Spicer v. State, 92-00323
| Decision Date | 10 February 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-00323,92-00323 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Parties | 18 Fla. L. Week. D490 Douglas Wayne SPICER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Julius Aulisio, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Susan D. Dunlevy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
Spicer and a codefendant were charged with armed robbery with a mask, trafficking in illegal drugs, and possession of a controlled substance. Spicer was convicted by a jury of the lesser offense of robbery with a mask and acquitted on the remaining charges. The state filed the required notice, seeking to have him sentenced as a habitual offender.
Robbery is a second-degree felony punishable by up to fifteen years' imprisonment. Secs. 812.13(2)(c) and 775.082(3)(c), Fla.Stat. (1989). If, however, a mask was worn during the commission of the robbery, section 775.0845(4), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that the offense "shall be punishable as if it were a felony of the first degree," permitting a maximum penalty of thirty years.
In this case, the trial court interpreted section 775.0845(4) as requiring robbery with a mask to be reclassified as a first-degree felony. The court then used the first-degree conviction to sentence Spicer to life imprisonment under the habitual offender statute, section 775.084(4)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (1989). Spicer argues that although section 775.0845 is an enhanced penalty statute, it does not reclassify the degree of felony. Thus, he argues that he can be sentenced as a habitual offender only for a second-degree felony. We agree and reverse.
Penal statutes must be construed in terms of their literal meaning. State v. Jackson, 526 So.2d 58 (Fla.1988). Words used by the legislature will not be expanded to broaden the definition of such statutes. Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310 (Fla.1991). If the legislature had intended section 775.0845 to reclassify offenses, it would have so stated, as it did in section 775.087, Florida Statutes (1989): "Possession or use of weapon; aggravated battery; felony reclassification;" and in section 775.0875, Florida Statutes (1989): "Unlawful taking, possession, or use of a law enforcement officer's firearm; crime reclassification; ...." (Emphasis added.) In fact, section 775.0875 is similar to the habitual offender statute, in that neither of the enhanced penalty statutes reclassify the degree of the offense. See Dominguez v. State, 461 So.2d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
The trial court was therefore placed in an "either-or" situation. The court could use the enhanced penalty...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Pethtel v. State
...conviction from one degree to a higher degree stems from an express and explicit grant of statutory authority. Cf. Spicer v. State, 615 So.2d 725, 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (reversing reclassification of robbery with a mask conviction because "[p]enal statutes must be construed in terms of the......
-
Cabal v. State
...with Woods v. State, 654 So.2d 606 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), Archibald v. State, 646 So.2d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), and Spicer v. State, 615 So.2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). 1 For the reasons expressed, we agree with the district court decisions in Woods, Archibald, and Spicer, and quash the decisi......
-
Solone v. State, 96-04958
...a second-degree felony, see section 775.084(4)(b)2., Florida Statutes (1991), those sentences are illegal. We agree. In Spicer v. State, 615 So.2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), approved, Cabal v. State, 678 So.2d 315 (Fla.1996), we construed the provisions of section 775.0845(4) and held that thi......
-
Velasquez v. State, 94-597
...626 So.2d 192 (Fla.1993); State v. Jackson, 526 So.2d 58 (Fla.1988); Jones v. State, 629 So.2d 215 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Spicer v. State, 615 So.2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).5 See Lamont v. State, 610 So.2d 435 (Fla.1992); Watkins v. State, 622 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Spicer; Brown v. S......