairness to the state.” See id. at 407-408, 405 S.E.2d 669. The Court therefore set forth such procedures on an interim basis, anticipating that “curative procedures to avoid a battle by surprise eventually will be incorporated into the [Uniform Superior Court Rules (USCR)].” Id. at 408, 405 S.E.2d 669. After Chandler, USCR 31.1 was amended and USCR 31.6 was enacted to codify the procedures that now govern the admissibility of Chandler evidence.2 Among other things, the defendant has the burden of showing the admissibility of Chandler evidence. See USCR 31.6(B).
To meet that burden, the defendant must, at a minimum, (1) follow the procedural requirements for introducing the evidence, (2) establish the existence of prior violent acts by competent evidence, and (3) make a prima facie showing of justification.
Laster v. State, 268 Ga. 172, 174, 486 S.E.2d 153 (1997) (footnotes omitted). The trial court's decision to admit or exclude Chandler evidence is subject to reversal only for abuse of discretion. See Jones v. State, 265 Ga. 138, 141, 454 S.E.2d 482 (1995).
(b) Spencer claimed self-defense, and pursuant to Chandler, he sought to introduce evidence at trial that the victim had robbed several people at gunpoint and had murdered another drug dealer. At a motions hearing about six weeks before trial, the trial court advised that it was unlikely to rule on a Chandler motion prior to trial, explaining that such a motion ensures that “everyone is alerted and the district attorney has good information on preparing for trial,” but the evidence is not admissible until the three-part test is met. Spencer served his initial written Chandler motion in timely fashion a month before trial, and he supplemented it a week before trial. The trial court declined to hold a pre-trial hearing on the Chandler evidence, stating that Spencer had yet to make a “prima facie case,” to which ruling defense counsel twice responded “Okay.”
On the first day of trial, defense counsel asked what he could say about the Chandler evidence in his opening statement, and the trial court responded, “Nothing.” Defense counsel then offered to have the defendant testify to establish the prima facie case, but the trial court declined, explaining that Spencer's testimony would not suffice because
Shortly before the State rested, the trial court raised the Chandler issue outside the jury's presence. The trial court went over each item listed in Spencer's Chandler motion, ruling evidence of several prior acts of violence by the victim against third parties admissible and excluding others, while reserving a ruling on the issue of the victim's alleged involvement in a murder. The defense then began presenting its case. When it came time for evidence about the prior murder to be introduced, the trial court sent the jury out again and heard testimony from a police detective who had investigated the murder case. The trial court ruled that the evidence of the victim's involvement was unreliable hearsay, so the...
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