Spengler v. United States
| Decision Date | 10 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | 2016-2662 |
| Parties | ANDREW R. SPENGLER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit |
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00794-EDK, Judge Elaine Kaplan.
ANDREW R. SPENGLER, Fort Worth, TX, pro se.
ALEXIS J. ECHOLS, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by JOYCE R. BRANDA, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., DEBORAH A. BYNUM.
Andrew R. Spengler ("Spengler") seeks review of the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("the trial court") dismissing his complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and declining to transfer the case to a district court. See Spengler v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 597 (2016) ("Dismissal Order"). He also appeals from the order of the trial court denying Spengler's motion to alter or amend the judgment and/or for relief from judgment. See Spengler v. United States, 128 Fed. Cl. 338 (2016) ("Post-judgment Order"). Because the trial court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, properly decided not to transfer the case, and did not abuse its discretion in denying Spengler's motion to alter or amend the judgment and/or for relief from judgment, we affirm.
In 1930 and 1932, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") created and established operating procedures for the prison commissary system and authorized two funds that are often referred to as the "Prisoners Trust Fund" and the "Commissary Fund" that are controlled by the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). Dismissal Order, 127 Fed. Cl. at 599-601. The commissaries allow inmates to "purchase items such as hygiene products, postage supplies, over the counter medicine, and snacks." Id. at 601 (citation omitted). The revenues for the Commissary Fund are generated through the sales of goods at prison commissaries; on the other hand, the Prisoners Trust Fund contains inmates' personal money brought in by, sent to, or earned by them. Id. (citation omitted).
Spengler is currently serving a 15-year sentence for Conspiracy to Deprive Civil Liberties and Deprivation of Civil Rights under Color of Law, housed at the Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Worth, Texas ("FCI Fort Worth"), and projected to be released on March 16, 2020. Id. at 599.
On July 27, 2015, Spengler filed suit against the United States government in the trial court alleging that he is a beneficiary of the Commissary Fund, which he argues is a trust fund, and that the government, through BOP, has breached its fiduciary duties by misusing monies from the Commissary Fund. Id. Spengler alleged that the government unlawfully diverted the Commissary Fund's monies to pay for, inter alia, inmate computer and telephone systems and various other provisions for inmates that are designed to work with the inmate computer and telephone systems, such as an electronic law library, fingerprint scanners, mailing labels, and mp3 players. Id. Spengler sought relief in the forms of injunction and money damages, requesting, inter alia, accounting of the Commissary Fund, destruction of personal data collected through the inmate computer system, restoration of the allegedly misused funds to the Commissary Fund, and an award of damages for the loss of revenue that would have been earned but for the alleged misuse of the Commissary Fund. Id.
The government moved to dismiss Spengler's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Spengler's breach of fiduciary duty claim sounds in tort, which does not lie under the Tucker Act. Id. at 599-600. Spengler responded that he is not asserting a tort claim, but a claim for money damages that arises out of a statute that classifies the Commissary Fund as a trust fund, 31 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(22), and DOJ Circular No. 2244, Rules Governing the Control of Prisoner Funds at the Several Penal and Correctional Institutions (Jan. 1, 1932) ("DOJ Circular 2244"), which describes prison commissaries' operating procedures. Id. The trial court requested supplemental briefing from the government and Spengler addressing the threshold issue whether 31 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(22) imposes fiduciary responsibilities on the government. Spengler v. United States, 1:15-cv-00794-EDK (Fed. Cl. Feb. 22, 2016), ECF No. 21.
On July 19, 2016, the trial court dismissed Spengler's case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dismissal Order, 127 Fed. Cl. at 598-99. The trial court concluded that classification of the Commissary Fund as a "trust" alone is "not sufficient to establish that Congress intended to impose specific fiduciary obligations on the United States that would subject it to a claim for monetary damages for their breach." Id. at 601. The trial court noted that nothing in the legislative history of § 1321 indicates the government's assumption of fiduciary duties, and that its conclusion is also supported by DOJ Circular 2244, DOJ Federal BOP, Program Statement No. 4500.11, Trust Fund/Deposit Fund Manual (April 9, 2015) ("BOP Program Statement 4500.11"), and a memorandum from the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel, Fiduciary Obligations Regarding Bureau of Prisons Commissary Fund, 19 Op. O.L.C. 127, 1995 WL 917141 (1995) ("DOJ OLC Memo"). Id. at 601-02. The trial court distinguished this case from Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1994), which was cited by Spengler, noting that the plaintiffs in Washington sought injunctive relief, not money damages. Id. at 602-03.
The trial court considered whether a transfer to a district court would be proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631, but determined not to transfer the case. Id. at 603, 605. The trial court found that Spengler failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that he failed to establish that he is prevented from pursuing administrative remedies due to the alleged obstructions by BOP. Id.
On September 26, 2016, Spengler filed a post-judgment motion to alter or amend the judgment and/or for relief from judgment under Rules of Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC") 59 and 60(b). In support of his motion, Spengler submitted (1) a settlement agreement resulting from Washington, pursuant to which the government reimbursed $4,000,000 to the Commissary Fund; and (2) the record of two grievances filed by Spengler allegedly showing administrative exhaustion. On the same day, the trial court denied Spengler's post-judgment motion for being untimely and failing to establish the existence of grounds for relief from judgment. Post-judgment Order, 128 Fed. Cl. at 340. The trial court noted that the settlement agreement in Washington is irrelevant to its previous legal conclusion because Washington did not address Tucker Act jurisdiction, and that the two grievances were not "newly discovered evidence" and "would not have produced a different result if presented before the original judgment." Id. at 343-45.
Spengler timely appealed from the decision of the trial court.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
We review dismissal of a complaint by the trial court for lack of jurisdiction de novo, Boyle v. United States, 200 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000), and we review a determination not to transfer a case under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 de novo as well, see Fisherman's Harvest, Inc. v. PBS & J, 490 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We review denial of motions to alter or amend a judgment and for relief from judgment for abuse of discretion. See Matos by Rivera v.Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 35 F.3d 1549, 1551-52 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (relief from judgment); Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1367, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ().
A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Brant v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Although a pro se plaintiff's complaint is held to a less stringent standard than those prepared by counsel, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980), pro se litigants are not excused from meeting jurisdictional requirements, see Kelley v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Spengler raises three main issues on appeal. First, Spengler argues that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction because he is a beneficiary of the Commissary Fund, which is a statutory trust controlled by the government, and the government breached its fiduciary duty by improperly diverting monies from the Commissary Fund to subsidize costs of confinement. Second, Spengler argues that he is allowed to bring suit in a court because he has exhausted administrative remedies, and to the extent he has not, he was obstructed from doing so, excusing him from completing the required grievance filings processes. Third, Spengler argues that the trial court erred in denying his post-judgment motion to alter or amend judgment and/or for relief from judgment as untimely. We discuss each issue in turn.
"Jurisdiction over any suit against the Government requires a clear statement from the United States waiving sovereign immunity . . . , together with a claim falling within the terms of the waiver . . . ." United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003) (citations omitted). "The Tucker Act contains such a waiver." Id. (citation omitted). The trial court has juris- diction pursuant to the Tucker Act "to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). However, the Tucker Act "is itself only a jurisdictional statute," United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976), and "does not create[] a substantive right...
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