Spengler v. United States
| Decision Date | 26 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-794C,15-794C |
| Parties | ANDREW R. SPENGLER, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Claims Court |
ORIGINAL
Keywords: RCFC 59; RCFC 60; Motion for Reconsideration; Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Fiduciary Duty; Prison Mailbox Rule; Commissary and Welfare Fund
Andrew R. Spengler, Fort Worth, TX, Plaintiff, pro se.
Alexis J. Echols, Trial Attorney, with whom were Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, and Deborah A. Bynum, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch. United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
This case is currently before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) 59 and 60(b). The pro se plaintiff, Andrew Spengler, seeks reconsideration of this Court's July 19, 2016 Opinion and Order granting the government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1). See Spengler v. United States, No. 15-794C, 2016 WL 3947954 (Fed. Cl. July 19, 2016).
Because Mr. Spengler has failed to timely file his motion for reconsideration under RCFC 59 and has failed to establish the existence of grounds for relief under RCFC 60(b), his motion is DENIED.
As set forth in detail in this Court's earlier decision, Mr. Spengler, who is currently serving a fifteen-year sentence in the Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Worth, Texas, claims that he is a beneficiary of the Commissary and Welfare Fund for federal prisoners (hereinafter "the Commissary Fund" or "the Fund"), which is designated as a "trust" fund pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(22). Compl. at 1, Doc. No. 1. In his complaint, Mr. Spengler alleges that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) breached its fiduciary duties to inmates by using monies from the Commissary Fund for what he claims are improper purposes, including in particular to fund the creation and operation of the Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer System (TRULINCS) and the Trust Fund Inmate Telephone System (TRUFONE). As relief, Mr. Spengler sought, among other things, orders directing the United States to provide an accounting of the Fund and to restore billions of dollars to it. He also asked the Court to award damages to him personally for, among other things, costs he has incurred to pay for clothing at the prison commissary, his expenses of copying documents, and the costs he incurred for the use of the TRULINCS and TRUFONE systems.
This Court granted the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 2016 WL 3947954, at *7. It noted that while the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), waives the sovereign immunity of the United States to allow a suit for money damages, Mitchell v United States, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (Mitchell II), it does not confer any substantive rights on a plaintiff, United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). 2016 WL 3947954, at *2. Therefore, a plaintiff seeking to invoke the court's Tucker Act jurisdiction must identify an independent source of a substantive right to money damages from the United States arising out of a contract, statute, regulation or constitutional provision. Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
The Court further observed that an independent source of a substantive right to money damages may be found where a statute "establishes specific fiduciary or other duties" and may "'fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of a breach of the duties [the governing law] impose[s].'" 2016 WL 3947954, at *3 () (alterations in original). To establish that the United States has accepted a particular fiduciary obligation, "[a plaintiff] must identify statutes or regulations that both impose a specific obligation on the United States and 'bear[] the hallmarks of a conventional fiduciary relationship.'" Hopi Tribe v. United States, 782 F.3d 662, 667 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation II), 556 U.S. 287, 301 (2009)) (alteration in original).
In this case, the Court held that neither the language, history, nor purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(22) suggested that—in classifying the Commissary Fund as a "trust fund"—Congress intended to impose specific fiduciary obligations on the United States that would subject it to a claim for monetary damages for their breach. 2016 WL 3947954, at *3-*5. Therefore, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Spengler's claims for money damages. Id. at *5. The Court also ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over his claims for injunctive relief because they were not incidental to a claim for monetary relief properly before the Court. Id. (citing James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
Further, the Court declined to transfer Mr. Spengler's claims to a district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 2016 WL 3947954, at *5-*7. It concluded that such a transfer would be inappropriate because Mr. Spengler had failed to meet his burden ofdemonstrating exhaustion of administrative remedies with respect to the claims made in this case as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Id.
Mr. Spengler now moves that the Court reconsider both its dismissal of his complaint and its denial of his request that his claims be transferred. He argues that reconsideration is warranted because the Court erred in its interpretation of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1994). Pl.'s Req. to Alter J. at 2. In addition, he argues that he did exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to at least two of the claims he is asserting in this case, as evidenced by additional documents submitted in connection with his motion for reconsideration. Id. at 5-7.
The first avenue through which Mr. Spengler seeks reconsideration is RCFC 59. Pl.'s Req. to Alter J. at 1. That rule provides that, except for a motion for new trial or reconsideration on the grounds that any fraud, wrong, or injustice has been done to the United States (grounds not alleged here), a motion for new trial or reconsideration "must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment." RCFC 59(b)(1); see also RCFC 59(e) (). Additionally, "[t]he court must not extend the time to act under RCFC . . . 59(b), (d), and (e)." RCFC 6(b)(2); see also Johnson v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 558, 560 (2016) (); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 119, 120 (2005) ().
Here, Mr. Spengler states that he received the Court's order dismissing his case on July 26, 2016. Pl.'s Req. to Alter J. at 1. Citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988), Mr. Spengler then alleges that he filed his motion for reconsideration "in accordance with the 'Prison Mail Box Rule' on 8/22/2016." Pl.'s Req. to Alter J., Proof of Filing & Service. In Houston, the Court held that when a pro se prisoner files a criminal or habeas corpus appeal, his notice of appeal is deemed filed at the time he delivers it to prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk. See Houston, 487 U.S. at 269-76.1
But even assuming that the "prison mailbox rule" applies to Mr. Spengler's motion for reconsideration, it would still be out of time under RCFC 59 because that rule requires that the motion be filed within twenty-eight days of the entry of judgment.2 Here, judgment was entered July 20, 2016. Judgment, Doc. No. 31. Accordingly, a motion pursuant to RCFC 59 was due to be filed no later than August 18, 2016. RCFC 59(b), (e). Mr. Spengler states, however, that he filed his motion under the "prison mailbox rule," on August 22, 2016 (by which the Court assumes that he is asserting that he placed the motion in the prison mail system on that date). See Pl.'s Req. to Alter J., Proof of Filing & Service. The motion is thus out of time.
Mr. Spengler alternatively requests relief from the Court's earlier judgment on the basis of RCFC 60(b). That rule states that the Court "may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" for six enumerated reasons:
"As a remedial provision, Rule 60(b) is to be 'liberally construed for the purpose of doing substantial justice.'" Patton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 1021, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing 7 James W. Moore & Jo Desha Lucas, Moore'sFederal Practice ¶¶ 60.18[8], 60.19 (2d ed. 1993)). At the same time, "[t]he United States Supreme Court has 'cautioned that the Rule should only be applied in extraordinary circumstances.'" Perry v. United States, 558 F. App'x 1004, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Lilieberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988)) (alterations omitted). Therefore,...
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