Spickes v. Medtronic, Inc., 82-10
| Decision Date | 05 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-10,82-10 |
| Citation | 275 Ark. 421,631 S.W.2d 5 |
| Parties | Ernest Eugene SPICKES and Frances Spickes, Appellants, v. MEDTRONIC, INC., et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
John Wesley Hall, Jr., Little Rock, for appellants.
Wright, Lindsey, & Jennings, Little Rock, for appellees.
This products liability case is within our jurisdiction under Rule 29(1)(m). In 1975 a cardiac pacemaker, manufactured by the appellee Medtronic, was inserted in the body of the principal plaintiff, Ernest Eugene Spickes. In 1977 the device proved to be defective, causing Spickes's heartbeat to accelerate. On October 5, 1977, the device was surgically removed and a substitute pacemaker, also made by Medtronic, was inserted in its place. There is no complaint about the performance of the replacement.
On October 28, 1980, more than three years after the surgery, Spickes and his wife brought this action for personal injuries, loss of consortium, and punitive damages resulting from the defective pacemaker. The defendants, Medtronic and the hospital through which the device was sold, pleaded the three-year statute of limitations, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 34-2803 (Supp.1981), and moved for summary judgment, with supporting affidavits. The trial judge granted the motion. The appellants' principal assignment of error is that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Medtronic is estopped to plead limitations.
The plea of estoppel is based on correspondence and telephone conversations between Spickes's original attorney, David H. Williams, and Medtronic's attorney, Reed A. Duthler, who practiced in Minnesota. The motion for summary judgment was supported by Duthler's affidavit, to which were attached copies of all the correspondence. The statute of limitations was never mentioned in the letters. Duthler stated in his affidavit that the statute was not referred to in the telephone conversations until after the time had run. He said he first mentioned the three-year statute in a conversation on October 24, but Williams insisted that the period was five years. In a few minutes Williams called back and admitted that the three-year period was correct, but said he did not think the plea would be successful. This suit was filed four days later.
In response to the plea of limitations the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting that Duthler had stated that there was no question about liability, that the only issue was the amount of money that would adequately compensate Spickes for his damages, and that there was no necessity for Spickes to bring a lawsuit. Duthler's affidavit also denied those assertions. He stated that the possibility of a settlement was discussed, but he did not admit or deny liability, did not promise a settlement, and did not request that a lawsuit be delayed or forgone. On the issue of estoppel no affidavits were filed on behalf of the plaintiffs in response to the motion for summary judgment.
On the basis of Duthler's undisputed statements under oath, the trial court was right in entering the summary judgment. It is now argued that Duthler's assertions were denied in the pleadings and were to some extent questioned by counsel at the hearing...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Martin v. Arthur
...This court has had occasion to discuss the three-year statute of limitations in a product liability case. See Spickes v. Medtronic, Inc., 275 Ark. 421, 631 S.W.2d 5 (1982). In Spickes, a defective pacemaker manufactured by Medtronic was implanted in Spickes in 1975. On October 5, 1977, the ......
-
Adams v. Arthur
...to the appellee hospitals on the appellants' product-liability claims. In so holding, we are also cognizant of Spickes v. Medtronic, 275 Ark. 421, 631 S.W.2d 5 (1982), where this court applied the Product Liability Act's three-year statute of limitations in the context of a product-liabilit......
-
Mulligan v. Lederle Laboratories, Div. of American Cyanamid Co.
...limitations period, the Arkansas Supreme Court without comment cited one of these earlier "accrual" cases. Spickes v. Medtronic, Inc., 275 Ark. 421, 423, 631 S.W.2d 5, 7 (1982), citing Field v. Gazette Publishing Co., 187 Ark. 253, 59 S.W.2d 19 (1933). Our interpretation of Sec. 34-2803 wil......
-
T & T Materials v. Mooney et al
...venue, we would be sanctioning split causes of action which is something we have expressly held we will not do. See Spickes v. Medtronic, 275 Ark. 421, 631 S.W.2d 5 (1982); Lisenby v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 245 Ark. 145, 431 S.W.2d 484 (1968); Eiermann v. Beck, 221 Ark. 138, 252 S.W.2d ......