Spicer v. Williamson
| Decision Date | 31 March 1926 |
| Docket Number | 225. |
| Citation | 132 S.E. 291,191 N.C. 487 |
| Parties | SPICER v. WILLIAMSON et al. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Duplin County; T. T. Thorne, Judge.
Action by Williams Spicer against D. S. Williamson and the Board of County Commissioners of Duplin County.From judgment of nonsuit dismissing action upon motion of each defendantplaintiff appeals.Reversed.
This is an action commenced by plaintiff, a physician and surgeon, in the superior court of Wayne county, to recover of defendantD. S. Williamson for professional services rendered to, and hospital expenses incurred in behalf of, Peter Camel, at the request of said defendant.Peter Camel was a prisoner in the custody of D. S. Williamson, who was sheriff of Duplin county.He was suffering from the effects of a wound inflicted at the time of his arrest by a deputy sheriff of Duplin county, upon a charge of robbery and larceny committed in said county.DefendantD. S. Williamson denied liability.He alleged that the board of county commissioners of Duplin county was liable for the amount due plaintiff for said services and hospital expenses.Upon his motion, the board of county commissioners of Duplin county was made a partydefendant, and the action was removed from Wayne to Duplin county for trial.The board of county commissioners denied liability, on the ground that the said board had not authorized the defendantD. S. Williamson, sheriff of said county, to take the prisoner to plaintiff for treatment.It alleged that it had not requested or authorized plaintiff to render any services to, or to incur any hospital expenses for, Peter Camel.
At the close of all the evidence, upon motion of each defendant there was a judgment of nonsuit dismissing the action.From this judgment, plaintiff appealed.
Langston Allen & Taylor, of Goldsboro, for appellant.
H. D. Williams, of Kenansville, and R. D. Johnston, of Warsaw, for appellee Williamson.
Gavin & Boney, of Kenansville, for appelleeDuplin County.
It is admitted that plaintiff, a physician and surgeon, who owns and operates a hospital in Goldsboro, N. C., received into said hospital, as a patient, Peter Camel, and thereafter rendered professional services to, and incurred hospital expenses for, said Peter Camel, at the request of defendantD. S. Williamson, sheriff of Duplin county.At the time of such request, Peter Camel was a prisoner in the custody of the said sheriff.He had been arrested by a deputy sheriff, and delivered into the custody of the sheriff, upon a charge of robbery and larceny committed in Duplin county.Immediately before his arrest, the prisoner had been shot and wounded by the deputy sheriff.He had resisted arrest, and, when pursued by the officer, had fired twice at him, with his pistol, thus not only resisting arrest, but also assaulting the officer with a deadly weapon.When the prisoner came into the custody of the sheriff, his condition, resulting from his wound, was such as to require immediate medical and surgical treatment.The physician who had usually attended prisoners in the custody of the sheriff, and whose bills for services to such prisoners had been paid by the board of county commissioners, was called by the sheriff to see the prisoner, and advised the sheriff that he was unable to care for the prisoner-that his condition required the immediate attention of a surgeon in a hospital, equipped to care for such cases.It was impracticable for the sheriff to consult the board of county commissioners, as its members lived at distances of more than 15 miles from the place where the prisoner was shot.Acting upon the advice of the physician, the sheriff took the prisoner in his automobile at once to Goldsboro, and requested plaintiff to receive him into his hospital as a patient, and to render him such professional services as in plaintiff's judgment his condition required.Plaintiff knew that defendant was sheriff of Duplin county, and that Peter Camel was a prisoner in his custody, charged with a violation of the criminal law in Duplin county.Plaintiff received Peter Camel into his hospital, and within a few days thereafter performed an operation upon him because of his condition, caused by the gunshot wound inflicted by the deputy sheriff while undertaking to arrest the prisoner.Plaintiff presented his bill to the sheriff, who filed it with the board of county commissioners at their next monthly meeting thereafter.The board declined to pay the bill.
The board of county commissioners did not authorize the sheriff to take the prisoner to plaintiff, and had no notice of these facts until after the services were performed and the expense incurred.It had been the custom of the board of county commissioners to pay bills for medical attention rendered to prisoners in the custody of the sheriff when presented by him to the board at its regular monthly meetings.These bills had been for small amounts.The board is composed of three members, two of whom live about 18 miles from the county seat, and one about 16 miles.
"The rule that where a person requests the performance of a service, and the request is complied with, and the service performed, there is an implied promise to pay for the services, does not apply where a person requests a physician to perform services for a patient, unless the relation of that person to the patient is such as raises a legal obligation on his part to call in a physician and pay for the services, or the circumstances are such as to show an intention on his part to pay for the services, it being so understood by him and the physician."This rule, as stated in 30 Cyc. 1597, is supported by authorities cited in the notes, and commends itself to us as sound in law and just in policy.But for the exception to the general rule, a stranger or neighbor might hesitate to call a physician to the aid of one in need of medical services.The exception is not unjust to the physician who may require an express contract for payment of the value of his services before responding to the call or rendering the services.Smith v. Riddick,50 N.C. 343.21 R. C. L. 412(55);McGuire v. Hughes,101 N.E. 460, 207 N.Y. 516, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 577, and notes, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 585.
It cannot be held that a sheriff, or other officer, is under a legal obligation to provide medical attention for a prisoner in his custody, for the payment of which he is personally liable.The relation between the officer and his prisoner is not voluntary on the part of either.On the part of the officer, it results from the performance by him of a public duty, and, while he is liable personally both to the prisoner and to the public for a breach of duty to either-for which he may be required to answer in damages to the prisoner, or upon indictment to the public-he cannot be held liable for medical or surgical services required by the condition of the prisoner, at the time of his arrest, or after he had...
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